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Ben Harris 
Opposition in a Changing Political Environment: Leadership 
and the Conservative Party, 1997-2010 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the changing nature of opposition within the British political system 
through a study of the balance of power between the Conservative Party and its leader in 
their most recent period in opposition from 1997 to 2010. A literature on the place of the 
opposition within the British political system was developed as part of post-1945 studies 
of the Westminster Model. However, despite dramatic changes in the political 
environment and the increasing rejection of the Westminster Model, more recent 
discussion has neglected systematic study of opposition. More recent writing on the 
Conservative Party has not been used to examine claims about the changing form and 
function of opposition, but has assumed the importance of the decisions of particular 
actors. In order to study the recent Conservative Party with a view to developing our 
understanding of opposition and the expectations upon its leader, the thesis identifies the 
change in the political environment as central. It suggests dealing with this by utilizing a 
conceptual framework derived from Presidentialisation theory. This offers a 
conceptualisation of the political system as a whole, identifying the increasing 
importance of leadership at its heart. Adapting this to the study of opposition suggests 
examination of three crucial components of leadership activity: the relationship between 
the party and the leader, the place of the leader within general elections and the place of 
the leader and opposition within the wider political environment including executive 
actions. Examination of these areas highlights the substantial ways in which power has 
moved from the leader to the party alongside the additional resources which the leader 
can command. It concludes that whilst the changing political environment may have 
served to make the leader of the opposition appear more powerful and prominent, there 
are significant structural constraints which prevent the exercise of this power. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problematic 
For an organisation that has traditionally been portrayed as the „natural party of 
government‟, the Conservatives‟ spell in opposition from 1997-2010 was unprecedented 
in the modern era. It appeared to many that they had lost their historic skill of winning 
and retaining power, and that there was a significant possibility they might never hold 
office again. At the same time the Conservative Party appeared to struggle with the role 
of being the opposition. In part this may have been because their extended period in 
office from 1979 meant the party was more geared up for governing than opposing. 
However, it was also clear that the changing political environment impacted on the 
activity which the opposition needed to undertake. Just as features such as a rolling news 
cycle and an increasing political focus on the Prime Minister had significant implications 
for the government, so it had implications for what was required from the Conservatives 
to oppose it.  
In recent years an increasingly exclusive focus on the politics of government has led to a 
serious neglect of the opposition in the literature. Further compounding this, despite its 
history of much greater electoral success in the twentieth century, relative to the Labour 
Party, the Conservative Party outside of government has been rather little studied. What 
studies there have been of the recent Conservative period in opposition have focused 
primarily on the individual agents and the interplay between them. This guides much of 
the literature towards a concentration on the problems caused for the Conservatives by 
the incompetence of individual actors and conflicts between them. While this is 
undoubtedly an important facet of the Conservatives‟ experience during this time, it 
pushes into the background consideration of the structural factors that influenced the 
trajectory of the Conservatives during this period. Thus not only institutional constraints 
but the different structures within the wider political environment in which the party 
operated tend to be neglected.  
From this starting point the thesis analyses the Conservative Party from 1997 to 2010 
with the aim of not just understanding the dynamics of that organisation but also with a 
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view to raising questions about the balance of power between the leader and the party, 
the role of opposition in modern politics, and the impact of changes in the political 
environment on the opposition.  
1.2 Research Questions 
These research questions are guided by the problematic, the findings of the literature 
review, and the conceptual framework. They themselves guide the structure of the 
substantive chapters, and inform the data and methods used to answer them. They 
provide more detail about the general questions and themes posed by the problematic, 
about the balance of power within the Conservatives, the role of opposition, and the 
leader of the opposition‟s relationship to changes in the political environment. Different 
chapters and different sections relate to different elements of the structural constraints on, 
and place of the leader of the opposition, as detailed in the problematic. The first 
substantive chapter relates to the balance of power within the Conservatives, as do the 
first two research questions in the second substantive chapter. The last section of the 
second substantive chapter and the third substantive chapter relate to the place of the 
leader of the opposition in British politics, and his relationship to changes in the political 
environment. In the modern political environment, it is difficult to place this period of 
opposition for the Conservatives in context, if we do not consider the inter party 
relationships and the wider place of the leader of the opposition, for they are both 
significant in dictating his place and success. 
 Did the balance of power between the leader of the opposition and the 
Conservative party favour the leader? Did the formal or informal balance of 
power within the Conservatives change in favour of the leader of the opposition, 
and how permanent were these changes between different leaders? Did the leader 
of the opposition claim the political mandate, or were there other figures within 
the Conservatives, or the Conservative party as a whole, able to plausibly claim 
the mandate or water down the leader‟s claim to it? How much power was 
concentrated in the leader of the opposition‟s office - were other figures within 
the Conservatives able to challenge or defy the leader‟s office? 
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 How prominent a role did the leader of the opposition take within general election 
campaigns, and how did it compare to other figures within the Conservatives? 
Has the leader of the opposition become more prominent among the media? Have 
leaders of the opposition had significant effects on the voting intentions of the 
electorate? 
 What techniques did the leader of the opposition use to persuade people they 
empathised with them, and were strong leaders? Did the media create an 
independent leadership dimension? How did the leader of the opposition relate to 
the way internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state was affecting 
the Prime Minister‟s office and the Cabinet, and what place did they have within 
state and international networks? What form of organisation did the leader of the 
opposition use for his own Shadow Cabinet? 
1.3 Rationale and Structure 
This thesis seeks to explain how the structural environment has contributed to the 
trajectory of the Conservatives in opposition from 1997. Doing this will give insight into 
the place of opposition in modern times and the place of the leader within the 
Conservative party. To do this we will use Presidentialisation as a tool for analysing the 
different Conservative leaders of the opposition. Presidentialisation is a theory which has 
had to take account of changes in the political environment, many of which apply to the 
leader of the opposition, the interplay between the leader of the opposition and the office 
of Prime Minister, and the different media and social pressures that the leader of the 
opposition is subjected to, meaning it is suitable as a base for the conceptual framework. 
The thesis contains seven chapters which contribute towards answering the problematic. 
This introductory chapter lays out the general outline of the methodology and framework 
the thesis will use, and the resulting structure. This then leads into two chapters which set 
out the reasons for studying this topic, and the detail of the framework that will be 
employed in answering the problematic. The first of these chapters is the literature 
review. It starts from a concern with the place of the Conservative party in opposition 
and the place of opposition in British politics. The chapter contains a review of literature 
about opposition in British politics, a summation of how the political environment and 
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the main theories about it in Britain have changed, and a review of how the Conservative 
party in opposition since 1997 has been treated by the academic literature. The review 
takes a range of books and journal articles and looks for trends in their treatment of 
opposition, and how these have developed relating to changes in the political 
environment. This chapter aims to put the literature about the Conservative party in 
opposition since 1997 in context and into different schools, to see what different areas 
are extensively covered and which areas could benefit from a different approach. From 
this analysis it was concluded that much of the literature either views the opposition with 
an agent centred mindset (either the leader or other personnel) taking less account of 
structural considerations or either focusing on single leaders, or aspects of the 
Conservatives in opposition. It was therefore concluded that a framework that provided a 
structural analysis of the Conservatives in opposition since 1997 would be able to make a 
contribution to a literature centred around events and agents. 
The third chapter is all about constructing this structural framework. It was concluded 
that Presidentialisation would be the best tool to use in tackling the problematic and the 
research questions. Despite its association with leaders of the executive, 
Presidentialisation is as much, if not more, about structure and the environment that 
politicians work in, making it suitable to apply to opposition in a continually evolving 
political environment, where the leader has to relate closely to other institutions and the 
changing environment. This chapter looks at the development of Presidentialisation as a 
term, the main causes and effects of the concept, and how it could be applied to this 
thesis. It does this by reference to the main works that have developed conceptualisations 
of Presidentialisation, and comparison of their main points. It then goes through each of 
these main points and judges how suitable they are to be applied to a thesis about 
opposition. This chapter finds that there have been three main works that have applied 
theories of Presidentialisation to the British political system. They are by Michael Foley, 
Anthony Poguntke and Paul Webb, and Anthony Mughan. While a large proportion of 
their studies are applied to the Prime Minister and the Executive, they do cover the 
opposition in some ways, and many of their points of analysis are equally applicable to 
the leader of the opposition. In analysing and relating them to the opposition, the chapter 
takes the decision to apply the extensive framework developed by Poguntke and Webb in 
their study of Presidentialisation in western democracies, with the addition of elements 
from Michael Foley‟s The British Presidency. Poguntke and Webb deploy an extensive 
framework which covers four major changes in the political environment, changing 
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media coverage, electoral dealignment, the growing size of the state, and the 
internationalisation of politics, which impact three areas, relations between a leader and 
his party, relations between the leader and the electorate and between the leader and the 
executive. While relations with the executive, the growing size of the state and the 
internationalisation of politics are difficult to directly apply to the leader of the 
opposition, they are still important indirect considerations for the leader of the 
opposition, in that there is still an interest in how the leader of the opposition reacts to 
them. The dealigned electorate, changing media coverage, and changing relations with 
electorate and party can be directly applied to the leader of the opposition. However, 
even after including all of this, we are still missing something, which refers back to the 
opposition‟s interaction with the Prime Minister. This leads us to consider Michael 
Foley‟s conception of leaderland, which is a way of conceptualising how the opposition 
relates to the government and the wider political system, and the environment especially 
- merging it with the conception of the executive to form a concept of the political 
environment, a network of influences that the leader of the opposition can only indirectly 
control, and is often in a reactive pose towards. This section is necessary as it is 
important to take account of the arena of leadership and the Prime Minister when starting 
out with an analysis of opposition, because it is hard to make judgements about the leader 
of the opposition ignoring them. 
Having established this framework, the thesis then moves onto three substantive chapters 
which will follow the framework and provide the base for the conclusions. The first of 
these substantive chapters is based closely upon Poguntke and Webb‟s first „face‟ of 
Presidentialisation, the party face. This is concerned with the balance of power between 
the leader and the party, and specifically whether there has been any move of power 
towards the leader of the Conservative party. This is done through analysis of the formal 
and informal balance of power within the Conservative party, of whether the leader was 
allowed to claim the mandate from the party, and how much power was concentrated 
within the leader‟s office. We gleaned this information through speeches by leaders, 
newspaper reports, and internal party documents. This enables us to construct a clear 
picture of how power has shifted between leader and party. In this chapter we see that 
although there were formal changes to the structure of power within the Conservative 
party that in theory gave the leader of the opposition more power, in reality successful 
usage of these powers depended on the leader maintaining popularity, a clear strategy, 
and stable relations with a volatile party that was able to exploit a greater media 
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preoccupation with „splits‟ to make life awkward for the leader, in a way they had not 
been able to during previous periods of opposition. 
The next chapter deals with the second of Poguntke and Webb‟s „faces‟, the electoral. 
Again, it is centred around the balance of power between the Conservative party and its 
leader. The chapter uses poll data, speeches, newspaper and television coverage to assess 
what the leader of the opposition‟s role was within the campaign compared to other 
Conservatives, how prominent he was within the media, and how much effect leaders of 
the opposition had on the voting intentions of the electorate. Again, the position of the 
leader of the opposition was precarious, with the leader and the party (especially in 2001) 
often reluctant to personalise campaigns. But despite this media coverage and public 
impressions were often personalised around the leader, leading to expectations that were 
not always fulfilled. 
This leads onto the sixth chapter which also covers outside expectations, and the political 
environment. It uses media coverage, speeches, and academic works to look at what 
techniques leaders use to persuade people they emphasised with them, but were at the 
same time strong leaders. Also analysed in this chapter is whether the media created an 
independent leadership dimension. The second part of the chapter is about how the leader 
of the opposition has interacted with the internationalisation of politics and the growth of 
the state, two factors that have affected the Prime Minister. This is where the conceptual 
framework modifies Poguntke and Webb‟s own framework, greatly expanding the 
„executive face‟. This is because of the different starting points of Poguntke and Webb, 
and this thesis. It relates to the „leaderland‟ Michael Foley defines as a separate space 
where leadership becomes an independent issue. This space is made up of the main 
political leaders and is defined in large part by the expectations generated around the 
office of Prime Minister. So Poguntke and Webb, by the nature of their studies which are 
mostly concerned with leaders of the executive, are able to take account of the 
expectations generated by the office, while in this thesis we need to take a broader 
approach that fuses the features of the leader of the opposition in the leadership arena 
with the office of the Prime Minister. Applying the Poguntke and Webb framework as a 
whole would ignore one important difference. Their study is about the leader of the 
executive, not the leader of the opposition. As has been mentioned previously, the main 
task of the leader of the opposition is to win an election and secure the office of Prime 
Minister. Part of leaderland is that the leader of the opposition becomes judged against 
19 
the requirements of the office of Prime Minister. To do this, we need a lot more reference 
to the Prime Minister himself, meaning taking account of both leaders is so important, 
not just seeing things from the perspective of the leader of the opposition. Given the 
importance of the office of Prime Minister to the conception of leaderland and the tactics 
leaders have to use to demonstrate their suitability for the office, it is very hard to 
exclude the Prime Minister and their actions from a study of the leader of the opposition 
in the same way that Poguntke and Webb are able to devote the vast majority of their 
work to leaders of the executive. This section came to the conclusion that the leader of 
the opposition was influenced by the expectations generated by the office of Prime 
Minister, especially what we called the „could you see him as Prime Minister‟ test, and 
struggled to fulfil the requirements of a leadership arena that demanded the ability to 
show strong leadership and still seem a „man of the people‟. The two aspects of 
leadership are separated because it focuses on the interplay between voters and elites 
needing to be persuaded of the concept and a self sustaining leadership arena being 
created. The second section of this chapter was about the way the leader of the opposition 
related to the way the internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state was 
affecting the Prime Minister, and the opposition. It was found that the leader of the 
opposition had a difficult time establishing control over international developments, 
although often it was a tricky area for the Prime Minister as well.  
This then leads to the question of whether this can be done within Poguntke and Webb‟s 
„faces‟, or whether leaderland needs to be given a separate chapter. It is contended that it 
still needs a separate chapter. As has been covered, leaderland is based on an independent 
arena of leadership that revolves around the office of Prime Minister, and therefore 
requires balanced consideration of not just how the leader of the opposition conducts 
himself in this leadership arena, but how he compares to the Prime Minister. Doing this 
within the „faces‟ would over-complicate the framework and make it very difficult to 
operate, and it would take the focus away from the place of the leader of the opposition 
in the Conservative party and the place of opposition in the system. At some points, 
especially in the party and electoral chapters, it would create unwieldy three way 
comparisons between the leader of the opposition, the Conservative party and the Prime 
Minister that would not give firm conclusions.  
The final chapter is all about the conclusions the thesis has drawn, bringing together all 
the material from the substantive chapters and assessing them in light of the framework 
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assessed in terms of the conceptual framework. It finds that the structural place of the 
leader of the Conservative party, was undermined by a party that had become more 
volatile and was empowered by the media to speak up against the leader, although the 
leader personally possessed more formal powers and prominence. This often undermined 
the attempts of leaders to personalise Conservative politics round themselves and take 
power and a mandate over the rest of the party. When they were not able to do this it 
undermined their overall political position, as there was a leadership environment that 
placed great expectations on the leader of the opposition to fulfil multiple leadership 
roles and be seen to fulfil the requirements of the office of Prime Minister. The changing 
structural position of the leader of the Conservative party in opposition has reflected 
higher expectations around the leader of the opposition without much of the increased 
power to the leader from the party that one would think would be entailed.  
1.4 Methods and Methodology 
In outlining the methodology of the thesis, this section will first consider issues in 
general before moving on to consider the individual methods employed by each chapter. 
It uses a wide variety of sources and this requires the use of different methods. Overall, 
the thesis is concerned to investigate the relationship between structures and agency, 
rather than simply assuming that all political activity is the work of individuals by 
asserting that politics is not just the product of agents interacting with each other. It also 
takes the perspective that decision making is shaped by underlying structural imperatives, 
which are not directly observable, and require a degree of analytical interpretation. The 
thesis is also informed by a rejection of the idea that there is a single unilinear 
developmental trajectory which can be established by precise calculations and deductions 
based on quantitative data. Whilst not rejecting quantitative analysis out of hand the 
thesis is primarily concerned with the interpretation of texts to establish meaning. Thus, 
although the thesis makes some use of quantitative material, most is qualitative. The 
sources are primarily biographical books, speeches by Conservative leaders, polling data, 
newspaper articles, internet videos and interviews conducted by the author with 
politicians. Using data from each of these sources requires individual approaches that 
apply to different parts of the thesis.  
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In the body of the thesis the main sources are approached from a number of different 
perspectives. In the first place they are analysed to establish a broad framework of 
events, where the combination of the primary sources of the thesis with the established 
academic literature is of particular significance. The aim of this is in part to outline the 
key features which defined the relationship between the leader and his party, and enable 
us to outline the formal structures of power within the party. The second phase of the 
analysis moves on to develop a clear understanding of the precise motivations and 
meanings of particular actions. Original speeches and interviews with party insiders and 
former leaders are particularly important in this respect in the early stages of the thesis 
where the emphasis is on internal party meanings.  We may know generally what 
happened at certain times, but may require more detail about what happened (say the 
vocabulary of a speech) and why it happened (insider testimony). Using full texts of 
speeches enables us to take the whole of what was said, and can throw different light on 
what may have become consensus or partisan media or party interpretations of key 
speeches. Questioning insiders can also help us probe these assumptions. A similar 
approach is also taken towards the analysis of media, newspaper and archive television 
coverage, for how it presented the leader of the opposition, in terms of headlines, 
television pictures, and narrative. Again the method of working here is highly 
interpretive, comparing and contrasting different coverage of key events.  
The main use of quantitative data relates to the effect of the leader of the opposition on 
voters, where polling data and data from the British Election Studies (BES) are used. By 
nature the mode of working here relies inevitably on statistics and the guidance of the 
BES controlled studies of leader effects. Although this is different in method from the 
approach taken to the other research questions, it is consistent with the general approach 
of the thesis because it remains concerned with issues of interpretation and meaning.  
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2 Review of the Literature about Opposition 
This chapter will conduct a review of the literature on opposition in British politics from 
the post war period onwards. It looks at how opposition has been covered by academic 
writers, and how these authors‟ works have interacted with the political environment of 
the time. The chapter is divided into different sections relating to opposition and the 
changing political environment. The first section focuses on the development of the 
„Westminster Model‟, what implications it had for the conduct of opposition, the place 
opposition itself had carved out within this model, and the main features of it. We then 
move onto a section looking at the development of the British political system, and how 
changes in the political environment threatened the established conventions of the 
Westminster Model. This is followed by a section that reviews the literature written 
about the Conservative party in opposition since 1997, and in what way this literature has 
taken account of the changed political environment and the threats to the Westminster 
Model.  
2.1 The Development of the Westminster Model and Opposition 
The development of political opposition and the Westminster Model have been 
intertwined with each other historically. The Westminster Model was based around the 
fundamental principles of parliamentary sovereignty, and adversarial, competitive 
politics.
1
 These principles governed the development of opposition. Recognition of the 
right of politicians in Parliament to oppose, criticise and seek to replace the government 
emerged between 1721 and 1784. 1826 saw the first recorded use of the term „Her 
Majesty‟s Loyal Opposition‟. 1841 provided the first example of a party taking power 
after winning the election standing as an alternative government. The second Reform Act 
in 1867 ushered in something like the modern organised party, with a need to appeal to 
the greatly expanded electorate. By the late 19
th
 Century it had become common practice 
for leaders defeated in the election to come together as an informal committee to discuss 
parliamentary and political tactics, and this process developed, with both parties formally 
appointing advisory committees to the leader. In the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937 the 
opposition was formally recognised, officially institutionalizing opposition within the 
                                                 
1
 Mark Bevir, „The Westminster Model, Governance and Judicial Reform‟, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 
61(4), (2008), p.561. 
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British political system. In 1955 Clement Atlee appointed a Shadow Cabinet of Ministers 
shadowing the government‟s responsibilities and Ministers underneath them shadowing 
the responsibilities of Junior Ministers. Since then it has become commonplace for the 
Leader of the Opposition to appoint a Shadow Cabinet closely mirroring the division of 
responsibilities amongst the Cabinet, that looked very much like a „Shadow 
Government‟.  Since 1975, opposition received „Short Money‟ from government which it 
could nominally use to research topics relating to government. This gradual recognition 
of the place of opposition had occurred within the Parliamentary system, and the 
Westminster Model. The House of Commons showed the “clearest evidence of the 
special role of the opposition” in its privileges in debates, committees and short money, 
all of which made the opposition party recognisably a shadow government, and militated 
against smaller parties. Opposition had been “institutionalised within the parliamentary 
system as an alternative government and this defines a set of roles which the principal 
party opposed to the majority in office is expected to perform."
2
 Opposition was 
recognised by the state, adversarial and acting as a „Shadow Government‟. But what 
place did this concept of opposition have within the study of British politics? 
The concept has been more important to British politics than in many other polities, 
precisely because of how it developed within Parliament. In lots of other countries, there 
does not exist an official opposition at all, let alone one based so closely and extensively 
around the government. The system was defined by parties, and conflict within the 
parameters of the constitutional system. It relied on “coherent and essentially unified 
parties” that do not work together in any substantive way, but presented competing 
alternative political visions. 
3
 Opposition in Britain was “institutionalised for the modern 
electorate as the standing possibility of an alternative government to replace the one in 
power.” Such a competitive, adversarial system had “necessarily encouraged and 
sustained a two party system.” Chief among the roles that the parties were expected to 
fulfil was the way they were supposed to oppose, to attack most of the government‟s 
activities and policies, not find consensus with the government. It had helped embed a 
highly adversarial kind of politics that tended to exaggerate disagreement, and disregard 
small parties, but at the same time had been remarkably effective in enabling the 
electorate to change the government, and prevent oligarchies developing. When the 
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system worked as advocates of the Westminster model believed it would, producing 
frequent alteration in office between the two main parties, then it could be “taken to 
mean that the opposition has successfully discharged a function of governing control,” 
and that they had enabled a large part of the electorate to believe elections were a real 
opportunity to take part in choosing the next government.
4
 Most voters thought they had 
a stake in the system. The Westminster Model had been a great influence on the way the 
opposition conducted its politics, and in turn the opposition had been an important part of 
the model, and in fact was integral to it. The style of opposition in Britain would not have 
been possible without the political environment that existed. It was a two-way 
relationship, as opposition had also become an important part of the system that sustained 
it, and helped to hold up some of the key aspects of the system that were supported by 
the shape of the surrounding political environment. The literature about opposition 
demonstrated this by reflecting and linking closely to the political environment that the 
opposition existed in. The model was sustained by the nature of society around 
Parliament. It was characterised by heavy class and as a result, party alignment. Parties 
were so important in “giving meaning to contests in individual parliamentary 
constituencies in Britain that for many voters candidates have no identities other than 
their partisan one.”5 The „big two‟ Conservative and Labour parties gained 
overwhelming majorities of the vote, and the adversarial debate amongst them dominated 
most political discourse.  
Much of the literature about opposition in the post-war period reflects an environment 
that was able to sustain a class based, strong, two party system. Many of the works share 
a similar appreciation of the structure of the British political system and oppositions‟ 
place in it. Perhaps the phrase which most encapsulates this conception of a system is by 
Allen Potter, „opposition with a capital O‟. Potter meshes most of the features of the 
post-war system and the Westminster Model that were detailed above, into a conception 
of opposition in Britain. Increasingly the leader of the opposition was being treated as 
“Her Majesty's alternative Prime Minister.” He took account of the large social and class 
cleavages in British society and how this affected voting, and then the extra 
parliamentary forms of opposition that were starting to develop in Britain. Porter was 
mainly dismissive of these 'oppositions with a little o', saying that they would be able to 
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achieve little of their aims, and that opposition in Great Britain “is by politicians, offering 
an alternative government in accordance with the conventions of the parliamentary 
system - opposition with a capital O”.6 The opposition was clearly identifiable, and 
situated within Parliament, which became the main area of focus for politics. It was a 
politics that was defined by the social and economic cleavages in society, which had 
created a party system based around them. Although there was some discussion about the 
increased role and prominence of the leader of the opposition, it was clear that the 
position of the leader was constrained by the conventions of the parliamentary system, 
and the large social and class cleavages that affected voting. They dominated the conduct 
of politics for the opposition, as in a system governed by these cleavages it was 
instrumental for parties to associate themselves with class blocs. When the actual 
activities of the opposition were studied, it was found they were very much influenced by 
the environment, and the features of the Westminster Model. The opposition was 
portrayed in these studies as “office seeking, loyal, single party, Parliamentary.”7 Two 
clusters of opinion competing for parliamentary supremacy was absolutely central for the 
system to work, for just having one cluster meant that it would not have worked at all, 
while more than two would have made the system unstable. Opposition was important to 
upholding the system. 
But the integral place of the opposition in Parliament did not mean the leader of the 
opposition was seen to have great power himself, and he was actually quite constrained 
by his MPs. The leader of the opposition was not at the apex of as many institutions as 
the Prime Minister was. He was in command of relatively little, and was forced by the 
essentially parliamentary nature of opposition to continually react to what the 
government was doing. It was very little institutional power with comparatively large 
amounts of responsibility. The Conservative leader, in opposition and in government, 
was charged with the “sole ultimate responsibility” for the Conservative electoral 
programme and policies, and traditionally was seen as presiding over the party with 
relative impunity.
 
 But in times of opposition the party still retained the option of 
rebellion in Parliament which would embarrass the leader. Looking at it this way, 
McKenzie deduced that the powers of the Conservative leader were “more precarious 
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and less invulnerable,” than may have seemed on an initial analysis.8 The theoretical 
absolute power which the Conservative leader possessed, could in most realistic 
circumstances, not be employed, as the threat of a revolt from within the party, especially 
from within the body of MPs,  had to be balanced against the nature and amount of 
power the leader exercised, and his general political direction. Although a leader could 
sometimes rise above them, MPs retained absolute decisive power as a group, and any 
leadership policy had to first and foremost start from a base of satisfying their MPs. This 
shows the prevailing treatment of leaders by academia. Although they were prominent, 
they were not regarded in the same way as US Presidential candidates, largely 
independent of party. They were creatures produced by a party in a sovereign Parliament, 
and their political futures depended largely upon what they did in that Parliament. 
In practice there was little that even the most charismatic leader could do to rise above 
the party because of the hold the Westminster Model had over the political environment. 
Perceptions of a leader were nowhere near as big an influence on voters as perceptions of 
their party. Voters‟ perceptions of a leader were at best marginal to the political and 
electoral process, and ultimate political power therefore rested in the hands of party 
institutions. As it was the leader could not show he was more important than the party to 
electoral victory. Government largely controlled the domestic agenda and the nature of 
politics - it was governments that controlled the major power resources, and it was up to 
them to lose an election, not the opposition to win it.
 The opposition were on the “outside 
looking in”.9 This was despite the fact more people as politics entered the 1960s were 
seeing the leaders through Television. But if the personality of the individual leading the 
office was increasing in importance, this was only to a point. The actual campaigns in the 
1950s and early 1960s, were issue dominated, and it was said that the notion that the 
election was a choice between rival political teams or leaders was pushing things too far. 
Even if attention was turning away from specific policies as determinants of voting 
behaviour, “people were voting for the parties much more than for their leaders.” Leaders 
were little utilised in any of the parties‟ posters or television broadcasts. 10 Class was still 
the most important determinant of voting behaviour in what was a relatively rigid 
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electorate.
11
 Although a leader of the opposition could be viewed as an alternative Prime 
Minister, he or she found they were in a relatively weak position to influence events, and 
impose their personality on politics in the style of an American presidential candidate. 
Most political attention was focused on Parliament and the institutions the government 
controlled. Political coverage of Parliament gave much attention to other political actors 
as well as the leaders.  
A conception of opposition highly centred around the Westminster Model gained such 
widespread recognition in academia and had become the established standard, that there 
was little attempt to move beyond it to a new conception of opposition. This meant that 
Dahl‟s work from the 1960s had remained a largely unchallenged reference point for the 
study of opposition, and most subsequent works shared his focus on Parliamentary 
opposition.
12
 This met with the environment of the day, although as we shall see it is a 
conception which does not fit as neatly to a changed environment today. This respect for 
the Westminster Model was also seen internationally, and this has continued through to 
the modern day. Although some international commentators found the „yah-boo‟ element 
of British politics puzzling, many international political scientists still saw the model as 
the “basis and epitome of western democracy thanks to the way it facilitates peaceful 
government succession.” The “greatest common denominator of western democracies” 
was the recognition and integration of the opposition into the parliamentary and 
institutional system that revolved around a “fundamental axis” of competition between 
the government majority and the opposition in Britain.
13
 But overall, despite the seeming 
hegemony of this model, there were criticisms emerging, which will form the basis of our 
next section. Although analysis of opposition by political scientists had a long tradition, 
many complained that it had been an “inadequately explored” concept, with much of the 
existing analysis concentrating on the outcomes of legal processes, not behaviour of the 
opposition as a political actor, and advanced less than other factors.
14
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Respect for the Westminster Model dictated the style, tone and above all content of the 
various literatures written about the opposition. It dictated the areas of inquiry, and 
limited the space for independent action that the leader of the opposition had. But what 
was this environment? British politics was an adversarial form of politics between two 
main parties. Voting, and many policies, were class based. Other prominent figures in 
politics enjoyed nearly as much media coverage as the leaders of parties. The bulk of the 
literature was therefore centred on parties and as such did not make the analysis of the 
leader their main focus. Sections that deal with the outside elements, such as the media or 
elections, were briefer than the sections on party which were much more exhaustive. The 
emphasis was still more on the power structure within parties and within the 
parliamentary system, than outside them. But while these works do not show much 
concern with areas outside parties, by doing this they reflect many of the priorities of the 
age. The literature reflected the stability and hegemony of the Westminster model, of 
which opposition was an integral part. And yet it was a hegemony that would be 
challenged by developments in the political environment, and in academia. 
2.2 Challenges to the Westminster Model 
This section deals with the challenges to the Westminster Model, and the place of 
opposition within it. The environment that sustained the Westminster Model did not last, 
and as it changed there began to be fissures in the Westminster Model that showed how 
intertwined it had been with the political environment. In turn this led to a challenge by 
academia to the fundamental precepts of the Model. In this section we explore the main 
changes in the political environment, how they impacted upon the Westminster Model, 
and their implications for opposition.  
2.2.1 Changes in the Electorate 
The shape of the electorate had been a crucial sustaining factor of the Westminster 
Model. Two blocs of partisan and identified voters, broadly split by class, sustained the 
two main parties in hegemonic positions. The fact that there were enough floating voters 
in the middle to occasion frequent changes of government between the two main parties 
meant that there was a mix of stability and promise in the system, stability in that 
regional and class factors dictated that there were a multitude of safe seats for the two 
main parties, and promise because there were enough floating voters for both parties to 
29 
harbour realistic chances of winning, and voters realised this. But this perception was not 
sustained throughout the 1980s, as Margaret Thatcher racked up comfortable majorities 
(including a landslide victory in 1983) and a third party, the Alliance of SDP/Liberals, 
gained serious amounts of voters (although not seats) in 1983 gaining a near identical 
vote percentage to Labour. Even a closer election in 1992 did not prevent informed 
speculation that Labour had no hope of winning power again, and that the Conservatives 
would maintain effective one party rule. 
15
 Even after Labour then won by a landslide in 
1997, and won two elections subsequently, it did not then prevent despairing speculation 
amongst Conservatives that then they would never be able to return to government 
because of changes in Britain and the colonisation of the centre ground by New Labour.
16
 
The „equilibrium‟ of regular changes in government had been replaced by starker shifts 
to long periods of domination by one of the main parties. This had immediate 
consequences for the opposition, as it undermined their claim to be part of a system 
where most felt they had a genuine chance to vote in a change of government. The fact 
that this no longer seemed realistic meant that all sorts of other institutions were suddenly 
claimed to be the „real opposition‟, some outside Parliament - the media, business, trade 
unions, pressure groups and so on. The threat from the third party was felt acutely by the 
two main parties. But what was underlying the more volatile behaviour of the electorate? 
It had origins in the process of electoral de-alignment, which had been first mooted in the 
1970s. Some academics theorised that class no longer „froze‟ the electorate to the point 
where the election winner would be determined by who mobilised the most supporters 
from „their‟ class base. Short-term influences were becoming a far greater and potent 
influence on the electorate than the “persisting social structure of society.”17 Previous 
class and family based voting was being split up as people moved around more, and 
traditional industries that sustained class consciousness began to decline.
18  
Relationships 
between an individual‟s social class and their voting behaviour, while still existing, were 
carrying far less weight than before. More voters were „up for grabs‟ by either of the 
main parties, with less firm partisan support than previously.
19
 Butler and Stokes thought 
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that this was down to a new generation of voters, brought up in a more affluent, less class 
conscious environment then their ancestors.
20
 Partisan dealignment became a much more 
popular part of the academic literature in the 1980s. Richard Rose claimed that the 
electorate was “wide open to change” - according to his figures three quarters of the 
electorate were no longer tied to a single party determined by family and class.
21
 Class 
based voting began to fragment, with the „wrong‟ class supporting the „wrong‟ party, 
voting based on their interests and concerns. But why had the previously hegemonic 
system of two parties supported by class blocs become more fragmented? In the 1980s, 
as the Labour party split, the correlation between increasing government unpopularity 
and increasing opposition popularity had began to decline, with Thatcher winning 
elections through a recession and over three million unemployed.
22
 The changes in the 
British electorate, which had gained popular attention by the 1980s, were labelled as 
moving from 'opposition with a capital O' to a „fragmented opposition‟, where parties 
had to appeal to floating voters, not the traditional blocs. Thatcher was able to convert a 
great number of the C2 class, traditional Labour voters, to vote Conservative. The 
reasons for the decline in class as an indicator of voting were many. It was said it was 
down to the way class was less important in determining life chances, new post-industrial 
social cleavages, the increased popularity of single issue movements, values cross cutting 
the importance of class, and a growing middle class.
23
 However not all of the literature 
agreed that this would mean leadership would become a more prominent factor for 
voters, with even works that thought that class alignment was declining saying that other 
factors were more important to voting. But leaders were featured more in parts of the 
academic literature. A look at the standard Nuffield election review texts shows the 
incorporation of electoral dealignment into the analysis of parties and the meshing of 
leader activities, the media and party strategy. Their review of the 1983 election which 
returned Thatcher to power is a contrast to earlier reviews. A major part was how “one 
figure stood dominant” - Thatcher - and this showed that the “traditional bases of the 
British party system and of British political ideas were in ferment.”24 Voting had become 
less class based and more volatile, shown by polls taken during the 1979-1983 
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Parliament. Even though Thatcher was not overwhelmingly liked, her strong leadership 
was valued by voters and crucial to her positioning of herself. She also benefited from 
her image as an outsider to the Conservative party, and her better use of modern 
marketing techniques than the Labour leader Michael Foot. She “became the main bearer 
of the Conservative message.”25 But leaders had certainly not assumed a hegemonic 
position over parties. Although leaders were being perceived by the electorate in an 
increasingly personalised way, they were “easily outweighed by other issues and events 
of concern to the public, including the movements of the economy.”26 If the 1983 
election was a powerful demonstration of the tendencies in the electorate which had been 
„bubbling under‟, then they were tendencies which did not go quiet throughout the 
following decades. A lot was made of how a new Labour leader needed to capture the 
new dealigned voters with more aspirational policies. Although they did not win an 
election during the 1980s, the progress of the Labour party was indicative of the changed 
landscape politicians had to interact with. After Foot‟s disastrous campaign in which he 
had been thoroughly „out marketed‟ by Thatcher, his successor, Neil Kinnock, took a 
very different approach, personalising the 1987 election around himself, and attempting 
to recognise some of the aspirations of Thatcher‟s new voters. Blair had great success in 
winning over these voters and „Middle England‟. The rise of Blair created an interest in 
Conservative leaders‟ need to win back the liberal, educated Middle Class, whose bonds 
of party loyalty were seen as very weak.
27
 The notion of „floating voters‟ and capturing 
them was a key part of the political discourse. The idea that an election was for the 
government to lose began to be challenged. More recent studies referred to the need for a 
unified, electorally appealing, politically renewed and credible opposition party before 
the government could be defeated at an election.
28
 As we shall see in our section about 
the Conservative party since 1997, these changes in the electoral environment have 
continued and even intensified.  
2.2.2 Valence Politics and the ‘Centre Ground’ 
The new shape of the electorate also threatened to have a profound effect on what the 
purpose of a political party was. Elections under the old political environment had been 
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mainly judged through the Downsian modal, where voters cast their vote based on an 
analysis of what party was closest to them on a right/left continuum.
29
 Increasingly, as 
parties needed to be seen as united around a strong leader, and „extreme‟ policies were 
„exposed‟ and whipped up into intra-party rows by a sceptical media, fundamental ideas 
or discrete policies where the public took different sides -„position‟ issues- became more 
difficult for the system to accommodate. Valence issues became more important, where 
voters largely agreed on the desirable ends to be pursued, such as economic growth, or 
reducing crime, and judged the parties on their relative competence to achieve the desired 
ends, or evaluated the performance of government in achieving them.
30
 An important sub 
element of this model was the way parties could benefit differentially from the „salience‟ 
of particular issues. This referred to the importance they were regarded with by voters, 
and meant a key part of party competition was to impose their issue agendas upon „rival‟ 
issue agendas, and move „their‟ issues up the „pecking order‟.31 Valence politics had 
made the party leadership crucial, as it took away many of the unique selling points of 
parties (their ideologies) and made the leaders more prominent.
32
 Three factors had 
coincided to make valence politics possible - the significance of judgement and 
competence ratings, the decline in association with left and right among the public, and 
the perceived convergence of the main parties. In addition, this occurred at a time of 
gradual consensus among the voters.
33
 As people lost interest in politics, it made 
increasing sense to use the leaders in a heuristic fashion, as cognitive shortcuts, letting 
the public judge the rival leadership teams on their integrity and judgement.
34
 It was 
argued that valence politics had helped put Blair and Labour in such a dominant electoral 
position, for on arguably the most important valence politics issue of all, the economy, 
Labour had an apparent record of continuous success that was very hard for the 
Conservatives to refute in a simple way.
35
 There also existed an issue agenda where 
„Labour‟ issues such as health and education were ranked by the public above 
„Conservative‟ issues like immigration or Europe. Of course there has been debate about 
whether such valence politics was really new, but what was beyond question was that it 
faced less opposition from an ideological conception of British politics, which was firmly 
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receding by the New Labour era. The end of the ideological era in British politics seemed 
to have heralded a new era of politics based on competence, a drier form of politics that 
rested less on ideas than ability to govern, and had a lot more time for leaders than 
ideology.  
2.2.3 Changing Media Coverage 
If the nature of the electorate that the parties were trying to garner votes from had 
changed, then it meant that the methods parties used to appeal to them, and the way the 
media covered them, had changed immensely as well. The changing role of the media 
was taken in confluence with the changing electorate to provide a set of reasons why the 
parties should follow a new model of relations with the electorate. During the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s, the style and content of media coverage changed significantly. 
Although television has been traditionally „blamed‟ for the change, we will see that the 
changes also occurred in other sections of the media like newspapers. This necessitated a 
different style for politicians in dealing with the media. 
Through the decades, television displaced newspapers as the place most people went for 
political news. But although television had been around in the post war years, it had 
changed from the 1960s onwards. Political coverage had been deferential, mostly about 
policies, and gave politicians the chance to put their point of view across unhindered. But 
from the 1960s onwards, a new generation of interviewers were more challenging of 
politicians, confronting them about the deficiencies or inconsistencies in what they were 
doing. Today there is a generation of interviewers who are adept at „catching them out‟. 
This scepticism has not just been confined to interviewers - especially since the „era of 
spin‟ under Tony Blair, news organisations have taken a much more sceptical tone to 
coverage and analysis, with promises to „fact check‟ politicians.36 News broadcasts 
frequently now give much more broadcast time to reporters‟ interpretation of what was 
said than the delivery of the speeches themselves. Rarely will politicians speak without 
their motives, strategy and what they „are not saying‟ being questioned.37 This practice is 
used on 24 hour news channels, alongside the more comprehensive coverage they are 
able to give to speeches and press conferences. These rolling news channels have also 
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encouraged the development of „instant‟ or „rapid rebuttal‟, where scandals or differences 
between the parties are constantly fed by new statements during the day. Despite the 
televising of Parliament in the 1980s, and the establishment of a 24 hour parliamentary 
channel, it has struggled to keep up with television‟s heuristic focus on leaders, and 
Prime Ministers Questions is often the only time Parliament makes TV news 
independently, aside from close votes, which have become rarer, though not extinct, in 
an era of larger majorities.  On mainstream television, there has been the most visible 
demonstration of the personalisation of politics as leaders appear on „light entertainment‟ 
shows and take questions from members of the public, and will even debate each other. 
Because of the way TV coverage of politics was filmed, it had more of an immediate 
impact on viewers than reading a political story in a newspaper. Close ups and reaction 
shots elicited more personal reactions from viewers.
38
 With the „dis-engaged‟ part of the 
electorate increasing, the onus was on parties and the media to „dumb down‟ coverage in 
an attempt to communicate politics to them. Most commentators decried this, with only a 
minority view holding that „dumbing down‟ political coverage was an essential part of 
engaging an apathetic audience.
39
 Broadcasters and print journalists felt a need to move 
coverage away from an increasingly unpopular Westminster, but instead of replacing this 
with more coverage of regulators, quangos and international institutions, they focused on 
human interest stories, which tended to obscure „big-picture‟ arguments over policy even 
more.
40
 Stories did not truly dominate unless they could be moulded round a personal 
angle, or a threat to the individual viewer.
41
 The way leaders were treated highlighted a 
smaller boundary between the public and private, with obstinately private matters being 
used to judge leaders that would probably never have been reported in the post war era.
42
 
The media had not passively accepted the parties‟ attempts to dominate the dissemination 
of messages, and became more aggressive itself. The tabloid press have exhibited a 
fascination with using leaders as heuristic shortcuts, and the „personal‟, not political 
aspects of leadership. More worryingly, for many, the broadsheet papers have exhibited 
similar tendencies. By the turn of the millennium, the days when papers would publish 
reams of reports about the events, debates and speeches within Parliament on dedicated 
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Parliamentary pages had long gone. Politics still got in the broadsheets, but the style of 
the coverage was more centred around opinion, and heuristic shortcuts. The print press 
severely reduced its reporting of process and procedure, favouring an approach which 
prioritised hunting in packs for scandal, dealing with big issues in great detail for a short 
time, and increasingly allowing comment to seep into the news in the manner of 
tabloids.
43
 An intra party row may be reported one day as if it would have seismic 
consequences, then completely forgotten a day or two later.
44
 One commentator said 
there had been an evolution of politicians and the media from the age of deference to 
journalistic disdain and the age of contempt.
 45
 Its scepticism meant that often the media 
was not reporting on politics, but being an active participant in it, increasing the 
“dependency of both politicians and voters on the media and the messages they 
provide.”46  
The changes in the media put a different onus on the parties and the leaders in the way 
they conducted election campaigns. If the existing forms of parliamentary politics were 
not getting through to as many of the public, then parties and leaders needed to do 
something different, publicise themselves to the floating voters, and the more diverse 
range of media outlets. To do this they brought in a set of professionals, many of whom 
had become established in the marketing industry, not politics, and did not much care for 
waging great ideological and philosophical campaigns. The „marketing‟ of candidates, 
often treated with suspicion by academics and politicians, was now taken seriously and 
had been turned into a new area of analysis. Indeed politicians, from a sceptical position 
about the ethics of such practices, now had embraced technology and often were at the 
sharp end of new technologies, because they perceived them to be a competitive 
advantage in winning elections, and could not afford to ignore them.
47
 The use of 
marketing itself was nothing new in modern politics but it had intensified due to the 
contextual environment of realigning and dealigning voter bases and more sophisticated 
media technology.
48
 Political marketing was not just “purely about the use of sales 
techniques in election campaigns” but something that was integral to the conduct of 
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politics.
49
 There were three types of options for parties - to become a product, sales, or 
market oriented party. A product oriented party develops policies internally and then 
argues their merits to the voters, with the policies defining the party. The sales oriented 
party uses communication techniques from the business world to sell policies to voters, 
recognising this is electorally necessary, but still developing those policies internally, 
albeit with the help of market intelligence. The market oriented party was totally 
different however. It used information on voters‟ preferences to design a product that will 
satisfy voters‟ demands, meet their needs, be supported and implemented by the party, 
and deliverable in government.
50
 They do not “attempt to change what people think, but 
to deliver what they need and want.” Activities of this nature, such as Blair‟s „New 
Labour‟ project, led to accusations that politics was just being treated as a material 
commodity. This meant politics would become less about rhetoric and more about 
cultural empathetic performances.
51
 Some insisted that „market testing‟ devices like 
focus groups, actually increased democracy and showed that the parties were listening to 
the public. But this ignored the fact that they were not open to all - only a few „tactically 
important‟ voters would have the (mis)fortune of having the opportunity to participate in 
a focus group. They were potentially valuing the opinions of a minority, inhibiting 
democratic debate and depoliticising politics.
52
 There was a danger as well that the 
parties, by targeting the more apathetic floating voters, would overlook their own voters, 
precipitating a breakdown of the relationship with party loyalists and threatening the long 
term future of these parties, possibly meaning they had to re-orient themselves to become 
sales oriented parties again.
53
  
As elections, and indeed politics, became a subset of the brand positioning of politicians 
and parties, political marketing techniques gradually spread their tentacles beyond 
election times. Margaret Thatcher had been portrayed as a strong leader at election times, 
but efforts to present her in this light did not just stop when she was Prime Minister. The 
efforts to portray Tony Blair as an „ordinary kind of guy‟ were a great concern at most 
times for Labour. Professionals continually agonised about the right way to present 
Gordon Brown. It often presented competing, and sometimes contradictory, imperatives 
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that leaders have to fulfil. In leadership studies there had been a tendency detected 
whereby leaders in Western democracies, particularly in the US, had had to develop 
skills similar to actors, because they were faced by a dual construct of public opinion. A 
sizable majority of the public claimed that they disliked fakery, yet a large majority also 
insisted that their political leaders were able to project “warmth, strength, likeability and 
relaxed sincerity.” Leaders had to carefully hone their self-promoting, likeability and 
leadership attributes while at the same time trying not to show that they were doing this 
as much as possible, and that it was all somehow „natural‟.54 A by-product of this mode 
of operating was the notion of the „permanent campaign‟. As the political marketing 
model held that the election would merely be the culmination of years of effort in 
successfully placing the party in a position to best satisfy the requirements of the 
consumer, then there was a „permanent campaign‟, with the main parties attempting to 
ascertain and then appeal to the wants and needs of consumers, gradually building up this 
reputation over time. Governments concentrated on the business of „relationship 
marketing‟, which for companies was the practice of maintaining customers‟ brand 
loyalty between purchases. However, this did not necessarily take account of the 
different context of governing and how a party would still relate to members and 
ideology. Critics maintained that political marketing was far too close to the methods 
applied in business, and was inappropriate to politics, especially the business of 
government. Political parties were criticised for being controlled by polls, focus groups 
and marketing professionals. 
55
 
2.2.4 The Decline of Parliament 
The end of an ideological style of politics, and the increasing importance of competence 
in government and dealings in international politics, threatened the place of parliament. 
No longer could it convincingly claim to be the fulcrum of debate and politics in Britain. 
Parliament could not hope to control the more complicated strands of international 
politics, governance and finance.
56
 Another threat to this reputation was parliament‟s 
declining power over government. With governments in the 1980s having large 
majorities, and the party whip being so effective on a body of MPs that was gradually 
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becoming less independent and more careerist, there were fewer close votes and 
government bills rejected. There was a view that Parliament was beginning to become 
irrelevant, a debating chamber that was a sideshow to the real business of politics. It was 
derided as “not fit for purpose,” parliamentary sovereignty now being a myth in a 
Parliament that contained fewer politicians with a philosophy beyond climbing the 
ministerial ladder.
57
 As well as having less power, the British political elite had become 
far less respected, especially affecting Parliament, which the public were far less 
interested and knowledgeable about.
58
 A series of scandals had undermined the 
reputation of parliament, while the institution had been criticised for its outdated 
practices on hours, speaking and expenses. The expenses controversy set the whole of the 
political class against taxpayers, as the incidences of expenses fiddles had been so 
widespread as to significantly undermine trust in MPs.
59
 Recently there has been growing 
public disdain for what was a political class that seemed more obsessed with centrism 
and winning the day‟s tactical battles than fixing British politics. Politicians were 
variously accused of following, not leading, public opinion, exploiting their families, 
undermining institutions, group thinking, speaking their own private language, and then 
deploying populism and correctness to masquerade as the „masses‟.60 The way opposition 
worked within Parliament had also begun to change. In modern political conditions the 
control functions of the opposition had to be exercised in constant public confrontation 
with the government, not in parliamentary business. In practice public confrontation had 
to be extended to the media, which of course had broadened its coverage of politics way 
beyond parliament.
61
 The media had now become the unofficial forum for interrogating 
politicians and making announcements.
62
 What the opposition was doing outside of 
Parliament became increasingly important to their success. Personality, and the politics 
of presentation and conflict drove communication activity, Parliament had not been very 
effective at promoting itself in the media against personality, while the media had not 
made a comprehensive element to present Parliament‟s legislative and scrutiny 
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functions.
63
 There were new incentives for oppositions - winning Parliamentary battles 
and debates would now struggle to capture the media agenda or public attention, making 
candidates outside Parliament much more important. This would only change at 
infrequent „set-piece‟ occasions when the government had a small majority or lots of 
rebels, and there was a big issue at stake, like over the Maastricht Treaty, or Iraq.  
2.2.5 The Retrenchment of the Westminster Model 
The developments that are detailed above conflict with the central properties of the 
Westminster Model that we detailed in the last section, and by themselves were taking 
the centre of politics away from where it had been under the Westminster Model. The 
movement against the Westminster Model gathered pace in academia throughout the 
1980s. There was a „repositioning‟ of opposition and its place within the model, as many 
commentators began to re-evaluate the traditional British model which had often seen 
regular changes of government.
64
 There were wider changes in academia that meant the 
study of purely British politics was becoming less popular, with comparative and 
international studies including Britain increasingly taking their place, and squeezing 
coverage of the Westminster Model.
65
 New models like the networked governance model 
had exposed the limitations of the Westminster Model, and Parliamentary Sovereignty.
66
 
The EU especially had changed the Westminster Model fundamentally.
67
 The amount of 
legislation that the EU started passing in the 1990s, which was often not scrutinised by 
the House of Commons, challenged Parliamentary sovereignty. The Thatcher years had 
led the Westminster Model to be rethought, and the damage done to the reputation of the 
Westminster model by the governance thesis, expressed in the differentiated polity 
model, offering a view of British politics as based around policy networks, power 
dependencies and exchange relationships.  Some thought this supplanting had been down 
to the deficiencies of the Westminster Model, and its “central concern with examining 
the narrow mechanics of British central Government,” producing “highly static, overly 
empiricist and largely descriptive accounts of formal institutional processes and political 
behaviour,” with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Civil Service and the workings of 
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Parliament to the fore.”68 In more recent times the Westminster Model has acted as what 
one commentator called a “smokescreen for changes in electoral politics” where people 
did not realise the irony of relating tales of the Blair presidency, while at the same time 
portraying British governance as fragmented with several decision makers. 
Presidentialism was the „smokescreen‟ that preserved the fiction of the Westminster 
Model, behind which there was widespread acceptance of the governance narrative. The 
government had been said to have pursued a governance narrative in practice, governing 
through networks, while leading in a presidential fashion.  But even after the Blair years, 
respected commentators like Lord Norton called for a return to the Westminster model.
69
 
The idea that the actions and fortunes of the government were dictated by the opposition, 
that had held sway under the Westminster Model, was at odds with modern 
developments. Modern commentators like Heppell outlined six factors why a 
government could lose an election, with the dependant variable being whether there was 
the evolution of a universally appealing, renewed and credible opposition.
70
 The 
opposition was not necessarily just a passive observer as it had been under the 
Westminster Model. 
This sums up the way literature on opposition progressed from the post war period to the 
1990s. The post war literature had been heavily influenced by the political environment 
that existed around it, of a two party politics defined by class, and dominated on many 
levels by parties. But changes which had arguably started in the 1960s, and become most 
apparent in the 1980s and 1990s, had called this system into question. With a dealigning 
electorate, the dominance of the parties in the media and among the electorate could not 
be taken for granted. What these changes seemed to do was threaten the old mode of 
British politics, and by definition opposition. It had rested on the twin pillars of party 
primacy in politics and elections, and two blocs of class and social based voting. There 
was a different way in which the media treated parties and leaders, and a process of 
electoral dealignment which had become increasingly apparent in the 1980s, with both 
changes being long-lasting and durable. But while this had been recognised, it had led to 
a varied series of debates, many of which did not directly influence opposition, and 
which did not attempt to unify the changes which had taken place in British politics. No 
major unifying theory had filled the gap, with discussions being mostly centred on the 
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governance thesis. But, while dealing with many of the questions of procedure and policy 
the old style of literature liked, they did not engage with many of the new developments. 
In our analysis of the literature on opposition, we have seen that the post war literature 
was biased towards the structural and institutional effects of opposition. They are system 
based accounts, and the system they draw out is an adversarial one that divides most 
questions into two competing views. But the effects of electoral dealignment especially, 
have served to question this conception of opposition, as have long periods of one party 
rule. They have also introduced new ways of working that draw the analysis of 
opposition away from processes and institutions. These changes in working have made 
the Westminster Model harder to maintain in its existing form. The unabashed 
parliamentary sovereignty that it had been based upon was being challenged. The decline 
in the amount of attention given to parliament was a cause and effect of parliament‟s 
declining reputation. Declining amounts of the public paid attention to, or respected, 
Parliament, and the accusation was that Parliament was greatly unrepresentative. Greater 
power in the hands of global traders and the EU meant that Parliament was not even in 
control of large amounts of the laws and politics of Britain. The changes in the political 
environment and the place of Parliament and the Westminster Model raises questions 
about how opposition would work under the new dispensation. In the next section we 
look at the literature about the most recent party in opposition, the Conservatives since 
1997, look at the main themes of this literature and how they have related to the changed 
political environment.  
2.3 The Conservatives in Opposition Since 1997 
So far, we have looked at the way opposition developed in Britain, how it evolved and 
how it came to be seen as an integral part of the „Westminster Model‟, the British two 
party system, and the political environment which sustained it. We have also seen that 
there have been changes in the elements of the political environment that sustained the 
Westminster Model. Now we will move onto the literature that covers the Conservative 
party since it has been in opposition since 1997, whether this literature has reflected the 
changes in the political environment and how interested they are in the study of 
opposition. Especially in the initial years of the Conservatives being in opposition, there 
was not a great amount of literature produced about them. This has changed since the 
Conservatives have looked more likely to be elected under David Cameron, but there is 
42 
still less literature written about the opposition than the government. Most accounts are 
not centred around “conceptualised explanations derived from comparative politics that 
allow” understanding of the Conservatives and apply to other parties.71 Most studies 
concern themselves with the Conservative party, and specific aspects of the 
Conservatives‟ development. To this end most of the studies are less concerned with a 
structural approach, but one that prioritises the thoughts and actions of individual agents, 
and the detail of individual events. A variety of themes guide what has been written - 
intra party battles, electoral struggles, ideology and leaders.  
2.3.1 Electoral Struggles 
A concern, perhaps the prime concern, of the literature on the Conservative party since 
1997, is how and why they have not succeeded in winning an election, and indeed have 
been so far from winning an election. More than any other factor, this has guided 
analysis of the Conservative party during this period. The Conservatives fell to a 
landslide defeat in 2001. In 2005 they gained over 30 seats, mostly through an efficient 
and clever operation in target seats - although share of the vote only went up by 0.5%. 
The electoral system made it very difficult for the Conservatives to win, with most 
specialists estimating that they would have to have over a 5% lead over Labour to even 
consider the possibility of an overall majority.
72
 The scale of the challenge influenced 
much of what was written about them.  
The size of the task led to a consensus among most academics that the Conservatives 
badly needed to be in a position where they could reach out beyond the „core vote‟, 
barely 30% of the electorate, not enough to take the Conservatives near an overall 
parliamentary majority. Most academics thought that the best hope for the Conservatives 
was for them to appeal to the „centre ground‟, where most voters‟ theoretically were. The 
definition of this centre ground seemed fairly uniform. Britain had moved leftwards, 
especially in the later years of Conservative government, and many thought that 
„hardline‟ politics „of the right‟ on public spending, Europe and immigration would repel 
sufficient numbers of liberal, educated, middle class voters for it to be almost impossible 
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for the Conservatives to win a majority.
73
 The Conservative leadership during 1997-2001 
was accused of showing “an electoral deathwish almost unprecedented in the modern 
era,” with their reluctance to accept that Thatcherism was now mistrusted by much of the 
public.
74
 The Conservatives had been incapable of understanding the fact that “voters had 
banked the gains made from the rescue and liberalisation of the British economy under 
Thatcher and were now concerned to ensure sufficient investment in public services.
75
 
Their attempts to create „clear blue water‟ on Europe and the economy had been a failure 
and the Conservatives had appeared to be a “single issue party that was talking to 
itself.”76 Little of the literature gives consideration to the opposing view that the party 
had a secure base of voters, and only needed to wait for the Government to make errors, 
oppose it in Parliament and secure the small amount of swing votes needed for victory. 
Instead, reflecting the environment of electoral dealignment, the emphasis is on how the 
party can appeal to a wide, broad majority of voters, especially a middle class that was 
drifting away from them.
77
  
Much of the literature about the 2005 election also prescribed how the Conservatives 
could have appealed to the centre ground. The Labour Government had been unpopular 
and exceptionally vulnerable, but the Conservatives were not seen as appealing to 
enough of the centre ground.
78
 Although the policy areas had shifted - in 2001 they were 
Europe and the Euro, whereas in 2005 it was immigration - the literature paints a picture 
of a Conservative party that was not merely unappealing to „middle ground‟ voters, but 
actively „scared them off‟ by taking a hardline approach and shrill tone about issues that 
appealed most to those who were already voting Conservative or not voting at all.
79
 
Again, the election reviews are much closer to their 2001 predecessors in their analysis 
of Conservative fortunes preceding and during the 2005 election, showing the same 
concern with a dealigned electorate. The party still needed more fundamental change to 
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overcome a huge image problem.
80
 Conservative politicians had, in the opinion of some, 
been “unwilling or unable to act in a way that might have given them more hope of 
winning or at least losing less badly.”81  
The actions David Cameron has taken since he became leader have been received in a 
very different way. Cameron has obstinately taken much of the academic advice. As he 
often said during his leadership bid, he was all about taking the Conservatives back to the 
centre ground. His message discipline, big tent approach and pragmatism in refusing to 
be separated from moderate policies, even during periods of rebalancing, were contrasted 
with past leaders.
82
 Many of the articles draw a contrast between the pragmatism of 
Cameron and the power of his party‟s right wing.83 Cameron had left the party in much 
better shape to win an election than the strategies of the other leaders.
84
 Cameron „ticked 
the boxes‟ of most academics for his attempts to resurrect the Conservatives‟ electoral 
fortunes, and the common factor between the academics seemed to be approval of his 
attempts to move the party towards the centre ground, although there was scepticism 
about precisely how far Cameron would be able to carry this process forward due to his 
hands being tied by local Conservative associations and the balance of power in the 
party.
85
 Cameron had minimised position issues that had undermined the party‟s claim to 
be serious, sensible and centrist, like the Euro.
86
 The rationale was that the educated and 
liberal middle classes were growing, who didn‟t see things in black and white. They were 
often promoted by the politics of correction - seeing one party had strayed too far from 
what was sensible or centrist and then dragging the country back.
87
 Voters would bank 
the good things a government had given them and look to the other party to deliver them 
from the bad things.
88
 What the literature largely does not ask is if Cameron, elected 
during a time of seemingly continuous growth and affluence, was the appropriate leader 
at a time when the British model of „Privatised Keynesianism‟, where individuals and 
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government stimulated the economy through debt, had seemed to utterly break down.
89
 
The rhetoric of the broken society or sharing the proceeds of growth was not necessarily 
relevant to a future of low growth, nor did theories of the post bureaucratic state provide 
an easy and clear way to direct Conservative responses to a global financial crisis.
90
 
Cameron was under threat of losing supporters who were cynical about the entire 
political establishment, providing a powerful message for UKIP that only they could be 
trusted to deliver truly right wing policies.
91
 Smaller elements of the literature concluded 
that „decontamination‟ would not necessarily lead the Conservatives to victory. Studies 
showed that the Conservatives would have benefited by 5% in 2005 from a move to the 
centre ground, a better vote share but one that would not have been enough to deliver 
them victory. To win a majority, they probably needed to change some people‟s attitudes 
as well.
92
  
2.3.2 The Leaders 
The treatment of Conservative leaders since 1997 by the literature naturally follows on 
from the last section, in that many of the works use this concept of the centre ground to 
judge the leaders, and introduce a great deal of anecdotal material into their studies of 
leaders, about the leaders themselves and the agents around them. Instead it is dealt with 
in a mostly ad hoc fashion, with events, the struggle to be on the centre ground, the 
influence of personality and interactions with other agents dictating much of what is 
written. 
The traditional conception of the Conservative leader as all powerful still holds true in 
the modern literature. He is the only person to have the “right to pronounce 
authoritatively on what constitutes Conservatism in any particular period”. The 
Conservatives had an “essentially presidential set up” where the Shadow Cabinet had at 
best a consultative role. While this provided benefits to the leader, it also meant that the 
leadership became “highly contingent on results, actual and potential.” A winner could 
pretty much do what they liked, but someone who looked like a loser would be under 
threat, especially in the event of electoral defeat, which was not seen as a corporate act, 
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but something for which someone had to be responsible.
93
 The Shadow Cabinet was 
taken to be a “handful of helpers” that was not particularly well respected as an 
institution, was too big to fit in the proper Cabinet when in power, and had no 
appreciable say over the leader of the opposition‟s strategy.94 This conception dictates 
much of the literature‟s attitude towards the Conservatives, although there is little of the 
literature that attempts to place it in a wider context of opposition and the leader‟s place 
in British politics. 
There was a countering view that whatever the leader of the opposition did, it was not 
near as important as what the Government did - this is seen in academic analyses of 
William Hague‟s leadership.  Ball thought the state of the Government overweighed all 
other influences on the opposition‟s fortunes, including the leader, the unity and vigour 
of the opposition, its general image and its stance on the most important issues of the 
day. The Conservatives had made successful progress from opposition to government 
with unpopular leaders, a view which classes leadership as unimportant.
95
 As many of 
the accounts of the Hague years asserted, a more effective leader might have avoided a 
landslide, but not defeat. This was due to the popular leadership of Labour by Tony Blair, 
who the Conservatives had great difficulty in deciding how to oppose. Blair and Labour, 
and the comparison with the Conservative leader, guide many of the studies, not the 
Conservative leader by himself. 
Against this powerful force, the efforts of one leader seemed inadequate, especially when 
they were a leader like Duncan Smith who had been ridiculed for his lack of charisma 
and had been a surprise victor in the Conservative leadership race. Snowdon and Collings 
thought Duncan Smith had been ineffective, and he had not been taken seriously as 
Prime Minister, resulting in his stock falling so far with the press and the public that he 
struggled to be heard. The “fundamental weaknesses of personality counted too heavily 
against him.”96 One article criticised the system of election which had contributed 
towards this surprise victory, and had led to a parliamentary party split, and a legitimacy 
problem among the MPs which he led, which was to disrupt and ultimately end his 
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leadership.
97
 Even the general party histories that refer to Duncan Smith tend to write 
him off as an era best forgotten, even when there was substantial policy work done 
during his premiership that arguably contributed towards future increased popularity. 
Like Hague, but to an even greater extent, most of the failings of Duncan Smith‟s 
leadership are put down to failings of personality, and an inability to be taken seriously in 
a more presidential age (even though few call it this). 
The next leader after Duncan Smith, Howard, was criticised for strategic errors. It was 
held that under Duncan Smith and Howard the Conservatives had learnt all the trivial 
lessons from New Labour but not the major lesson that power was gained by capturing 
the centre ground. Duncan Smith had realised this but had not the personality to impose 
it, while Howard had been “tactically and strategically inept” in developing an alternative 
to Labour.”98 It is the suitability for an electoral environment that was heavily centred 
around valence politics and the centre ground that dictates much of the academic 
judgments about Howard, a different style of assessment to the other leaders.  
It is noticeable that since the accession of David Cameron to the Conservative leadership, 
there is again an ad hoc concern with prospects of electoral success and the notion of the 
centre ground. The election of Cameron has been taken to be an important aspect in 
broadening the party‟s appeal, tackling the twin problems of “viable leadership and 
electoral credibility.” Unlike the other leaders, there was a belief that he had a genuine 
chance of becoming Prime Minister.
99
 Cameron was seen as a “presidential politician 
happy to provide journalists with arresting and intimate visuals and to talk about...his 
family life,” and Bale thought, in contrast to his predecessors, he was a “politician who is 
recognisably a human being despite his highly privileged background.” The general 
debate about the consensus and whether he borrowed more from Blair or Thatcher was 
one that informed some of the articles written. He had only started to talk tough on 
immigration and Europe when the Conservatives had “earned „permission to be heard‟ 
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and passed the „dinner party test‟,” despite the accusations he was „betraying‟ 
Thatcherism. 
100
  
Some thought the Conservative resurgence in the polls had been “largely due to the 
charisma, character, and more substantively, the political moderation of David 
Cameron.”101 Some of the different authors engage with some base elements of the 
political environment in a way that did not largely happen with the other leaders - 
Cameron‟s focus on presentation and image, how it played with voters, how his image 
was separate from his own party‟s. But others had begun to frame this leadership as 
something independent, and give voters and the media credit for recognizing Cameron as 
such. They do not assume it will be subsumed within the image of his party. They are 
able to separate policy positions that may be associated with him or his party. And they 
recognise the party‟s instrumental interest in letting this happen. Overcoming the 
numerous challenges that faced the Conservatives would depend on Cameron. 
102
  
There are two pieces of literature that, while focused on the specific area of Conservative 
leadership selection, reflect the importance of leadership, and almost uniquely, 
comparative study of leaders. They also attribute independent and decisive effects to the 
leader of the party. Heppell challenged existing theories, saying that the method of 
election did influence the result.
103
 Denham and O‟Hara differ. They contend that the 
mandate from the leadership election was of “limited extent and significance,” and 
Conservative MPs evaluating the leader‟s performance remained the “ultimate source of 
legitimacy for an incumbent leader.”104 Heppell makes a convincing case for the central 
role of the leader in the fortunes of the party, and the critical need to choose a party 
leader that appealed to a sufficiently large number of dealigned voters to win an election. 
Each leader was different, but they all had to deal with a similar syndrome, “at whose 
core is the need to secure election.....the main measure whereby leaders are judged and 
ranked.” He pinpoints the time after 1997 as a time when, unlike any other, the 
Conservatives managed to select leaders “so unsuitable and unattractive in electoral 
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terms.” That instability showed the relationship between the leader of the Conservative 
Party and the Parliamentary party was dependent on leaders‟ electoral success - if a 
leader was an electoral asset then their authority as leader was enhanced. If the leader 
was not an electoral asset the ties of loyalty to the leader for the party would be 
weakened. This is a theory much of the other literature implies but does not centre itself 
around. Heppell contrasts the stability and relative success of the old, undemocratic 
system of appointing the leader, to the new one which has led to more instability and a 
“cultural predilection” among Conservatives for engaging in political assassination of 
their leaders. There had been failures of process in devising sound leadership election 
procedures, failures of outcome whereby the legitimacy of leaders‟ elections was 
questioned, and a large failure in selection criterion - where the Conservatives placed 
ideology above what Heppell thought should have been their biggest priority, the election 
of a leader who could successfully “acquire and maintain power.” This reflected a new 
political environment where ideology was less important in achieving success than the 
leader. Heppell distils the three essential characteristics of a newly elected leader as to be 
able to unify the party, to be an electoral asset to the party, and to be able to demonstrate 
administrative capacity, being ideologically, electorally and administratively acceptable. 
In these elections Hague and Duncan Smith did not even secure superiority in two of 
these three areas, although David Cameron did. The leadership election that Cameron 
won was the portent of a more stable era for the Conservatives, less dominated by 
ideology.  
2.3.3 Feuds at the Top 
The attribution of problems to the mix of different personalities at the top of the 
Conservative party since 1997, and the feuds between them, is a large and recurring part 
of the literature about the Conservatives, because of the often anecdotal, episode- and 
agent-led focus of the literature. This encompasses feuds between personalities in the 
Shadow Cabinet, ex Ministers, within a leader‟s office, and with MPs. These feuds were 
often bitter and particularly affected the leader‟s ability to exercise his authority. This 
was partially because the party had never agreed on the real reasons for the large defeat 
in 1997. There had not been consensus over whether it had been a result of becoming out 
of touch with the majority on issues like the public services, or whether John Major had 
forced millions of „natural Conservatives‟ to abstain by not being right wing enough 
about Europe and the size of the state. The 1992-1997 Conservative Government had 
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been famous for being disunited and almost dysfunctional over Europe, but the division 
that was really to define the 1997-2001 Parliament was the „mods and rockers‟ dispute, 
between social „modernisers‟, and „traditionalists‟. Much of the literature seems to take 
the modernisers side but does not explicitly state this. The literature documents how 
Portillo and Francis Maude reportedly had frequent behind the scenes fallings out with 
Hague and his Director of Communications, Amanda Platell. The revolt over 'Kitchen 
Table Conservatism‟, was undermined by hostility from the Shadow Cabinet and party 
grandees.
105
 Criticism from grandees was worst in Hague‟s time (a whole book, Tory 
Wars, was built on the backbiting at the top), but it also occurred under Duncan Smith, 
Howard and Cameron, with figures like Portillo, Clarke and Tebbit speaking out against 
the leader. A significant dimension to these feuds has been the development of what Tim 
Bale calls the „party in the media‟- the “editors, commentators, and journalists who have 
a huge impact on Tory strategy, or whatever passes for it.” Bale is the first author to 
make this distinction explicit. The media had as much power to influence political 
decision makers as the voters, or the party grass roots. How a leader handled these feuds 
was a key part of his performance for many of the academics. Generally Hague was not 
seen to have controlled his party or his private office very well, and Duncan Smith was 
seen in much the same way. Howard however, was widely praised by the literature for 
the way he managed to establish an efficient and largely united central team, and 
managed to frighten most MPs into not disagreeing with the leadership. Cameron has 
continued in the same mould, with his organising of his central office being praised, 
although the close knit nature of his team means that he has been exposed to criticism 
that he is not liked by his own party and is letting disunity develop. But overall the party 
Cameron has worked with is now more “malleable and manageable” than the party his 
predecessors‟ led.106  
2.3.4 Policy and Ideology 
Historically the Conservatives had “shown considerable unity as an institution” 
accommodating all sorts of politicians from different ends of the political spectrum, and 
at times has appeared to be united not by ideology but a “commitment to statecraft, with 
a primary concern of winning elections and then maintaining a governing competence so 
as to retain power,” but in the judgement of many they had lost this ability. Certainly the 
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tensions over Europe during the 1992-1997 Government, and the struggles over Europe 
and social policies afterwards, certainly served to question this conception of the party 
and ideology.
107
 There is little consensus among academics about whether ideology has 
played a significant or peripheral role in Conservative politics since 1997, an era that 
some have thought is based around „post-ideological‟ politics. In one author‟s words 
“ideology is an important factor when evaluating the implosion of the Conservative party 
in the immediate post-Thatcherite era.”108 But this is not universally agreed with, and 
since 1997 comparatively little attention has been paid to Conservatism and ideology.
109
 
Different authors have different views about the relationship between the Conservatives 
and the series of principles and policies which had made up Thatcherism. Because of this 
it has led the literature down a road of framing most discussion about ideology through 
its relationship to Thatcherism, and again the question of how the party should adapt its 
ideological principles and policies to have the best chance of winning an election. There 
was a divide between Thatcherites who were most concerned with economic liberalism 
and those who were most concerned with social authoritarianism.
110
 Although this is 
strongly disputed by other writers about Conservatism who think Thatcherism had 
attempted to recast the Conservatives as a party of economic liberalism, national 
independence and moral authoritarianism.
111
 Both sides of the divide in the 
Conservatives were accused of mishandling the development of Thatcherism. The left 
were accused of not having a strategy beyond listening to focus groups, while the right 
was accused of being obsessed with the market.
112
 But if there was a place for ideology 
in Conservatism, what set of principles did it entail? Hickson‟s The Political Thought of 
the Conservative Party Since 1945, Ball and Seldon's work on the Conservative party in 
opposition, and Kieron O‟Hara‟s two books deal with what ideology should underpin 
Conservative politics. But even in these works, electoral considerations tended to guide 
them. O‟Hara worries about how the Conservative position in the present electoral 
system, was “dire” and the Conservative needed to become a home for at least some 
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disaffected left wingers to win a majority.
113
 The electoral angle trumped pure analysis of 
ideology. Right wing ideology frequently became the fall guy for bad performance at 
general elections. One of those works that are centred around the Conservative party and 
ideology even insists that the Conservatives had to change their policies and rhetoric to 
express more confidence in the state and ditch most of the “consumerism” that had been 
associated with Thatcherism, in order to win back support. It was paramount above all 
else to not relent from the task of changing the perception that the Conservatives were 
not a party of the rich,
114
 and to NOT seem they were a party driven by New Right 
ideology, which had sometimes tended towards market fundamentalism.
115
 However the 
Conservatives had accepted policy convergence with Labour in many areas. The 
Conservative Manifesto project showed they had moved slightly to the left since 1997 
and converged with Labour. But Cameron‟s repositioning of the party had caused 
complete confusion among some commentators, who accused him and George Osborne 
of not even upholding basic pro business and market principles.
116
 The economic 
meltdown had left the Conservatives without a strategy in their view.
117
 There was a 
paucity of alternative ideas about the financial crisis, that indicated the parties wanted 
things to remain as they were before the crisis, even with the high levels of public and 
private debt that had reigned. This stalled the development of ideological literature. Even 
in such a severe crisis, there was little perception ideology was shaping Conservative 
responses, or even that this would be desirable.
118
 There has been a realignment of the 
parliamentary party, with economic liberalism, social conservatism and euroscepticism 
predominating among MPs.
119
 Cameron to this end has consistently attempted to portray 
himself as a non-ideological politician, and demonstrates obvious comfort with moderate 
Blairites and Liberals.
120
 Ideology bubbles under, but has not been viewed as defining 
importance to the fortunes of the Conservatives during since 1997.  
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2.4 Conclusions 
The opposition literature post 1997 is different to the old „opposition with a capital O‟ 
literature, and deals with a whole set of concerns outside Parliament. The older literature 
was heavily influenced by the environment in which it was written. This environment 
was about two parties, class, cleavage and party dominated politics, where party was 
unquestionably a bigger influence than the leaders. It was conceptualised in terms of the 
Westminster Model, in which opposition played a key part in upholding, and was 
remarkably integrated into the model. But underlying changes in the political 
environment, as diverse as electoral dealignment, different media coverage, the rise of 
valence politics, and a decline in respect for Parliament, meant that the Westminster 
Model was impossible to sustain in its original form, and this idea has been much talked 
about in academia. Quite naturally, one would think that this has affected the place of 
opposition in British politics and how it must act. But as we see from our review of the 
literature about the Conservative party in opposition since 1997, although parts of this 
literature reflected a different environment, there was little overall attempt by any of this 
literature to integrate the changed political environment into the conceptual frameworks 
of their studies. They deal with elements of the changed political environment, they do 
not group these around one overarching framework. Instead, notions of electoral success 
dictate most of the studies, especially what were the „right‟ strategies. Due to the 
anecdotal, event and agent based nature of many of these accounts, or the fact they are 
based around specific micro areas of policy, mean that often the place of opposition in a 
structural sense and in relation to the political environment is not the priority. Even 
works which are centred around specialist topics, such as ideology, mostly come back to 
the question of what the party should have done to win an overall majority. The end point 
for most of these works is not opposition and its place in the political system, but the 
Conservative party, and usually specific aspects about the Conservatives. Instead, most 
studies come back to the „mistakes‟ the Conservatives made that denied them electoral 
victories. Most of the works are largely about specialist areas of policy, electoral 
position, or collections of different specialist articles. The lack of concentration on the 
changed political environment, and the structural place of leadership and opposition 
within British politics directs us to look at theories which have attempted to incorporate 
these two factors into their frameworks. These are the works on the Presidentialisation of 
politics, and they are what we look at in the next chapter, while attempting to utilise these 
theories to construct a workable conceptual framework for this thesis.  
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3 Conceptual Framework 
As we have detailed in the last chapter, the literature about the Conservative party in 
opposition since 1997 has covered this period in an agent centred way, and would benefit 
from a study that makes its main focus the structural constraints on opposition, with 
especial reference to extreme changes in the political environment. Is there a framework 
that can plausibly allow this kind of analysis? Can we use Presidentialisation as a 
framework for analysis of the leader of the opposition in this changing political 
environment? Specifically, can we use Presidentialisation as a theory relating to the 
political system as a whole and not just the Prime Minister, as it has been often regarded? 
This is despite the way Presidentialisation theory has developed from being a theory of 
the political system and political conduct within it. To help formulate an answer to this, 
we must decipher how the term developed, what different authors have defined 
Presidentialisation as, what framework they had developed around this meaning, and 
how they apply it. What of the conceptual framework of their studies has possible 
applications to this thesis? Having done this, we will then attempt to construct our own 
conceptual framework of Presidentialisation and devise a way of applying it to leaders of 
the opposition since 1997.  
3.1 The Development of Presidentialisation 
In this section we will assess the development of Presidentialisation. To do this, we must 
take up the story after the post war hegemony of the Westminster Model, and the changes 
in the political environment that emerged from the 1960s onwards. As we have seen, in 
different areas like the media, electoral alignment and the place of parliament, the 
political environment significantly changed. Thatcher‟s decade in power was a very 
visible demonstration of some of these changes. But this did not lead to widespread 
attempts to develop new theories, and the debate was conducted around terms developed 
during the heyday of the Westminster Model, despite an increasing concern with aspects 
of politics that may be termed „presidential‟. Although Presidentialisation, at first, was 
never the term used, an increasing concern with different leaders and leadership styles, 
and the changing elements of the political environment, showed an increasing receptivity 
to similarities with the US. There was the genesis of Presidentialisation theory, if not the 
whole. Thatcher had sparked renewed academic interest in the study of leadership. She 
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had offered a pure, visible, demonstration of leadership that her predecessors had not, 
giving “purpose, meaning and guidance to collectives by articulating a collective vision 
that appeals to ideology, values, motives and self-perceptions of followers”.121 Thatcher 
was described as a „Weberian‟ charismatic leader122, the type that has been popular in 
leadership literature.
123
 But this image was largely not channelled into studies of 
Thatcher‟s leadership. Some of the interest was instead funnelled through the theory of 
Prime Ministerial Government. Indeed the increased amount of debate about leadership 
seemed to centre around the Prime Minister far more than the leader of the opposition, 
and was hung on the poles of the Prime Ministerial/Cabinet Government schism, a rift 
that had derived from the Westminster Model. This debate had “provided the context for 
the study of executive power since the early 1960s”. Unlike dealignment or the role of 
the media, this debate revolved around one institution, the Cabinet, and was based around 
the perceived primacy of the Cabinet in the British constitution, that had endured through 
the establishment of the office of Prime Minister. In this conception of British 
Government, most decisions had to go through the Cabinet, the prime decision-making 
body in government, with the Prime Minister being „first among equals‟ with the other 
Cabinet Ministers.  But the changing post war role of government had raised questions 
over this conception of executive authority. In the 1960s John Mackintosh and Richard 
Crossman had asserted that there were long term trends that were inflating the power of 
the Prime Minister at the expense of the Cabinet. Prime Ministerial authority over the 
Cabinet had been increasing by virtue of a Prime Minister‟s power to choose members, 
agenda, committees and ultimate decisions of the Cabinet. Ironically, as the role of 
government expanded after the War, and Cabinet departments greatly expanded their 
fiefdoms of control, the growth of the state that had occurred throughout the twentieth 
century meant that Cabinet was unable to debate and deliberate at length on all the big 
issues of the day. For many decisions it was reduced to the role of a rubber stamp, with 
decisions already taken by Ministerial Committees, or the Prime Minister, before being 
formally approved by the Cabinet. Because of this, there was a greater need for central 
direction from the Prime Minister, giving him more power. The process had even gone so 
far that isolated voices like Tony Benn and James Margarech, in the 1970s, raised the 
spectre of „Presidential Government‟, and how there were now many similarities between 
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the style of a Prime Minister and a President. 
124
 But the theory of Presidential 
Government was not widely taken up, even in the years after the rise of Thatcher. There 
was a general view that the President of the United States was a much more powerful and 
more individual figure than the British Prime Minister, and was a figure that would not 
fit into the British system. The US President was head of state, head of a superpower, 
took part in individual nationwide elections, and was surrounded by numerous and 
powerful central staff. None of this applied to the British Prime Minister. Although these 
accounts may have overestimated the power of the US President, institutional differences 
between Britain and the United States prevented the term „presidential‟ gaining repeated 
application to British politics. The bulk of the academic debate was still between Prime 
Ministerial and Cabinet Government, and it was this debate that rode the wave of the 
increasing awareness of leadership questions Thatcher brought. Thatcher transcended 
traditional definitions of leadership that emphasised how institutional structure would 
affect behaviour. She was an individual who routinely operated outside the conventions 
of the institutions she headed. Prime Ministerial Government was still the most obvious 
way of explaining Thatcher‟s strong leadership in terms of the existing institutions. This 
was a framework derived from the existing institutional structure, and it was assessing a 
change in the balance of power between institutions (the Cabinet and the Prime Minister) 
not a re-definition of these institutions or activity outside them. It was conducted through 
the Cabinet, just with power between the protagonists being distributed differently. In 
turn, the proponents of Cabinet Government used the workings of the institutions to 
define their theories as well. They thought that powers the Prime Minister could exercise 
outside the Cabinet had been exaggerated, and that for every opportunity social and 
technological changes had opened up for Prime Ministers, there was a corresponding 
collective restraint. Television had helped opponents to become more prominent, leaders 
were still prisoner to the image of their parties, and the Prime Minister was only as strong 
as institutions of the Cabinet and senior colleagues allowed him to be. Any changes 
Thatcher had brought to the office would pass away with her exit from Downing Street, 
and had been completely contingent on her personality and style. The influence of 
personality was temporary, while the institutions and the power maps they dictated were 
permanent. Thatcher‟s individualistic leadership style had stretched the elastic of Cabinet 
Government, but that elastic would „snap back with her‟. Remember after all, the Cabinet 
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was instrumental in removing Thatcher from office in 1990. 
125
 But the terms of this 
debate ignored much of what had been unique about the Thatcher premiership. She had 
been able to remain Prime Minister for 11 years while governing past her party, and her 
own Government, achieving what some would say were her most significant successes 
while appearing to revel in the way they split her party and Cabinet. Aspects of her 
leadership had shown the potential of an individualistic, somewhat maverick leadership 
style, what Kavanagh called a „mobilizing‟ style that flew in the face of the traditional 
limited and parliamentary leadership of peacetime Prime Ministers. 
126
 Many of 
Thatcher‟s ideas had not been original, but the push and drive she gave them while in 
office had been very new.
127
 The rise to power of the less confrontational John Major, 
with his promises of a more collegiate style of government, and more consultation with 
the Cabinet, seemed to confirm the enduring collective nature of the British system, and a 
re-assertion of some of the principles that made comparison with the US Presidency so 
unlikely. In many ways the difficulties Major faced during the latter days of his 
Government, struggling to establish personal authority over a divided party, a Parliament 
with a slim Conservative majority, and a Cabinet that limited his freedom to manoeuvre 
on many issues, seemed to confirm how British politics was defined by Cabinet, the 
Westminster Model and Parliament. The advances that Thatcher had made through her 
determination and strong personality could not be sustained permanently with a weaker 
leader. But underneath all this, many of Major‟s problems had been down to a perceived 
failure to match up to the imperatives of leadership Thatcher had established. There were 
signs that Thatcher‟s premiership had inculcated a high regard for strong leadership 
within the British system, not least shown in the growing analysis of Major‟s weakness 
through his own leadership deficiencies, and inability to „dominate‟ Cabinet and party 
like commentators thought a „true leader‟ should.128 The place of leadership was 
seemingly changing, and as we shall see in the next paragraph, Presidentialisation theory 
attempted to provide a whole conceptual explanation for this change. 
Michael Foley‟s The Rise of the British Presidency in 1993 took a new, and radical, 
direction compared to the other literature. Despite the arguments over Prime Ministerial 
Government, the impact of changes in the political environment, and Thatcher on 
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leaders‟ place within the system, Foley‟s was the first coherent and extensive attempt to 
rationalise all this and create a framework which alluded to the growing parallel paths of 
development with the United States and its President, as had been referred to by Benn 
and Margach decades before. It attempted to tie together some of the changes in British 
politics, in something approaching a unified and coherent theory, mapping out their 
causes and effects in the system. Unlike the other studies, these causes and effects were 
largely outside the Westminster/Cabinet core. Unlike the other authors, Foley took 
Thatcher‟s Premiership to be the illumination that helped us understand deeper changes 
in the system, that went beyond its institutions. He placed great emphasis on what the 
previous decade had seen, in his view a Prime Minister whose pre-eminence had been 
only comparable to Churchill during World War Two, and who had in effect become the 
“face of Britain” and created a government “largely synonymous with Margaret 
Thatcher‟s persona.” Government had plausibly been the “institutional embodiment of 
her personal ideas and drives.” But while her domination encouraged respect and awe, it 
had led to her being held accountable for most social and economic ills, on the grounds 
“of her sprawling personalisation of Government.” In this fulsome appreciation of the 
power of Thatcher‟s personality, Foley was not alone. But what was different about 
Foley‟s Presidentialisation theory was that he did not tie these developments to 
Thatcher‟s personality in any substantive way, or even to a type of leadership. She was 
merely a powerful example of many things that would have happened even if she had not 
been Prime Minister, a “visible outlet and register of a set of underlying and previously 
concealed dynamics.”129 Foley‟s concept went far beyond a personality-led explanation, 
and was developing a concept that attempted to link fundamental changes in the system 
to the new politics of leadership that had been created. But in doing this Foley was 
questioning the old way of perceiving the system largely through its institutions. Foley 
explicitly turned on their head older notions of party hegemony and the Westminster 
Model, in a way that works on electoral dealignment and other topics had alluded to, but 
not explicitly done. By setting the British premiership on a „parallel line of development‟ 
to the US Presidency, Foley was placing the British system alongside one where parties 
were weaker, there was less of a tradition of class based voting, and leaders attained a 
higher profile with media and public. By claiming that there were still large structural 
differences between the two states, and that what he called the Presidential dimension 
was a method of understanding, Foley was not advocating constitutional change, or 
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saying there had been constitutional change. Instead he was saying that such fundamental 
changes as there had been, had occurred below the surface of the constitution or 
institutions. Foley did not deny there were structural differences between the British and 
American systems, but thought the US system could increase the understanding of 
changes in the British system, and both had followed parallel paths of development. 
Among the parallel tracks were: spatial leadership, the cult of the outsider, designer 
politics, the weakening of parties, and the capture by leaders of election campaigns.
130
 
An integral part of objections to Foley was that the American presidency was alien to the 
British Parliamentary system, which could simply not accommodate an all powerful 
president. This was the way of seeing British politics through its institutions. But Foley 
thought that this had not done justice to the concept and was based on a “highly 
inaccurate and even distorted view of the American Presidency” that attributed to it 
misleading „Imperial powers‟, and ignored the comprehensive checks and balances that 
existed. Foley was tracing a change that was largely taking place outside institutions. The 
British executive was “extremely powerful,” in comparative terms. While presidentialism 
underplayed the degree of collegiality in the British system, it also ignored the fact that a 
Prime Minister had more leverage over the executive and legislature than any 
President.
131
 Foley thought that the Presidential analogy could throw fresh light on the 
Prime Minister‟s general position, and the new opportunities for leadership that had been 
opened up, and tackle the “erosion of serious thinking” about the Premiership since 
Major had replaced Thatcher. 
132
 While other academics tended to play down the 
fundamental changes in the British system, and cite personality as a factor that was 
making the changes seem to have more impact on the system than they really did, Foley 
was doing the complete opposite. There were the “existence of deep set shifts in the 
nature of the political system…..that have allowed the personal nature of leadership to 
have a powerful bearing upon the wider fields of personal perception, evaluation, and 
discourse” making a comparison with the US Presidency far more pertinent. The 
underlying changes in the British system had been of such a scale, that the current 
premiership was closer to the presidency than the old premiership. But this theory was 
not left unchallenged, and attracted a lot of criticism from other parts of academia. A 
strong challenge came to it from the relatively new field of core executive theory, that 
argued Presidentialisation was a gross simplification of the power structures within 
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government, and concentrated far too much on one man, to the exclusion of the many 
individuals that made up power networks. Although some were more important than 
others in these power networks, in practice all actors were interdependent on one another. 
Although the balance of power within the Core Executive had changed, it was not true to 
say that a „British President‟ had emerged, and superseded the core executive.133 
Although there was an executive office „in all but name‟, they thought this was not a sign 
of the emerging British Presidency, but modernisation of Cabinet Government. This was 
despite the direct replication of many of the institutions of the White House inside 
Downing Street, such as a Chief of Staff, a Strategic Communications Unit and a 
Performance and Innovation Unit. These initiatives were an enhancement of the capacity 
of the Core Executive, making it “increasingly coordinated and coherent, and 
increasingly proactive and performance driven”. But they did not prevent the collective 
exercise of power. Collective Government was able to operate on specific policies (with 
the Chancellor having an unprecedented degree of autonomy and control), even under a 
strong Prime Minister like Blair. Britain was said to have “neither a Presidential 
institutional structure, nor a Presidential institutional capacity.” 134 Although bouts of 
Prime Ministerial dominance may have infected the system temporarily, it was never 
sustainable because the system was not in essence presidential and was not designed to 
support the Prime Minister. There had been change in balance between the Prime 
Minister and the collective Cabinet, but not a revolution that had firmly tipped the 
constant oscillation between the two. Foley was criticised for not taking account of the 
“power dependencies found within any system of collegial Government.” The Prime 
Minister was only one actor among others sharing power in structured networks. 
Heffernan thought Foley‟s theory overlooked the fact that the British Parliamentary 
executive was more powerful than the US President, and ignored the institutional 
differences - the President was directly elected, located within a constitutionally limited 
federal system, separate from the legislature, and was not the leader of their party, but 
head of a personalised executive. The fact that the British system was parliamentary gave 
the Prime Minister powers which the President could only dream of.
135
 Richard Rose 
acknowledged media and international constraints had fundamentally changed the nature 
of the Prime Minister‟s job, but thought that the “fashionable” talk that the Prime 
Minister has become a President was not valid when the Prime Minister bases his 
                                                 
133
 Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, 'The Blair Government and the Core Executive', Government and 
Opposition, Vol.39 (1), (2004), p.1. 
134
 Burch and Holliday, 'The Blair Government and the Core Executive', pp.20-21. 
135
 Heffernan, 'Why The Prime Minister Cannot Be A President', pp.54-59. 
61 
authority on his Parliamentary majority, and is less influential internationally than the US 
President.
136
 Foley‟s argument, that the US President was not as all powerful as everyone 
thought, was used against him. This shows the fluidity and confusing nature of the 
debate, that the same argument can be used to support both sides of the argument. It also 
shows how the previous casual use of the term could create confusion about the precise 
nature of the US Presidency. Also it must be noted that not all of the arguments that had 
been used in favour of Presidentialisation were actually agreed upon. There was a section 
of the literature that disagreed with the proposition that class voting had not actually 
declined.
137
 There had not been the substantial realignment by class voters in the opinion 
of some that there had been in the US.
138
 The origins of Presidentialisation were 
disputed. However, what is definite is that over the 1980s increasing attention was paid 
to the power of the Prime Minister. Although Thatcher, with her personal and 
individualistic style, had made many changes to British politics, and intensified the 
debate about leadership, it had been mostly centred around the traditional terms of its 
effects on the executive, the terms that had existed before she came to power.
139
 So there 
is maybe not as much space between the protagonists in the debate as the titles and 
conclusions suggest. And of course the way the core executive theory was structured 
meant that the debate did not refer much to the opposition, which also took a back seat in 
the accounts of Presidentialisation.  
Despite the criticism of Foley‟s concept, it has been employed and developed in other 
academic works since 1993, and the concept has gained some traction and has not been 
ignored. Anthony Mughan‟s more limited study based on Presidentialisation, about 
whether leaders had become a decisive effect on voters during general elections, was 
published in 2000. There has been a wider study by Poguntke and Webb, which took a 
comparative approach to Presidentialisation by studying it in several different western 
states. Foley also published a second edition of his work in 2000, and has subsequently 
written articles about Presidentialisation theory relating to Blair and Brown. Many other 
works have referred to the concept. The theory of Presidentialisation, while it has 
certainly not become an all encompassing standard for the study of British politics (and 
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certainly not related to opposition) has become established, with a place inside the 
academic debate, and has been developed upon.  
The work by Mughan is most limited in scope and coverage, but is a work centred 
around the main points of Presidentialisation. He deals with the question of whether or 
not the process of Presidentialisation meant that elections were turning away from the 
parliamentary model, which was “devoid of the individualistic element found in regimes 
where the office of president is the main prize to be won by an individual.” He took as 
his starting point an ideal type Parliamentary system where party had been an impersonal 
entity, fully determining the behaviour of party supporters, with the leader having no 
electorally separate and meaningful influence on voting behaviour. The conventional 
view of Parliamentary elections had been that “they are contests between parties 
representing cleavage groupings” with the personalities of candidates “electorally 
irrelevant in situations where party systems have been shaped by deep and historically 
rooted antagonisms that all but monopolize the battle for public office.” This reflects 
many of the aspects of the environment we highlighted in the previous chapter, the 
environment Foley was saying was outdated and had been supplanted by evolutionary 
change. Mughan set out to test the hypothesis that “leaders matter, and matter now more 
than they used to.”140 He did this by content analysis of newspapers and television 
broadcasts since the 1950s and 1960s. He concluded that the presentational aspect of 
leaders had increased in importance in the time period he studied. Mughan wanted to see 
if, as Presidentialisation would imply, the system had become more like the US model, 
with an independent electoral impact for leaders becoming stronger with each election. 
He asserted that the electoral impact of leaders was becoming stronger, and had proved 
decisive in some elections. Like Foley, Mughan thought that the traditional way of 
looking at the system had become a misrepresentation.  The traditional institutionalist 
view could “easily overstate the impact of the institutional environment on the dynamics 
of election campaigns, individual voting choice and electoral outcomes” and precluded 
recognition that “exogenous forces, like television based election campaigning, appear 
capable of bringing presidential and parliamentary systems of government to look more 
like each other in some of the ways that they operate.”141 Presidentialisation comprised 
two dimensions, presentation and impact. The Presidentialisation thesis implied some 
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reorientation of our traditional party based understanding of the dynamics of electoral 
competition and Government accountability” and had “received nowhere near the 
scholarly attention that its widespread currency and it‟s theoretical implications would 
indicate that it merits” closely echoing one of Foley‟s main concerns.142 Evolutionary 
changes, not formal changes, to British political institutions were dictating the change in 
nature of the British system, but these changes had been under-represented in an 
academic discourse that had become heavily slanted around institutions.  
Many of the themes enunciated by Foley in his first volume were repeated in his second 
version, The British Presidency: Tony Blair and the Politics of Public Leadership. This 
followed a similar style and argument to the previous version, but with the addition of 
material on more recent events, especially the performance of Tony Blair as leader of the 
opposition and then the Government. But the main thrust of the work was the same - that 
there had been a fundamental change in the British political system that went beyond the 
personalities of individual leaders. Blair had been the very public exhibitor of the 
underlying changes in the system Foley had highlighted in his first book, and the 
methods it was becoming imperative for politicians to use in response to these changes. 
Blair had acted as an outsider to his own party, and attempted to push it towards the 
people, not vice versa. Leadership had become a significant political issue standing alone 
from party, assigned it a high priority by the public and the media. From a referendum of 
members over Clause IV, to the expansion of the Prime Minister‟s Office, Blair had used 
„Presidential‟ techniques, many of which were directed at increasing his personal power 
and prominence over the upper echelons of the party. 
143
 For Foley, the Blair 
phenomenon only added to his conviction that there had been fundamental change in the 
British system, which could be explained and interpreted with reference to developments 
in the US Presidency. Like his first work he did not argue institutional change had taken 
place, but that there were sub-institutional changes in the system that paralleled the 
development of the US presidency. There was also some analysis of the impact on 
opposition leaders, like Blair, Kinnock and Hague, descriptions of their projections of 
leadership independence, and how they formed part of an independent politics of 
leadership, along with the Prime Minister. But the overwhelming amount of material in 
the book was about the leaders of the executive in Britain and America. Latterly Foley 
has analysed the series of leadership crises that have embroiled Blair‟s successor as 
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Prime Minister, where all financial and government uncertainty became an “aggregate 
crisis that centred largely upon the figure of Gordon Brown,” and brought associations of 
culpability, generic responsibility and direct accountability. Brown had attempted to ride 
the wave of the politics of leadership, emphasising his parents and moral background, but 
the „backstory‟ of having a joint leadership role within the government in Blair‟s day 
undermined his claims of renewal. Additionally Brown had looked uncomfortable in the 
“high exposure and high expectations culture of contemporary leadership politics” and 
with the “persistent monitoring of his performances in a variety of conspicuous 
dimensions relating to leadership assessment and evaluation.” When an individual 
becomes Prime Minister there is a “qualitative change in both the terms of his or her 
political existence and in the context in which that individual is expected to operate.” The 
Prime Minister became the “primary medium through which a profusion of negative 
experiences, grievances and anxieties could find an interpretive unity in the common 
theme of a flawed leadership.” Critical analysis often began with Brown‟s personality 
and character traits.
144
 Brown‟s attempts to appear an „outsider‟ leader were never seen 
as truly credible. This showed the difficulty of being Prime Minister in an environment 
where the office attracted a massive amount of responsibility and blame, perhaps 
unrealistically, and political analysis was centred around personality. This takes Foley‟s 
theory of Presidentialisation even further, and shows how all encompassing it had 
become, with particular reference to the expectations it had generated around the office 
of Prime Minister. 
Another significant text in the application of Presidentialisation theory has been Thomas 
Poguntke and Paul Webb‟s collection of essays, The Presidentialisation of Policies in 
Western Democracies. In particular the study was unique for its rigour and structure. 
They set up an extensive framework, which was applied across all the chapters on the 
different countries by the different authors. In creating this framework the authors 
brought together many of the influences and effects we have already talked about and 
mapped them together into an overall framework, the structure of which we shall see in 
the next section. Most relevant to this thesis was the chapter on Presidentialisation in 
Britain.  Heffernan and Webb‟s review concluded that there had been a process of 
Presidentialisation in British politics since the 1960s. Heffernan has voiced criticism of 
Presidentialisation theories in the past, and he does not mention why he has been 
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associated with a study about Presidentialisation, and whether it fits with the networked 
governance standpoint he has penned other works from. The deliberate changes Blair had 
made to the Prime Minister‟s Office, and the self conscious way it was pursued were 
evidence of the phenomenon of Presidentialisation. One confusing aspect of the analysis 
is the way they use the obvious power of the Treasury under Gordon Brown, as evidence 
of the increasing power of the centre, despite the many times Brown has been reported as 
actually obstructing the will of the centre. But this is glossed over, although they did 
admit that Brown‟s institutional power resources and political capital meant he could 
constrain Blair. Overall, the authors found evidence of Presidentialisation. Like Foley, 
emphasis is placed on the way Blair and Conservative leaders have resorted more to 
plebiscitary democracy, thereby by-passing party activists. Especially under Labour, the 
writers had discerned much evidence of campaigns centred around the leader, from Blair 
to Kinnock, with publicity overwhelmingly concentrating on the leader. It was shown in 
the pattern and style of media coverage as well.  This is a common theme that most of the 
contributors on other countries found. They found that in elections there was evidence of 
individual and aggregate level effects, and the potential of them was enough to make 
parties conduct election campaigns that were much more centred on the leader. This led 
them to conclude that leaders were “increasingly at the heart of everything the electoral 
professional party does” and were now a “key feature of contemporary democratic 
politics.” This gave the leadership power but only provided it could deliver electoral 
popularity and policy success. The three main phenomena observed in their study as 
being more candidate centred election campaigns, parties being relegated to support of 
the leader, and the potential for exertion of Prime Ministerial power within the executive 
being larger.
145
 There was a process that was empowering leaders, especially successful 
ones, at the expense of parties and the executive. 
We have seen in this section that the concept of Presidentialisation has been moved on 
apace over the last thirty years. Before this, it had been a fringe theory, easily dismissed 
by those who said it was unfeasible, because of differences between American and 
British institutions, and overshadowed itself by institution-led explanations of power. But 
with a work that took account of the extreme changes in the political environment in the 
1960s and 1970s and conceptually linked it to an idea of evolutionary change, Foley re-
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established a place for Presidentialisation, which has been taken up by other authors. 
However, this position is not dominant within academia, and indeed is still a minority, 
albeit a powerful one. Institutional explanations, and especially the more recent 
development of core executive theory, challenge many of the central tenets of 
Presidentialisation theory and are still in a more influential position in academia. But 
while we cannot say that Presidentialisation theory is dominant, we can at least say that it 
is a theory that attempts to incorporate the changes in the political environment that we 
talked about in the literature review. In the next section we shall analyse in detail how 
these changes were incorporated into the conceptual frameworks of the main works on 
Presidentialisation. 
3.2 Conceptualising Presidentialisation 
In the last section we traced the development of the theory of Presidentialisation, from its 
ostracism on institutional grounds to its increased popularity in parts of academia. We 
have seen the overall place different authors think they are occupying, relative to Core 
Executive and other theories. But what have been the detailed conceptions and 
frameworks the different authors have used to define Presidentialisation? Specifically, 
what do these authors define as the meaning of Presidentialisation, the causes of 
Presidentialisation, and the effects of Presidentialisation?  
3.2.1 The Meaning of Presidentialisation: 
The actual term Presidentialisation is somewhat of an umbrella term for what different 
authors think are the meaning of their concepts. Indeed, there is not even unified 
agreement on the term that should be used. Ironically, being the academic most 
associated with the „umbrella‟ term, Michael Foley has attacked „Presidentialisation‟, 
saying that it has been open to misuse, and that his allusions of a British presidency are 
not the same as implying a “presence of a process of Presidentialisation.” Foley prefers 
instead to talk of a „presidential dimension‟. The existence of what he called the „British 
presidency‟ did not infer that there was a process that would culminate in a full 
presidential system, and the validity of the British presidency phenomenon did not 
depend upon this happening. The British Presidency he talks of was a hybrid, and not a 
“transitional process from one pure form to another.” The presidential dimension was 
something short of a full blown transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system. 
67 
Foley associates this full blown transitional process - which would include constitutional 
and institutional change - with Presidentialisation. The case he advocated for a 
„presidential dimension‟ in British politics was not the same as the “case for the 
„Presidentialisation‟ of British Government.” Attempts to substantiate a „presidential‟ 
element in British politics had merely served to delay recognition of the existence of a 
„presidential dimension‟. Attempts to couple presidential phenomena with “electoral 
behaviour and party choice, or with the formal configuration and resources of the core 
executive” were a hindrance to the recognition of a presidential dimension. Foley did not 
take the presidential dimension to mean a “set of closed theories and absolute 
properties.” Presidential systems were just as evolutionary as the parliamentary system, 
and the parliamentary system could accommodate “gradual change, or the graduated 
production of radical change.” The emphasis was on the area responsible for producing 
extensive change - the “ramifying dynamics of the relationship between party leaders and 
public expectations,” the assimilation of new roles by leaders and Prime Ministers in 
particular. 
146
 Such change was evolving and constant. None of the other works that we 
have seen made similar attempts to differentiate the conception of the term 
„Presidentialisation‟, and indeed use it freely. Foley‟s two main problems with the term 
seem to be that it is too inflexible, and that it groups together other properties which are 
not necessarily relevant, thereby weakening the central points of the argument, which is 
that parliamentary systems are evolving in such a way that makes them more like, not the 
same as, presidential systems. But Poguntke and Webb, and Mughan, use the term in a 
way which does not necessarily corroborate with these concerns. Poguntke and Webb, 
although arguing that there has been evolutionary change in the political system, freely 
use the Presidentialisation term. Their discussion of the levels of power afforded to 
leaders of different constitutional types produced three main findings, about presidential 
regimes, which fed into their concept of Presidentialisation in western regimes. They 
found that “the logic of presidentialism provides the head of Government with superior 
executive power resources” emanating “directly from the fact that he or she is not 
responsible to Parliament,” as well as being directly legitimated and having the power to 
form a Cabinet and govern, without large interference from other institutions. The second 
main finding was that presidential regimes had more leadership autonomy vis-a-vis their 
own party but one that was contingent on electoral success. This led onto the third 
finding, which was that there had been a personalisation of the electoral process flowing 
directly from a “natural focus on the highest elective office” with the implication that “all 
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aspects of the electoral process are decisively moulded by the personalities of the leading 
candidates.” This provided the basis for them dividing the effects of Presidentialisation 
across three „faces‟, party, electoral and executive. Although they are not arguing that the 
parliamentary system will become like this overnight, there is an evolutionary change 
towards becoming more like the presidential system. A “de facto Presidentialisation of 
politics” which can be understood as the development of increasing leadership power 
resources and autonomy within the party, affecting “three central arenas of democratic 
government” - executive, party and electoral. This is from factors “other than those 
flowing directly from the formal constitutional structure.” 147 Mughan also couples 
„electoral behaviour and party choice‟ with the concept of Presidentialisation, going 
against Foley‟s argument that this weakens the concept. But then it can be argued that he 
is not going much beyond what Foley himself has done - Foley alludes to an increased 
prominence and role for leaders over the electorate. All the main accounts think that 
Presidentialisation/the presidential dimension is down to a mix of factors occurring, not 
giving any one special prominence. What unites these works is not so much a belief that 
these issues had not been considered by the academic literature on an individual basis - 
indeed there is a copious amount of literature on some of them - but there has not been 
enough consideration or acknowledgement that these changes formed a unified whole, 
that they were changing the nature of British politics. As we have seen in our assessment 
in the previous chapter on the literature about the Conservative party in opposition, the 
facets of the „Presidentialisation‟ theory are often disregarded or not taken together as a 
whole. Not enough attention had been paid to substantial changes in the system, with 
people simply seeing the US Presidency as an end point far from the constitutional 
powers of the Prime Minister, condemning the changes on formal grounds as an alien 
intrusion to British politics, and using them as a politically motivated criticism of the 
office holder and the Government. This had been seen with Thatcher and Blair. This 
flavour of academic and political debate meant that the word and concept was in danger 
of becoming a political term, one of abuse or praise, while still possessing a meaning few 
found clear or relevant. Previous conceptual use of the terms Presidentialisation or 
British Presidency, while dismissing its validity as a rounded concept, also do sometimes 
not treat it accurately, giving it somewhat exaggerated properties to support arguments 
on various topics. While not denying the significant structural differences between the 
US President and the British Prime Minister, Foley thought a presidential allusion would 
                                                 
147
 Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, 'The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A 
Framework for Analysis' in The Presidentialization of Politics, pp.5-19. 
69 
lead to an improved understanding of the presidency and the premiership, and alert 
researchers to general trends in underlying properties of political leadership, and reveal 
the “nature and extent” of changes to the “conditions and expectations of political 
leadership…..that have made the Prime Minister‟s position amenable to presidential 
terms of description.” 148 The other two main authors agree with this. Mughan 
approaches his question of whether there has been Presidentialisation in much the same 
way as Foley approaches the question of the presidential dimension. Mughan thought the 
traditional institutionalist view that still held sway in many places could “easily overstate 
the impact of the institutional environment on the dynamics of election campaigns, 
individual voting choice and electoral outcomes.” The focus on discrete constitutional 
terms had overshadowed and blurred the importance of sub-constitutional factors at 
work. This was evident in the neglect of the increased importance of the leaders of the 
two main parties in Britain to understanding electoral results. To “overemphasise the 
differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government risks 
overlooking theoretically interesting and practically consequential similarities between 
them." The crucial question was not whether institutional structures prevented elections 
from being personalised, but “rather what are the conditions under which they do so.”149 
“Exogenous forces, like television based election campaigning, appeared capable of 
brining presidential and parliamentary systems of government to look more like each 
other in some of the ways that they operate. Moreover an institutional perspective does 
not necessarily preclude recognition on this kind of convergence.” An institutional 
approach to the study of politics was not necessarily wrong but it had to encompass the 
changes that were happening outside of the central institutions. On the face of it this is 
very similar to Foley‟s concept. Recognition of the many differences between 
presidential and parliamentary systems did not preclude the fact certain forces were 
making them more alike in certain areas, and analysis of the development of presidential 
systems could shed light upon the nature of the change in the British parliamentary 
system. Although there is some disagreement over the use of the terms 
Presidentialisation and presidential dimension, and exactly what the term covers, we can 
see that all the main authors here agree that it is a process taking place without formal 
constitutional changes, because of a variety of factors, many of which are outside 
institutions, and that these changes are giving more autonomy, power and prominence to 
leaders. 
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Another common theme of these works is their conception of the old norms and rules 
which governed British politics in the days when Parliamentary politics reigned supreme, 
and the factors that began to challenge this dominance. Mughan‟s starting point was that 
parliamentary politics is a particular party politics that is “devoid of the individualistic 
element found in regimes where the office of president is the main prize to be won by an 
individual” who “to a substantial degree runs for office on the basis of his own 
qualifications, experience, personality and promise.” Traditional parliamentary elections 
had been between parties representing cleavage groupings, where party systems “shaped 
by deep and historically rooted antagonisms” crowded out the chance for leadership 
personalities being the decisive impact on voting choice for significant numbers of 
voters.  But there had been developments in the 1960s and before that threatened this 
structure. Partisan dealignment foresaw a great reduction in the mass class and 
denominational parties, foreseeing their replacement by a less ideological, more 
centralised, less class and more interest based type of party. 
150
 Presidentialisation 
implied moving away from collective to personalised Government, away from 
governmental and electoral politics dominated by political parties, to the leader becoming 
a more autonomous force, converging on the “individualist American model.” It was 
“personalisation of electoral politics that on the one hand occurs within the parameters of 
an unchanging parliamentary constitution and on the other persists over time.” The 
nature of parliamentary systems could be changed even if the rules that governed them 
didn‟t. Poguntke and Webb used a continuum to demonstrate this, with a regime‟s 
location determined by the shift of political power, resources and autonomy from parties 
to individual leaders, and their place in what they call the three faces of 
Presidentialisation. This conception of Presidentialisation tells us a lot about how the 
authors think the concept should be used and where in the political system it should be 
applied to.  
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Figure One: Presidential and Party Regimes (Poguntke and Webb)
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The authors are not very interested in the formal legal-constitutional classing of a state, 
as symbolised by the horizontal dimension here. The distinctions here are clearer and less 
flexible, as states cannot gradually shift towards other formal types. However, the focus 
of the study is much more on the vertical dimension, a continuum, which is not a “rigidly 
portioned set of discrete categories.” States could move in both directions down the 
continuum due to “structural and contingent political characteristics which determine the 
degree of personal visibility, autonomy and power resources which national political 
leaders have.” The location was more precisely determined by the “shift of political 
power resources and autonomy to the benefit of individual leaders and a concomitant loss 
of power and autonomy of collective actors like Cabinets and political parties.” Poguntke 
and Webb drew this from their Weberian conception of power which was “the ability to 
achieve a desired outcome, even against resistance.” If so, then autonomy was an 
„important‟ precondition of power - as it meant a lesser likelihood of resistance, and a 
larger sphere of action protected from outside interference. Overall power was a 
combination of growth of the leader‟s zones of autonomous control, and a “growing 
capacity to overcome resistance by others” through greater resources. 152 At this point we 
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may consider this theory of zones of autonomous control, in comparison to Foley‟s The 
British Presidency. Foley thought while the Prime Minister‟s constitutional and 
institutional situation would probably never emulate the position of the US President, the 
President could act as a “lever” to open up the Prime Minister, via the “interpretive and 
explanatory potential” of the President.153 It is change occurring within the contours of 
the parliamentary system, and change that the parliamentary system has thus far been 
able to absorb. Surely Foley‟s theory of the „presidential dimension‟ leaves open the 
potential for the leader of the party to increase their zones of autonomous control, and a 
growing capacity to overcome resistance by others? After all the entire premise of spatial 
leadership is of a viable way for the leader to overcome resistance by institutions by 
appealing to the people. And the centralisation of activity around the leader‟s office and 
the increased independence of the leader from party elites are surely increases in the 
zones of autonomous control. Of course, as we shall see, Foley‟s theory does not rest as 
much on power but the electoral and political imperatives for parties to promote strong 
leadership. But it still cannot be claimed that some of the tactics Foley says have become 
imperative for political parties to use are not concerned with the exercise of political 
power. This dispute over the meaning of the terms Presidentialisation or presidential 
dimension is actually largely over semantics, for fundamentally the different authors are 
agreed that they are covering a process which has involved great sub-constitutional 
change, to institutions that remain parliamentary, that have been prompted in changes in 
the political environment since the 1960s, which have mirrored developments in 
America. 
3.2.2 Causes of Presidentialisation: 
We have seen a measure of agreement over what Presidentialisation means, and an 
overall conception of what Presidentialisation meant for politics, but what did the 
different authors think the causes of Presidentialisation were? Did they think the causes 
were somewhat similar or did they differ about the causes of a process of 
Presidentialisation? Did they have a genesis in changes in the political environment?  
As we have seen in the literature review, a major part of the concept of 
Presidentialisation is a reaction against the old, party dominated, cleavage and class 
controlled system. The nature of the old system had been “cautious, sensitive and 
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collaborative,” bound by a need to comply with party loyalty, electoral support and 
constitutional conventions. In this environment, as we have seen, parties were far more 
prominent influences over voters, and although leaders could be impressive figureheads, 
they were still that: figureheads, bound to the image of their parties and not able to 
develop their personas and stand independently. Any leaders that were able to free 
themselves from these shackles were only able to do so temporarily, due to the 
extenuating and extreme circumstances of World Wars, until Margaret Thatcher broke 
the post war mould. This provides the starting point for the works of Poguntke, Foley and 
Mughan. The changes in the political environment, that had occurred, especially since 
the 1960s, were not isolated, or temporary, but could be seen as part of a more profound 
and deep seated series of changes in Western polities. The authors cite many of the 
changes we saw in the literature review, about dealignment, changes in the media and 
Parliament. The central question for Poguntke and Webb was “whether there are 
contingent and structural (as opposed to formal-constitutional) factors at work that push 
modern democracies towards a more presidential mode.”154 Poguntke and Webb lay out 
their conception of the causes of Presidentialisation in a section called „The Dynamics of 
Presidentialisation‟. They outline three faces of Presidentialisation, intra-executive, intra-
party and electoral. The „faces‟ are where the visible manifestations of Presidentialisation 
become evident, the manifestations that result from structural and contingent causes that 
make up the concept of Presidentialisation. They demonstrate this in a diagram (Figure 
Two) of cause and effects of Presidentialisation.  
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Figure Two: The Causes and Faces of Presidentialisation (Poguntke and Webb)
155
  
We initially see two issues which have been cited by all the authors mentioned as key 
causes of Presidentialisation. The first of these is the erosion of traditional electoral and 
social cleavages. Poguntke and Webb state that the influence of the erosion of cleavages 
has been clearly shown in some areas, like in the marked decline in party memberships, 
and electorates becoming more “socially and ideologically heterogeneous.” A more fluid 
electorate would mean the “personal qualities of actual or prospective heads of 
government may become relatively more important for the conduct of election 
campaigns” as the importance of party and social alignments gradually drifted away. 
They traced the „end of ideology‟ debates of the early 1960s, and the associated 
interpretations of party transformation in the West as a time in which “traditional links 
between mass parties and their bases of social groups support have eroded.” Traditional 
parties had struggled to maintain the strength of their relationships with core 
constituencies, and counted less and less of them as firm bedrocks of support. 
The second structural factor listed by Poguntke and Webb is the changing structure of 
mass communications since the early 1960s. Naturally, television - which had become 
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people‟s first source of political information - tended to “focus on personality rather than 
programme in order to reduce the complexity of political issues, and politicians 
frequently respond by concentrating on symbolism, rather than substance or detail.”  This 
was also an area that affected newspapers, with more reporting driven by personality, and 
less coverage of the legislature. But Poguntke and Webb also emphasise there was a 
conscious choice by politicians to exploit the way the media worked for their own ends.   
The next of the structural causes that Poguntke and Webb list is the growth and 
complexity of the state. Poguntke and Webb point to how the “growing complexity and 
competence of the state” has generated a variety of responses, such as the centralisation 
of power, undermining of collective responsibility, and the core executive reducing the 
scope of their direct responsibility for government, while enhancing a coordinating 
ability in other areas. There was a consensus that there had been a move towards 
reinforcing the political core executive in most advanced industrial countries and within 
the core executive, and there had been an “increasing centralisation of authority around 
the person of the chief executive” to give coordination and direction to the sprawling 
mass of government.  
The fourth structural cause is the internationalisation of politics. This has been 
maintained and increased during the last decade - the integration of the EU has been 
furthered, and varied issues like terrorism, pollution, asylum, trade and finance have 
created new work and areas of competence for organisations like NATO, the G8, G20, 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the UN. These extra responsibilities have given 
international leaders more opportunities to meet, interact with, and make agreements 
with other international leaders, and gain a lot of coverage in their domestic media. The 
key part for Poguntke and Webb is that with a greater number of issues shifting to being 
dealt with by inter governmental negotiation, “this shifts power to the heads of 
governments and some of their key advisors or governmental colleagues” increasingly 
leaving Parliaments, and sometimes Cabinets, to be able to only “ratify the decisions that 
have been taken elsewhere.” In the case of the EU, it meant a whole tranche of domestic 
politics was decided in an international political arena, with leaders and senior 
government members, not Cabinets, Parliaments and parties. 
156
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This list of causes is very specific, and the clear integration into a diagram that links it to 
the effects of Presidentialisation is testament to the detail that Poguntke and Webb have 
included in their conceptual framework. The other two main works on Presidentialisation 
do not go into as much detail, but they do outline causes of Presidentialisation. Foley 
does not lay out a systematic list, but refers often to big changes which have affected the 
political landscape, like electoral dealingment, the different way the media treats politics, 
or different way leadership politics is seen. But his study of spatial leadership in the 
United States also raises some causes which may be applicable to Britain. He lists them 
as partisan dealignment and voter volatility, ticket splitting, the rise of candidate centred 
campaigns and personalised mandates, disaggregation of voter blocks, public concern 
with politicians‟ abuse of power, and declining public trust in the central Government.157 
Although there is little opportunity for ticket splitting to happen in Britain due to the 
electoral system, the core causes of partisan dealignment, leader centrality and public 
scepticism of politics all do happen, and indeed they are applied by Foley throughout the 
book, treated as de facto causes of Presidentialisation. These accord very closely to 
Poguntke and Webb‟s list of causes, and the significant changes to the political 
environment which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Mughan also highlights many 
of the same concerns in his book about the Presidentialisation of parliamentary elections. 
Mughan thinks that the “exogenous forces” of television based campaigning and 
electoral dealignment have caused Presidential and Parliamentary systems to look more 
like each other in some of the ways they operate. Television was better suited to 
projecting leaders rather than issues. From the 1960s, leaders have been treated by the 
media as serious players in their own right, and television had replaced papers as primary 
source of news. Like Poguntke and Webb, Mughan thinks declining party membership, 
itself partially a result of electoral dealignment, meant the parties needed to use the 
media, as it was one of the few ways they could „talk‟ to large numbers of their own, and 
potential, supporters. Mughan did think that partisan dealingment moved in tandem with 
the increasing effect of leaders, but was not a complete explanation of 
Presidentialisation.
158
 
We can see between the main authors there are quite a lot of similarities between them 
about how they regard the main causes of Presidentialisation. There are small differences 
like Mughan not completely seeing the case for partisan dealignment, or Poguntke and 
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Webb laying out the causes in a different way to the others, but overall they are very 
similar. They all lay heavy emphasis on two changes which we talked about in the 
literature review, the differing way politics was covered by the media, and partisan and 
class dealignment. Those, combined with other causes, were fuelling Presidentialisation, 
but what were the effects of this process? 
3.2.3 Effects of Presidentialisation: 
We have looked in the last section at what the authors think the causes of 
Presidentialisation are, but what exactly do they think have been the effects of the 
Presidentialisation process on British politics? How would a process of 
Presidentialisation actually change British politics? Again we see similarities between the 
different authors.  
All the main authors share the opinion that the old party system would survive in its basic 
physical form, and be largely untouched constitutionally, but it would show the ability to 
absorb change which would make it in practice more like a presidential system. For 
Mughan, convergence could take several forms, being the product of constitutional 
change, evolutionary change in the absence of constitutional change, and transient 
political circumstance. What the Presidentialisation theory asserts will happen is 
evolutionary change in the absence of constitutional change. Presidentialisation for 
Mughan‟s electoral study would mean a system where leaders could have an influence 
that would either gain or lose their party votes. It had two dimensions - presentation and 
impact - the leader increasingly becoming the public face of the party, and the 
behavioural effect party leaders have on the voting pattern of citizens. Mughan used polls 
that asked whether a party would have done better or worse under a different leader, and 
found the leaders did have an effect. As Mughan argues, “the culmination of evidence 
confirms that recent British general elections have indeed presidentialised in terms of 
both presentation and impact.”159 
In contrast, Poguntke and Webb use their detailed framework to judge if states had 
shifted location towards the „northern‟ (presidentialised) axis of their typology diagram. 
Since the “underlying questions on which the project is based are concerned with 
change” contributors were asked to assess given indicators for a sense of change from a 
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given baseline. The use of indicators was complicated by the fact that different indicators 
might not travel well from one country to another, given that the authors wanted 
“functionally equivalent indicators instead of simply using identical ones.” They 
suggested an indicative list which could capture the phenomenon of Presidentialisation in 
each of the three faces. In the executive face, the objective was for the authors to provide 
a “sense of the changing power resources and autonomy of leaders within government.” 
The indicators in the executive face were the growth of resources at the disposal of the 
chief executive, an integrated communications strategy controlled by the chief executive, 
increased centralisation, control and coordination of policy making by the chief 
executive, more personal polling, growing tendency to appoint more non-party 
technocrats or politicians without a large party base, more Cabinet reshuffles, and 
invoking a personalised mandate based upon their electoral appeal. In the party face, the 
authors focused on “potential changes which may indicate the development of a more 
personalised form of party leadership” and in addition to contingent gains of leadership 
power resources and autonomy, there were a number of “structural changes which 
permanently strengthen the role of leaders and make them more independent of middle 
level party elites.”160 They are rule changes which give party leaders more formal 
powers, the growth of leaders offices in terms of finance and personnel, the capacity of 
leaders to forge programmes autonomously of their parties, use of plebiscitary modes of 
political communication and mobilisation, evidence of personalised mandates (people 
becoming leading candidates despite not being the most senior politicians), and the 
institutionalisation of direct leadership elections. In terms of the electoral face, they 
wanted the authors to focus on campaign style (the prominence given to the leaders), 
media focus on the leaders, and leader effects on voting behaviour.  
In their conclusions, they said that there had been considerable contingent 
Presidentialisation within the executive face, but also that in every case, leaders' power 
resources and autonomy within executives had increased or were already at a high level. 
There was strong evidence that there were long term structural developments that would 
not be soon reversed, and there was “ample evidence of structurally induced 
Presidentialisation.” It would mean a greater capability for leaders to act, although not 
one that necessarily furthered their ability to achieve desired outcomes, and increased a 
tendency for leaders to govern past their parties and the most important social forces 
which support them, with skilful use of mass communications becoming an important 
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resource for this strategy, and the recourse to a personalised mandate making modern 
leaders simultaneously both stronger and weaker - they could go it alone with support of 
public opinion, but do little without. In the executive face, contingent factors had been 
very important, for example in Spain, Sweden and Britain, with the power of the 
executive swinging around according to the personality of the leader in office. In the 
party face there was a clear cut trend towards the growth of leaders‟ power within, and 
autonomy from, their parties. Empowering the grass roots had bypassed the activists in 
the parties. In the electoral face, leader centred campaigning had generally been 
increasing, but it was “less certain that voters are behaving more as if they were in a 
presidential system, with something approaching a direct accountability relationship with 
the head of the government” with parties still preponderant in voter assessments in 
parliamentary elections, and it being “probably the least convincing aspect of the 
Presidentialisation thesis,” although leader effects on voters were significant or 
increasing in eleven of the fourteen cases they examined. But there was a media 
perception that leaders had a large effect that convinced strategists to centre campaigns 
round leaders, furnishing leaders with legitimacy and a plausible claim that only the 
leader could deliver the vote. The leaders‟ relationship with their parties had 
fundamentally changed, and there was a complete change in the shift from a collective to 
an individual exercise of power and accountability. 
161
 There had been an increase in 
leader effects on the vote, with the public mapping character, not party traits, to the 
offices of state.
162
 In a table they list in the concluding chapter, Poguntke and Webb 
show that in almost all the countries studied, indicators of executive and party 
Presidentialisation changed in the expected direction, and did so, albeit less 
overwhelmingly, for electoral Presidentialisation. They found there had been a process of 
de facto Presidentialisation, a “shift in the direction of the typical presidential mode of 
operation” within the constraints of a parliamentary system.163 This brings it into stark 
contrast with Mughan‟s study. Other studies differ as well, such as Helms‟ work on 
Presidentialisation in Germany, where he found “precious little empirical evidence” to 
support a decisive impact of individual leaders on election campaigns.
164
 But if the case 
for the electoral impact of leaders was not completely convincing, it was still patently a 
big factor in the minds of politicians, and clearly a big influence on campaign strategists. 
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In the party face there had been a trend to leader centred inter party politics driven by the 
modern mass media and facilitated by loosening party loyalties. Another was the 
growing role of the electronic media, which focus on personalities rather than 
programmes. There had been overwhelming evidence in favour of Presidentialisation - a 
“shift in the direction of the typical Presidentialisation mode of operation.” There was 
still a party system, but the mass party of old was obsolete. De facto Presidentialisation 
was eroding the traditional party system although not supplanting it. Leaders could act 
with such power and autonomy, with a considerable focus on them, that under certain 
circumstances they could be thought of as akin to a President, and there was 
“indisputable evidence” of a shift in structural factors which generated greater potential 
for this Presidential working mode. 
165 
Foley is vaguer in his conclusions about the effects of Presidentialisation, saying it will 
lead to a politics that is more centred around leadership, where it becomes a key 
determinant of voting attention and the media agenda, and where it becomes an 
imperative for leaders to keep on top of, utilizing Presidentialisation strategies which 
may seem at odds with some of the imperatives of the old British collective system. 
Although the list of indicators Foley uses is not so extensive or exact, it does show many 
of the same features - leader centred campaigns out of utility, increased media focus on 
personality not policy, bypassing party elites, and a strengthened central structure around 
the leader. But it is the factor of „leaderland‟ that Foley uses that goes somewhat beyond 
other conceptions of Presidentialisation, and supplies the difference that makes his 
concept of the presidential dimension unique. But what is this concept exactly? It is 
definitely a concept that impacts upon the leader of the opposition, as it relates to 
leadership becoming an issue across the political spectrum, and indeed can affect minor 
parties as well. The development of a presidential dimension relates to the conception of 
the old working of the system. As Foley puts it, even with a strong, popular leader, they 
were still constricted to being the projection of their party, and relied on the parties own 
hierarchy for their position. But leaders were “no longer simply a front organisation for a 
party.” To “meet the requirements of contemporary political leadership” and be able to 
win elections and gain the day to day approval that was now crucial to them doing their 
jobs, leaders had to reveal more of their personalities to an electorate that was more 
interested in personalities than institutions. All leaders were working to establish 
leadership as a political issue, as a “separate criterion of political evaluation, and thereby 
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as a forum for personal advancement.” They had to prove they were worthy as leader of 
the British public, “within the constraints of what is still primarily a party competition for 
Government.” Thus contests of leadership had assumed a distinctive, and divergent, 
identity with its own style, that explained the popular interest in political leadership and a 
closer convergence between connotations of public and nation on the one hand and 
properties of individual leadership on the other. The presidential dimension was the 
existence of the need to have good leadership qualities, and be able to demonstrate them, 
and have them publicly appreciated. Leaders had to not merely appear in public, but 
show they had the qualities to claim to lead the public, and identify closely with them, 
through personalised interventions, outsider politics and spatial leadership. The media 
was responding to, and intensifying these demands, stretching leaders from their party by 
leadership centred analysis and polling, generating a leadership agenda and allowing 
leaders to appeal across weakening party lines. The fears of competitive disadvantage in 
the next general election was the “pole star” that allowed leaders to push such strategies 
independent of the parliamentary party system. And this was not a ridiculous fear, it was 
based on the reality of a media that was structured around the news value of making 
leaders the central topic of a lot of the news, and devoting burgeoning resources to 
analysis of issues in terms of leadership.
 
Leaders were regarded as encapsulations of the 
news. Leadership was a political issue, “employed as an evaluative category of political 
judgement and one to which substantive political effects are readily attributed.” One of 
the central factors to Foley‟s concept is that the presidential dimension would be able to 
act as an independent variable, which it hadn‟t been able to before.  The debate in Britain 
had largely missed the point, it being “good politics” to accuse the other side of having a 
presidential style, and not concentrating on the real issues, but missing the development 
of a “highly advanced and self-conscious politics of leadership.” His analysis of trends 
on the last 20 years of British politics, incorporating media, polling and primary data, 
made Foley assert that the public had become exposed to and conditioned by leaders, and 
“radiates a leadership dimension throughout British politics, but draws obstinately 
unrelated issues into its orbit” and “itself has become a political issue” which had created 
an “unprecedented public dimension to the perception of the political process and the 
nature of political conduct” which politicians had to condemn at the same time as 
secretly embracing and stimulating.
166
 There had been a world created called 
„leaderland‟. This is one concept that colours the work of Foley and Mughan, more than 
Poguntke and Webb. That voters or elites need to be exposed to aspects of the concept, 
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and them absorbing them in turn creates the fertile ground where Presidentialisation can 
occur, creating a reinforcing circle, where its growth encourages politicians and media to 
regard politics as presidential, which then reinforces voters in doing the same. 
Presidentialism was not “by and large synonymous with gullible voters being taken for a 
ride by unscrupulous politicians and image makers and a consequent enfeeblement of 
democratic choice.” Personality had become an „information shortcut‟.167 
Presidentialisation was an effect on and had been affected by, the cycle. The main parties 
had acted as “primary sponsors of a form of leader centred politics” in which individual 
leaders expected to project organisational integrity and programmatic intent and also 
provide conduit for reception and dispatch of political communications, be the main 
agents of electoral identity in a “volatile politics and electoral market place,” in which 
effective operators at this form of politics become key political assets. High performance 
leaders were valued, becoming defining strategic choices for parties.
168
 Certainly Foley‟s 
explanations of Presidentialisation go beyond these authors in his conception of an 
alternative space that would be created independent of the old norms in politics.  
The main authors show greater differences in their conceptions of the effects of 
Presidentialisation than the causes. There is general agreement that the process of 
Presidentialisation will cause a large degree of evolutionary change in the British 
political system, that it will give more power to leaders (subject to them being able to 
demonstrate ability to win elections) and it will intensify the development of a political, 
media and public environment that is centred around leaders. But there are differences in 
the scope of these effects - while Foley says it will lead to the grand vision of leaderland, 
Poguntke and Webb are more circumspect. 
3.2.4 Relevance to this Thesis 
At this point we will analyse how relevant the different concepts of Presidentialisation 
are to the proposed theme of the thesis, leaders of the opposition since 1997 and their 
place within British politics and party in a changing political environment.  There is 
substantial common ground between the accounts of Presidentialisation we have 
reviewed. Presidentialisation is conceptualised as a theory of political systems, not just a 
theory of political executives, even if most of its applications thus far have been to 
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leaders of the executive. While the term for some implies a dangerous and unnatural 
obsession with the American Presidency to the detriment of the British constitution, all 
the writers reviewed are clear about the way their conceptions of Presidentialisation draw 
heavily on the development of the US Presidency for inspiration and guidance. They do 
not afford any other state the same prominence in moulding the concept, even states that 
have presidential constitutions themselves. America is the analogy that these authors look 
to. They also agree that a focus on the institutional side of politics may have obscured the 
significant changes happening outside these institutions, even though the structure of the 
institutions were largely formally unchanged. All the studies start at the parliamentary 
system, and maintain that the British system remains Parliamentary.  The British system 
may be moving closer to the US system, but through the informal mode of operation. 
They think that such changes as will be wrought by the Presidentialisation process will 
not result in substantial changes to legal and constitutional rules, or even institutions. The 
changes will instead occur on a sub-constitutional level, and have more of an effect on 
leadership relations and interactions with those aspects of the political process conducted 
through outside institutions - with the media, with voters, with party and so on. The fact 
that it is a general area of agreement that Presidentialisation is not dependent on changes 
in the formal constitutional setting is relevant to the leaders of the opposition, and the 
structural constraints on them, in two ways. Firstly, the British constitution, 
notwithstanding early changes by Tony Blair to the House of Lords and Scottish and 
Welsh devolution, has undergone remarkably little change for a very long period, and 
being uncodified, such changes that have occurred, have been evolutionary. This 
manifests itself most obviously in the changes in the political environment that affect so 
much of what the leader of the opposition does. Secondly, very little of these changes can 
be taken to have changed the leader of the opposition‟s formal role. R.M.Punnett, in 
1973, defined the job of the opposition leader and his team as providing an office 
seeking, loyalist, single party, parliamentary opposition, in the style of an alternative 
government.  On the surface, not much has changed about these roles.
169
 Thirdly, the 
leader of the opposition is actually in many ways a more flexible and isolated position 
than the Prime Minister, not possessing the extensive institutional apparatus around him, 
the direct power of the Prime Minister in areas like when to call an election, representing 
the nation at summits, or power over Ministers with large departments and 
responsibilities. So the establishment of a connection with public and media, and 
electoral success, is not accompanied by the institutional and governmental apparatus 
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that surrounds the Prime Minister, and all the inherent duties and responsibilities that are 
dictated by the shape of the formal institutions. The connection is more immediate, and 
less affected by the office he occupies. 
This shows a great deal of relevance to the leader of the opposition. But what about the 
developments in the political environment that were causing these changes? Are they 
relevant to the leader of the opposition? The old assumptions that limited the power of 
leaders in Britain - that a Prime Minister was constrained by the Cabinet, that parties 
were far more important influences on voting decisions than leadership personalities, that 
voters voted largely according to class and social cleavages - are threatened by a changed 
political environment. There is substantial agreement between the authors on the causes 
of this new environment. All allow that contingent factors, such as a leader‟s personality, 
can to some extent control the phenomenon, even though these will not be of much use in 
explaining the long term trends and reasons for Presidentialisation.  It is the structural 
factors that are most important in explaining the process. Electoral dealignment, and the 
larger influence of the media, are two reasons which feature prominently in all of their 
conceptions of Presidentialisation, and appear to be most relevant to the leader of the 
opposition, because they can be shown to be directly applicable to him. Poguntke and 
Webb also offer the internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state, which are 
less directly relevant to the leader of the opposition, although in some ways there is a 
relevance that is mediated through the government. There are some ways in which the 
growing internationalisation of politics has been seen to impact upon politics. Leaders of 
the opposition also make some international visits and also attend meetings with groups 
of other similarly minded international leaders, and as Foley gives examples of, 
sometimes attempt to use these to gain publicity and improve the image of their 
leadership. The second factor that has the most direct impact is that the EU has led to 
more matters being decided in Brussels, impacting upon domestic politics, presenting 
complications and requiring responses from, the leader of the opposition. But the 
publicity bonus that EU leaders enjoy will not flow to the leader of the opposition in the 
same way. But even if the internationalisation of politics was not something that gave 
more direct power to the leader of the opposition, it was an influence he had to react to, 
and forms part of the political environment that the leader of the opposition existed in. 
The authors agree that these structural changes cannot be ignored by leaders, as coping 
with them successfully would be an immense help in achieving electoral success. This is 
a huge incentive and creates a self-reinforcing environment where the adoption of 
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Presidentialisation strategies by successful leaders encourages other leaders to do the 
same. This in turn conditions the media and public to treat presidential politics with great 
importance, especially by their focus on leadership questions - this is especially 
important for Foley, and a key part of the concept. But even if there are leaders who do 
not benefit from the process, it does not necessarily undermine the concept of 
Presidentialisation, as if it can be shown that their failure to adapt to a presidential 
environment has reduced their ability to compete in presidential politics then it still says 
many different things about the environment. It is this concept which hangs the structural 
changes together, and quite obviously is very relevant to the leader of the opposition, 
indeed, if true, it is a concept he cannot possibly avoid. Presidentialisation is, as we have 
seen, an overall conception of evolutionary change in the system, and of course the 
opposition cannot be ignored here, for if what Foley theorises is actually to happen, then 
the opposition must play some sort of role for there to be a presidential dimension, or 
fully fledged leadership politics. Just like the United States, it is only the assimilation and 
driving forward of the politics of leadership by leaders other than the head of the 
executive that can hope to perpetuate it. If there are non-institutional changes in politics, 
then opposition is just as open to them as the executive. 
But it is important to note that there are some parts of Presidentialisation theory that are 
very difficult to apply to the leader of the opposition. The place of the leader of the 
opposition is a unique one. While he resides in an adversarial, majoritarian system, and 
has to compete electorally to gain power, his influence over the Government and the 
machinery of power is usually not direct. We see some of the features of the majoritarian 
system, in that the leader of the opposition is not often working within an alliance, or 
enjoying direct influence with the machinery of government. But the leader of the 
opposition is not within the definition of a consensual system, and the actual environment 
he occupies does not exactly match the one described by the authors here. This is because 
of a bias towards the executive leader, shared by most of the works on 
Presidentialisation. At this point we have to ask ourselves why this bias exists and if it 
precludes the possibility of applying Presidentialisation theory to the leader of the 
opposition. Undoubtedly the Prime Minister is in a more prominent position and receives 
the majority of academic attention. Some of the aspects of Presidentialisation like the 
internationalisation of politics or an expanding state, realistically only apply to the leader 
of the executive. But can the fundamental principle of Presidentialisation apply to the 
leader of the opposition? We would contend that it would. Presidentialisation, as we have 
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seen, refers to a process by which there is sub-constitutional change, leading to greater 
prominence and autonomy of action for leaders. As we saw in the literature review, 
leaders of the opposition were, in their way, an important part of the political system. 
Despite their lack of power over government, it did not prevent opposition having 
definite interaction with the principles that defined the system - it formed one of the large 
power blocs that were supposedly crucial to maintaining the system, and were an 
established part of Parliamentary workings, maintaining scrutiny and adversarial politics. 
The opposition was affected by the system and could affect it. Can we say this is true 
today? With qualification, yes. Qualification because the range of areas opposition 
participates in is somewhat different. There are areas like the internationalisation of 
politics, and the growth of the state, which have not had as much of an impact directly on 
the leader of the opposition. But there are many aspects of the change Presidentialisation 
represents that do impact upon the leader of the opposition, especially in what Poguntke 
and Webb call the electoral and party faces, which can be applied almost verbatim to the 
leader of the opposition as they are to the leader of the executive. As Presidentialisation 
is a theory which exists mostly outside institutions, and prioritises leadership above 
party, it is surprisingly flexible in its potential application to leaders not in the executive. 
Elements of the executive face can be also applied as part of the other two faces as well, 
like an integrated communication strategy, more personal polling, and invoking a 
personalised mandate. The causes of executive Presidentialisation, the 
internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state, are influences that the leader 
of the opposition has to constantly react to. In addition, his own „Shadow Executive‟ of 
the Shadow Cabinet has to work in accompaniment with the leader of the opposition and 
react to his authority. 
Poguntke and Webb produce a comprehensive list of effects of Presidentialisation, but on 
their own they do not tell the whole story of a leader of the opposition and his place in 
the political system. It is Foley‟s leaderland which helps do this. Even if leaders do not 
benefit from it, they will still be sucked into „leaderland‟. Because a leader‟s personality 
was so much more prominent in determining the fortunes of the parties at elections, a 
leader whose struggles were undermining the poll position would be more vulnerable to a 
restless party and media.  In leaderland, most political issues tended to be seen through 
the prism of the two main leaders, no matter how little control they had over these issues. 
The personality traits of leaders were a far bigger cue for editorial and electoral agendas.  
The debate that Foley flags up between Presidentialisation and the presidential dimension 
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is largely a side issue. Ironically, by blazing a trail with the theory that „the British 
presidency‟ was not a process that would turn the British political system into an 
institutional replica of the US presidency, and creating an environment where other 
authors have used this definition, to now think of Presidentialisation in these terms is not 
as realistic as it may have been in 1993, when Foley wrote the first edition of The British 
Presidency. We can allow that there have been changes to the structural environment that 
leaders exist in that are not the result of formal changes to state institutions. As we have 
seen, there are definitions and conceptions of Presidentialisation that allow us to apply 
this concept of a leadership dimension to the leader of the opposition. It is vitally 
important to do this as it is a concept that is potentially a guiding principle by which the 
leader of the opposition does his job, and the debate about semantics should not be one 
which stops it being included in this thesis. 
The authors‟ conceptual frameworks include some contingent factors that are prone to 
change. In Poguntke and Webb‟s diagram of their framework they list these as the leader 
and the political context that exists in a nation‟s politics at one time. Obviously the 
political context will be always relevant to any study of politics. But how should we view 
the role of the leader, when the proposed timescale of the thesis includes so many 
different leaders? As Foley and Poguntke maintain, the process of Presidentialisation 
offers political leaders opportunity to increase their prominence and power over other 
political actors, but, and this is a large qualification, only if they are able to demonstrate 
to their political allies and others that they are going to win an election, or at the least 
seriously have the potential to lead their party to electoral victory. As Foley points out, a 
leader that is not able to prove this may actually find himself even weaker than he would 
have been under the old environment - witness the struggles of John Major after the 
Conservative party regressed significantly in the polls, his two immediate successors as 
Conservative leader as they struggled with low and static poll ratings throughout their 
tenures, or the tough times Gordon Brown endured since pulling out of calling an 
election, fearing he would not win. The nature of evolutionary, but fundamental, change 
in the system does not just offer the opportunity for some leaders to profit out of it, but 
raises the possibility that leaders with a style more suited to the old conception of the 
system will be net losers. This new law in the political system increases the self-interest 
of parties in picking leaders that have the attributes required to deliver success in the new 
system. In turn this helps create a politics which is unashamedly centred around 
leadership, and has an independent space where the leaders compete against each other, 
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separate from party. The losers out of this leadership space are just as important as the 
winners in relevance to the Presidentialisation concept and a changed political 
environment. 
We posed the question at the start of this section as to whether Presidentialisation was a 
suitable tool to use in analysing the fortunes of Conservative leaders of the opposition 
from 1997, in a way that was based around structural concerns and not just agents, and 
that reflected what changes in the political environment had done to these structural 
concerns. It has been found that Presidentialisation suits most of these objectives. In 
relation to the political environment, it is a theory that has had to take account of the 
changes in the political environment in the broadest possible way, often outside the 
institutions of the British state, which is what most opposition studies had been 
traditionally constructed around. Presidentialisation is also a theory that is based around 
leadership, and additionally the interaction of leadership with the outside environment 
and other leaders. Significantly the construction of Presidentialisation theory, and 
especially the emphasis of interaction between leaders and the creation of an autonomous 
sector of leadership, provides a way of conceptualising the position of the leader of the 
opposition relative to his more powerful counterpart, the Prime Minister.  
The studies here and their conceptions of change in the political environment - the media 
and electoral causes of this, the way the change worked outside institutions - are very 
relevant to the leader of the opposition. But these studies do not on their own provide the 
framework for this thesis to assess Conservative oppositions since 1997. Despite Foley‟s 
protestations that his study concerns leadership in general, many of his references orbit 
around the Prime Minister and many of the references use the Prime Minister as a 
yardstick. This is the same in the Poguntke and Webb study as well. Mughan is more 
balanced but only applies his work to elections and not beyond. How would a study work 
that incorporated the institution of Prime Minister but made its main focus the study of 
the Conservatives in opposition, recognising the importance of this end and the study of 
opposition? 
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3.3 The Conceptual Framework of This Thesis 
In the previous section we looked at what elements of different authors‟ conceptions of 
Presidentialisation we could conceivably utilize in a thesis about the leader of the 
opposition. Having done this, now we must establish a conceptual framework. What are 
the basic principles of it, and how will it apply to the leader of the opposition? 
This thesis will assert that there have been fundamental changes at a sub constitutional 
level in British politics since the breakdown of the hegemony of the Westminster Model. 
These changes have not produced recent literature on the Conservatives in opposition 
that takes account of these changes and uses them to form their conceptual frameworks. 
Indeed no one conceptual framework has emerged and the literature focuses on agent-
centred networks. Although the changes in the political environment have not occurred 
„deliberately‟, at the behest of one actor, or for the same reasons, they have had a similar 
set of causes and effects to events surrounding the US Presidency and can be called 
„Presidentialisation‟. This is a process whereby electoral dealignment, change in the 
media, the growth of the state and the internationalisation of politics, have had effects on 
the executive, party and electoral areas, and created an overall form of political 
competition that is defined by leadership, where leaders have more power and autonomy.  
The thesis will be based on providing a coherent way to study different opposition 
leaders in the modern political environment. It recognises that although structure is a 
focus of the study, this extends to the political environment, and that institutional 
explanations of the political system do not help us construct the framework, for most of 
the changes in the political environment have occurred outside the institutions of the 
British system, of which the opposition is a formal part. But what are the changes in the 
environment that have altered the nature of the political system, leading to the 
development and discussion of Presidentialisation theory, that thus far has been mostly 
applied to the executive? We judge this by looking back to key points academics used to 
define the Westminster Model. That environment was characterised by high levels of 
class alignment that dictated voting preferences, a respect and focus on Parliament, a 
media that was reluctant to engage in personality politics, and a Cabinet that could 
control most state activity. All of these aspects have changed, especially voter 
dealignment and greater media focus on leaders. These changes have convinced party 
strategists there is a need to promote their leaders more and give them more autonomy. 
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These imperatives apply just as much to the leader of the opposition. The political 
environment of old encouraged the opposition to win debates in parliament, and win 
elections on the minute of policy. This framework contends that the new environment 
requires the opposition to select a leader who can gain enough independent support, 
disassociate themselves from party when they need to, and put their leadership to the fore 
as an issue, which requires interactions with other leaders and ability to set the agenda 
over them. This is what is central for the leader of the opposition. But the leader of the 
opposition cannot just be assessed by themselves, they need to be assessed in conjunction 
with the overall place of leadership within the political system, for this forms the bridge 
between the wider political environment and what the leader of the opposition does.  
We have seen in the previous section that there are large amounts of the conceptual 
framework of each work that we have detailed that are relevant to opposition, and most 
specifically its leader. In Poguntke and Webb‟s work, almost all of the party and electoral 
faces can be applied to the leader of the opposition, while some of the executive face can 
be applied to the leader. Foley‟s concept of leaderland is definitely relevant to the leader 
of the opposition, as it is an important way in which to broadly conceptualise the changed 
political environment that the leader of the opposition is affected by, and affects. The 
Mughan study, while more limited in conceptual scope, reaffirms the points that the other 
works make. Although the studies that we have looked at spend most of their time 
analysing the executive, they provide a way of conceptualising the radically changed 
political environment that has been little developed in recent works about opposition. 
Thereby, by combining and modifying parts of the Foley and Poguntke frameworks, we 
can form a picture of what a study about the leader of the opposition would look like. 
The thesis will utilize many similar principles to the three authors. There has been 
fundamental change in the British system, but within the contours and rules of a still 
intact, but evolved, parliamentary system. Overly institutionalist explanations of this 
system are a hindrance to proper explanation of it, especially when so much of the 
evolutionary change is happening outside the central institutions - and this applies even 
more to the leader of the opposition. But the structural constraints that exist outside these 
institutions are becoming increasingly important. We have seen that the structure and 
concept of Poguntke and Webb‟s party and electoral faces still allow for manifestations 
of Presidentialisation by the opposition, as the structural influences of an increasingly 
dealinged electorate and the mediatisation of politics are still direct influences on the 
leader of the opposition. While the whole extent of the executive face is not applicable 
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due to the different constitutional and political position of the leader of the opposition we 
can establish the extent of the leader‟s influence across his central team, and his reactions 
to the growth of the state and the internationalisation of politics. The concept of the 
presidential dimension that Foley talks about, how conditioned the public and media are 
to Presidentialisation, and how much they have come to expect, or want, leaders to use 
Presidentialisation strategies, and how fertile the ground is for the employment of these 
strategies, truly goes to the nub of the issue. For it equally affects the leader of the 
opposition, perhaps even more so than the Prime Minister. If politics creates and sustains 
this leaderland, this continual battle for public leadership, it then should become the only 
way for the leader of the opposition to achieve his goals, and becomes instrumental for 
the party to allow this in the pursuit of electoral victory. This is why we have to include a 
section, alongside the influence of the executive, that assesses whether there is an 
independent political space for leaders, and whether it really is a concept that governs 
political strategies at the top level, as it is the best way of encapsulating the entire 
political environment as a whole, a key part of the thesis.  This will be informed by the 
overall work of the thesis undertaken within the other faces, and will form part of the 
overall conclusions of the thesis and the overall framework.  
Therefore we have multiple levels to this framework. It is a framework constructed to 
assess the leader of the opposition, and how he is affected by major changes to the 
political environment. It starts with these major changes to the political environment, as 
they are the bedrock of the framework. The changing structure of mass communication 
and the gradual erosion of partisan and social cleavages are hugely important to the 
political environment that the leader of the opposition faces.  The internationalisation of 
politics and the growth of the state also affect the political environment, but they are less 
direct, and are mediated by the political context, especially the actions of the 
government. These changes affect three „faces‟ of Presidentialisation for the leader of the 
opposition, electoral, intra party and executive. These faces affect, and are affected by, 
the creation of a leadership space. Was an independent area of politics created centred 
around leadership, and did the leaders of the opposition exhibit the characteristics of 
„presidential‟ leaders and translate them to the political agenda? Ultimately do leaders of 
the opposition have to abide by the principles of a presidentialised environment, or has 
this been a mirage, only applicable to the Prime Minister as a framework of analysis? 
The arena of leadership does not exist in a vacuum, it is at the same time a potential spur 
to Presidentialisation in each of the three faces and potentially changed by continuing 
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Presidentialisation in these three faces. Ultimately, it has to be the nature of this 
relationship, and the detail of Presidentialisation in three faces, that we derive our 
conclusions from. In terms of how this feeds into the overall structure of the thesis, we 
can now envisage three substantive chapters, informed by the Poguntke and Webb 
framework, with the concluding chapter taking account of Foley‟s conception of a 
presidential dimension that brings more of an overall picture of the state of British 
politics. The chapters on the party and electoral faces can be applied almost as exactly as 
they were by Poguntke and Webb, being as relevant as they are to the leader of the 
opposition as to the leader of the executive. The party chapter is about an analysis of the 
relationship between the leader of the opposition and his party, to see if there has been a 
shift in intra party power to the benefit of the leader. It is based around four main 
sections:  the structure of power in the party, the intra party balance between party and 
leader (formal and informal), whether the leader competes for the electoral mandate, and 
the concentration of power resources in the leader‟s office.  It will utilise the flowing 
indicators: rule changes which give the party leader more formal powers, the growth of 
the leaders‟ offices in terms of funding and personnel, the capacity of leaders to forge 
programmes autonomously of their parties, the use of plebiscitary modes of political 
communication and mobilisation, evidence of personalised mandates and the 
institutionalisation of direct leadership elections. The chapter about the electoral face is 
also split into four sections: an overview of the 2001 and 2005 campaigns, dynamics of 
election campaigning and leadership, media coverage of politics and the leader of the 
opposition and significance of leader effects on voting behaviour. It will use the 
following indicators: amount of media coverage focused on leaders, leadership focus in 
party publicity material, increased leader effects/ salience on voters. The chapter on 
executive Presidentialisation cannot be directly applied, as the leader of the opposition 
does not control the state apparatus that the Prime Minister does. Instead we must 
consider something wider – the political environment, and a network of influences that 
the leader of the opposition cannot directly control, but has to interact with and respond 
to. This encompasses a global level of Foley‟s leaderland, looking at the efforts leaders 
of the opposition made to promote their formal and informal qualities of leadership, 
while also considering if the media treated leadership as an independent dimension. 
There is a micro level of executive actions and structure, which the opposition also has to 
respond to. The concluding chapter brings together the structural influences on the leader 
of the opposition, and assesses how they have affected the leader of the opposition 
against his party and his wider place in British politics. 
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So the overall conceptual framework this thesis uses has been established. It treats 
Presidentialisation as a concept that may make the parliamentary system look more like 
the U.S Presidential system, but will not change it in a legal-constitutional sense. It starts 
and ends in analysis of a parliamentary system but one that has experienced a huge 
change in the environment it exists in from the class aligned, parliament centred, 
Westminster Model which had prevailed post-war. It has created structural constraints on 
the leader of the opposition that have large potential impacts on his relationship with his 
party and his place in British politics. Integrating Presidentialisation theory in the 
conceptual framework is a coherent way of bringing the main changes together and 
applying them to the leader.  
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4  Parties and Leaders 
This chapter covers the relationship between the leader of the opposition and the 
Conservative party since 1997, following the structure of the conceptual framework. It 
touches on a debate which has increasingly become more prominent in British politics, 
that to be successful, a leader has to separate themselves from their party, because so 
much political and electoral attention is focused on leaders. This forms a key part of the 
argument of those who say that British politics is undergoing a process of 
Presidentialisation, for it takes power away from parties (albeit on a short term, volatile 
basis). But this is not a position that is universally accepted. Some accept there was a 
move of power and prominence towards leaders, but contend it has not fundamentally 
altered the nature of a system still based around parties, who still dictate most voting 
preferences and give the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition their respective 
status in Parliament. However Presidentialisation theorists have explained this by saying 
that as more responsibility accrues to leaders for the party‟s electoral position, then if the 
leaders do not produce near instant success in the polls they will be vulnerable to 
challenges from the party. Most challenges to leaders now are not based on ideology or 
policy, but personality and an unwillingness to tolerate a leader who is unpopular with 
the public.
170
  
In this chapter we assess the question of whether Presidentialisation and a changed 
political environment have brought a shift in power from the party towards the leader. To 
help do this we will start off by establishing what the structure of power was in the 
Conservative party prior to 1997, and how these leaders were elected by the party. The 
next analysis splits into three main areas, following the conceptual framework. The first 
is the shift in intra-party power to the benefit of the leader, with the leader having 
growing autonomy from the dominant coalitions of power within the party, via 
personalised mandates. This is divided into structural and informal ways of changing the 
balance of power. The next is a shift towards recognition by the party that it is the leader 
rather than the party competing for a popular mandate. The last section is about a 
concentration of resources in the leader‟s office, devoted to enhancing the leader‟s 
personal standing, not controlling the party machinery. And all in mind of the 
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overarching theory that leaders will be stronger when electorally successful, but more 
vulnerable when defeated.  
4.1 Power in the Party 
To establish the dominant alliances of power within the party, we must look at the 
structure and attitudes of the Conservative party before 1997, and how they changed 
since 1997. The Conservative party traditionally showed deference to the leader, without 
much of the fractiousness of Labour. But they had belied this reputation for unity, and 
acted in an exceptionally fractious way, during the 1992-1997 Parliament. Rebellions, 
plots, and even a shock leadership election revealed a party split over the economy, the 
legacy of Thatcherism, and especially Europe. The disunity made the Conservatives look 
even less electable. The structure of the party, ill-suited to preventing the indiscipline, 
partially contributed towards this defeat. The rebellion over the passing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993 showed the problems the leader had in establishing effective control. 
During its passage, there was a band of over twenty rebels who consistently voted against 
the treaty. The Government was only able to pass it by desperately linking it to a vote of 
no confidence. The Government‟s progress after this event challenged some of the 
assumptions of Presidentialisation theorists. The Prime Minister and Conservative party 
leader, John Major, had entered office with a high personal rating. While this had 
shattered in the aftermath of the ERM debacle in 1992, the Conservatives had won a 
General Election that year. Major‟s personality had been extolled during the campaign, 
with the Conservatives producing a political broadcast about his humble upbringings, and 
the newspapers calling him „Honest John‟ thanks to his simple (although planned) style 
of addressing the public standing on an improvised wooden soapbox.
171
 Going by 
Presidentialisation theory, we might expect that the claim to a personally won mandate 
might have had some sort of hold over the parliamentary party. Instead, over Maastricht, 
there were MPs willing to make Major look weak, and imperil his leadership of the party, 
over an issue of policy and ideology, not primarily of personality. Major had constant 
difficulties applying discipline, to voluntary, parliamentary and professional wings of the 
party that were not even formally united. Major had difficulty in offering carrots, or 
sticks, to rebellious characters. Although he withdrew the party whip from the most 
persistent offenders, the independence of local party associations meant that he could not 
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have these MPs deselected. Most discussions of the Conservative leader were inseparable 
from the state of chaos in his party, with Blair putting it most succinctly - „I lead my 
party, he follows his‟.172 This, and the ruthless way the Conservative party had brought 
down Thatcher in 1990, demonstrated that the Conservative party could wield extreme 
power over leaders, and was partially shielded from the leader‟s ire by the messy 
organisational structure of the party. The resulting disunity had not helped the 
Conservatives at all before the 1997 general election.  
There was no sign that this febrile state would change, and if anything the return to 
opposition seemed like it would make it worse. Even before the general election 
campaign had finished, there were stories of plotting by the main leadership candidates. 
A series of ideological fault lines in the party had developed. The Conservative 
parliamentary party emerged from 1997 much smaller, wounded by division, and unsure 
whether to move on from, or unite around, Thatcherism, some never quite having come 
to terms with deposing Thatcher in 1990. On one level, Thatcher had been a stunningly 
successful leader, winning three general elections with a style of leadership that relied 
more on her personality than previous leaders. She had broken acceptance of the post war 
consensus, had an „ism‟ named after her, presided over a great British move up the 
international competiveness league tables, greatly reduced the power of trade unions to 
wreck businesses through strikes, and facilitated a massive increase in home and share 
ownership.
173
 But for many others she was also the Prime Minister who great swathes of 
the population had hated for her ideological and confrontational nature, who had only 
won elections due to the split in the British left, and had been guilty of abandoning the 
steady pragmatism and caution which had made the Conservatives so electorally 
successful. As we see from Heppell‟s ideological categorisation of MPs, the infighting of 
the 1980s had mutated into three main areas of division. One was the divide between 
Eurosceptics and Europhiles. Another was between economic liberals and „wets‟. And 
the third was between social conservatives and liberals.
174
 Each divide was inextricably 
linked to Thatcher herself. Despite various arguments about whether she really had 
promoted „her‟ values, and to what extent, Thatcherism was generally associated with 
euroscepticism, economic liberalism and social conservatism, and Thatcher herself was 
very concerned that the party would continue to promote them. Despite some 
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inconsistencies, she was personally associated with these three modes of thought, and 
became even more hardline in advocating them after leaving office.  After 15 years of her 
leadership, the party had become more receptive to them, and this had been reflected in 
the constant challenges to Major over Europe and tax, and the springing up of 
Thatcherite groups like No Turning Back. The 1997 election ushered in a more 
Thatcherite parliamentary party.
175
 Since Thatcher had been deposed as Prime Minister, 
her stature had risen, with many reflecting that she really had changed British politics. 
Even Labour had publically accepted many of her main reforms.
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 The fact that she 
remained publically active in politics meant that any leader of the opposition post 1997 
faced an immediate dilemma. How would they establish an independent and credible 
political position and image that would not lead to the accusation that they were a puppet 
of Thatcher‟s, or alternatively that they were trashing the legacy of a visionary leader? 
Following the assumptions of presidential politics, this problem became even trickier for 
any leader. If politics was becoming more about the leaders putting a vision of their own 
personalities across, it would surely not help to have one of the giants of post war politics 
„leading‟ the actions of many in the Conservative party who proudly declared themselves 
Thatcherites. And this was against the knowledge that Thatcher, unlike many former 
Conservative and Labour leaders, would often not opt to keep quiet to save her party 
embarrassment if they had done something that she did not like. Indeed, this had gone as 
far as Thatcher inciting Conservative members to vote against the Government during the 
passing of the Maastricht Treaty.
177
  
But while the place of Thatcherism within the Conservative party may have been very 
strong after 1997, it was not unchallenged. There were still vocal rumps of pro-
Europeans, economic wets and social liberals, who claimed to represent „traditional‟ 
conservatism, and who often appealed to the „One Nation‟ wing of the party. This 
provided the context for the leadership election in 1997 that took place after the general 
election. After Major‟s desperate attempts to hold the middle line between the right and 
the left of the party, especially over Europe, the expectation was that the leadership 
election would be decisive. As we shall see, the 1997 election effectively turned into a 
faceoff between the Thatcherites and the left, with the left still strong enough to send a 
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candidate through to the final round. So any Conservative leader after 1997 attempting to 
gain more power for themselves in relation to their party, faced the challenge of a party 
that had become much more guided by Thatcherism, but not united by it, had grown 
accustomed to plotting, ideological battles and infighting, contained vocal minorities, 
independent local associations, and a constitution that offered the leader little opportunity 
to communicate directly with members. 
4.1.1 Leadership Elections and the Changing Power Structure of the Party 
This section looks at the context that the leaders of the Conservative party since 1997 
have had to wield power in. This encompasses two main areas, how the leaders won 
power, and what this said about the make up of the Parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary party. We will also look at changes to the formal structure of the party, as 
this also affects the context that leaders exercise power in.  
The Conservative leadership elections provide a gauge of the Conservative parliamentary 
party, the membership, and an indication of leaders‟ power bases within the party. Of the 
four leaders of the Conservative party during this era, only three were actually elected in 
a full scale leadership election - Michael Howard acceded to the leadership unopposed in 
2003. William Hague won a contest purely among Conservative MPs in 1997, while Iain 
Duncan Smith and David Cameron won mixed contests between MPs and all party 
members in 2001 and 2005 respectively. Both Hague and Duncan Smith suffered from 
the limited nature of their wins in their leadership contests, and the impact that had on 
their relations with the dominant wing of the party, the Thatcherites. Heppell‟s typology 
of the MPs who voted in Conservative party leadership elections finds that in respect to 
the parliamentary Conservative party, 80% were economically liberal, 90% were 
eurosceptic and 80% were socially conservative, matching the Thatcherite stance.
178
 
Under Hague, it became apparent from early on in his leadership that he would have to 
deal with a high volume of criticism from both ideological „sides‟ of the party, varying in 
their source, often according to what Hague was doing or what his political strategy 
appeared to be. It would be expected that whichever one of the camps gained control, 
there would be a proportionally bigger amount of public dissension from the 
„disenfranchised‟ group. But both sides of the ideological divide subjected him to intense 
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criticism and scrutiny. In looking at why this was, we first must consider the 1997 
leadership election and how and why Hague won it. 
The leadership election in 1997 was one that was conducted in a fiercely hostile 
atmosphere. Passions on both sides of the ideological divide towards each other were 
“personalised, ideologically divisive and traumatic.”179 To add to the atmosphere of 
chaos, there was no runaway favourite, all of the candidates seeming to possess 
significant drawbacks. The perception prior to the 1997 general election was that the 
leadership election would turn into a showdown between the unofficial leaders of the 
Eurosceptic Right and the Pro European Left, Michael Portillo and Michael Heseltine. 
But due to Portillo losing his seat, and Heseltine‟s health problems, both did not 
participate. Both sides of the internal divide had been robbed of their totems. Although 
Clarke seemed to fill the gap for the left, this did not happen with the Eurosceptic right, 
which fractured in three different directions, around Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and 
John Redwood. In this environment, Hague possessed some key advantages. His status as 
the “least unpopular and the most inoffensive” of the candidates on the right, and his 
relatively low profile meant he had the fewest enemies. Despite starting the contest with 
a relatively small bunch of supporters, most of them party centrists, he was in a strong 
position to pick up votes from defeated candidates in subsequent ballots. One other piece 
of good fortune for Hague was the pact between Kenneth Clarke and John Redwood 
before the final ballot. Such an alliance, far from being seen as a welcome portent of the 
party beginning to unite again, was seen as implausible, alienating the right and the left. 
It made the atmosphere worse, spurring the public intervention of Margaret Thatcher - “I 
am supporting William Hague for the same kind of principled government which I lead,” 
- and drove many from the firm right of the party to Hague, who won. There was a 
perception of Hague as a default leader due to the fact Heseltine and Portillo had been 
unable to participate. It was begrudging support and a shallow mandate. Hague suffered 
because he was “insufficiently identifiable with the Thatcherites to articulate a new 
narrative of Conservatism that transcended Thatcherite Conservatism.” The votes that 
had taken him to victory were at best third preference votes, reflecting the cautious, 
incremental and pragmatic measure of the support Hague had slowly built throughout the 
election. Ultimately, the last ballot had largely been about what was termed getting a 
leader who was not Clarke, and Hague had happened to be that anyone, elected not so 
much for what he stood for (his previously low public profile and cautious statements 
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during the campaign had not done much to enlighten) as what he was not, and what he 
could stop. It meant that Hague started his term with the dual problem that he was seen as 
a “default leader” who had won due to luck, and a leader that could not lay claim to a 
large body of supporters bound to his vision and leadership. This would store up 
problems for Hague‟s relationship with his party in the four years that followed. 
Much the same analysis applied to Duncan Smith, four years later. Duncan Smith won 
the leadership after finishing second in the final ballot of MPs and then beating Clarke in 
the final vote among all members. Duncan Smith‟s support among MPs was 
ideologically defined - all of his supporters were economically liberal eurosceptics, while 
all but one was a social conservative.
180
 This was a contrast to Clarke and Portillo, who 
had managed to attract eurosceptics and social conservatives. This meant that from the 
start Duncan Smith was the creation of the Thatcherite right. With the ballot of members, 
of course it is not possible to categorise all members‟ views so precisely, but it is 
possible to discern from polls taken at the time that the membership was overwhelmingly 
Thatcherite, even more so than the parliamentary party.
181
 Duncan Smith‟s history as one 
of the Europe rebels meant he stood very clearly in the public and party mind as on the 
Thatcherite wing (an impression Duncan Smith did little to dispel by his frequent 
skirmishes with Clarke during the contest).
182
 Despite a rise to Shadow Defence 
Secretary, he was very inexperienced, and extremely unknown to the public. Clarke was 
the choice of more of the general public. Duncan Smith had been helped by a number of 
high profile endorsements in the final stage of the campaign, including Lady Thatcher 
who declared Clarke was not the right man, due to his sympathies to the European 
Union, and praised Duncan Smith for his qualities and ability to defend much of the 
Thatcherite agenda.
183
 The perception, which had been abetted by the leadership election, 
of Duncan Smith as on the extremities of Thatcherite Conservatism, meant that the 
moves he made in his opening months as leader to move away from Thatcherism 
“managed to antagonise traditional pure Thatcherites.” On the other hand, modernisers, 
while welcoming these moves, were still deeply suspicious of Duncan Smith‟s 
authenticity as a moderniser, “an implausible indicator of the modernisation and 
inclusivity agenda,” and still remained ready to criticise the leader. When Duncan Smith 
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switched back to a more Thatcherite position during the second year of his leadership, 
then he was truly stuck, having completely antagonised the modernisers, being forced 
into moving to a harder position to shore up support with the dominant Thatcherites who 
were lukewarm supporters of him.
184
 The impression was that Duncan Smith had 
sneaked through as leader thanks to the new Conservative electoral system that put the 
deciding vote in the hands of all the party members.
185 
Stephen Dorrell said that the 
election of Duncan Smith “should never have happened....it was a dead end....crude.” The 
leadership rules in 1997 had militated against Clarke, and he had been defeated by the 
party‟s ideological obsession with Europe. By 2001 Dorrell opined that the party was 
beginning to tire of these obsessions, but “by then the party in the country had become 
involved in this great ideological debate as well,” and was so captured by it that it did not 
recognise the “relative non-importance of European issues to the electorate” leading to 
electoral marginalisation.”186  
The way Michael Howard won the leadership was very different to Hague or Duncan 
Smith. Unlike them, there was no long, gruelling leadership campaign, with the different 
sides of the party bad mouthing each other. Indeed the way Howard was elected can be 
traced to the desire to avoid this type of campaign, for the fear of having a fractious battle 
in the middle of a parliament, one that could tip the party over the financial precipice 
(large donations had dried up under Duncan Smith‟s leadership), and a contest under the 
„Hague Rules‟ of leadership selection, which had lost some credibility after the election 
of Duncan Smith.
187
  So characterising Howard‟s rise to the leadership in the same 
ideological terms as the 1997 and 2001 changes of leadership does not fully explain it. 
Howard stood as a unity candidate, emphasising his ability as a safe pair of hands to 
unite the party at a difficult time, and build up to an effective election campaign. Having 
been a minister heavily associated with the authoritarian right, he now echoed the calls of 
modernisers for the party to become more inclusive and as Shadow Chancellor had 
argued against the wishes of many Thatcherites to promise large income tax cuts. He was 
the first candidate since 1997 not to have an endorsement from Thatcher, indeed 
Thatcher did not intervene publically in the contest at all. Although David Davis, a 
committed Thatcherite, considered standing, he did not in the end for fear that it would 
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lead to more infighting in a fruitless cause, and that he would be blamed for it. Michael 
Portillo and Kenneth Clarke, the only two senior figures of comparable stature to 
Howard, decided not to stand. Instead, Howard was ushered into the leadership „by 
acclamation‟, with him being the only candidate, and no vote occurring either among 
MPs or ordinary members of the party. But Howard still owed his leadership in some 
way to the different sides of the divisions within the party. The modernisers had created 
the conditions for Howard to march unopposed to the leadership, by bringing out into the 
open and fanning the scandal that was the pretext for deposing Duncan Smith in the first 
place. And although the right did not oppose him, with their in-built majority among both 
wings of the party it is inconceivable that they would not have put forward a candidate to 
challenge Howard if senior figures on the right had not been satisfied with his 
candidature. The unity in electing Howard was ignoring the ideological fault lines in the 
Conservative party, not ending them for good. 
The experience of David Cameron is a somewhat different one. He was able to use a 
different approach in winning the leadership.  By 2005 the centrality of Europe had 
diminished, with main divide being between the modernisers and traditionalists. This led 
to a „right wing primary‟ between David Davis and Liam Fox, and a „left wing primary‟ 
between Ken Clarke and Cameron. After the boost of his impressive speech to 
conference, Cameron defeated Clarke in the „left wing primary‟, and was able to attract 
many votes from the right as well, especially among eurosceptics. He subsequently 
achieved an overwhelming victory over Davis in the members‟ ballot, gaining 67.7% of 
the vote. Cameron possessed a mandate to lead the party far in excess of his 
predecessors, coming first amongst both Conservative parliamentarians and the party 
membership. He secured the support of nearly half of Conservative parliamentarians, 
unlike Duncan Smith, and unlike Hague a significant proportion of this was granted as 
„first choice‟ votes. These votes were from a broad range of ideological wings within the 
party. After he was elected leader he was able to draft leading figures on the right like 
Hague and Davis into his Shadow Cabinet team, an opportunity that had been denied to 
Hague and Duncan Smith with relation to the left. Cameron had also been advantaged by 
the changed nature of the dominant Thatcherite tendency within the party. Although 
Thatcherism had not obviously relinquished its grip over the parliamentary party in 2005, 
the priorities of the Thatcherites had changed. Instead of upholding Thatcherism, the 
priority was getting the party elected again after such a long time out of power. 
Thatcherism was a much more implicit and subtle influence, and one that was beginning 
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to become subordinate to the task of selecting a leader who would possess all the 
necessary attributes to appeal to a more flexible electorate and a more presidentialised 
way of conducting politics. 
188
  
The intriguing thing is that, in three cases we have studied, there was an actual leadership 
election, but in none of them the most popular candidate with the general public at the 
outset of the campaign actually won the leadership. In 1997 and 2001 Ken Clarke was 
more popular than William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith respectively. In 2005, Clarke 
started off the most popular, although Cameron‟s explosive speech to conference was his 
breakthrough with the public, and after Clarke was put out in the first round, Cameron 
was unquestionably the most popular candidate. This showed the difficulty starting off as 
the front runner in leadership races. But aside from that, in the cases of Duncan Smith 
and Hague, the eagerness to prevent the most popular candidate among the public 
(Clarke) showed the power of ideological considerations. With Cameron, this did not 
occur, Cameron being a popular candidate himself, despite doubts he would uphold the 
dominant ideology of the party. Hague and Duncan Smith both won swing support from 
Thatcherites, as the „Stop Clarke‟ candidate, and the manner of their elections questioned 
their legitimacy and, as we shall see, constrained their space to pursue modernising 
strategies in the initial stages of their leadership. Cameron, by contrast, while dealing 
with much the same majority Thatcherite party body, was able to draft significant levels 
of support from both right and left, and MPs and members, based on a modernising 
platform which he was consistent in pursuing from the beginning of his leadership. 
In terms of the formal structure Conservative leaders had to work within after 1997, this 
changed radically. Many changes were made in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 
election defeat. This is not really surprising, as there was general acceptance that the 
party would have to change its mode of organisation. The acceptance stemmed from 
three main factors which in different ways threatened the stability of the party as a 
credible fighting force. The first was a declining membership, and the lack of new 
members being attracted to the party to join, and eventually replace, the ageing 
membership base. If continued, this would create extreme difficulty for the party in 
conducting local activities, especially during a national election campaign. The second 
was the unruly way the party had conducted itself in the 1992-1997 Parliament, and the 
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imperative to construct a system that the centre could control, inspired by the disciplined 
regime that New Labour had imposed upon MPs in their years in opposition. The third 
was also inspired by Labour and how they had established, under strong central direction, 
a slick and nimble media operation at the core of the leadership structure that made 
stringent efforts to ensure the leader would get good media coverage and that the rest of 
the party would be disciplined in repeating the messages of the leader. Of course, as we 
shall cover in the next section, some factors and the solutions to them are contradictory. 
The Conservative party faced a need to make membership of the party more enticing, 
while at the same time establishing a regime that subjected these members to a greater 
level of central control and reduced their power over the central leadership, in theory 
making party membership less enticing. So any direction with regard to party reform that 
was undertaken after 1997 had to balance these two difficulties.  
The Conservative party now is very different structurally from what it was in 1997 in the 
immediate aftermath of the general election. But this was not through a traditionally 
Conservative, piecemeal, incremental approach to change. Instead most of the change 
happened in the aftermath of the defeat, under William Hague, and has been largely 
consolidated by subsequent party leaders. Hague‟s leadership campaign heavily 
emphasised the need for the party to change its organisation and how this would help the 
party achieve electoral success. A series of proposals were published under the Blueprint 
for Change document presented to the 1997 party conference. They attempted to deal 
with all of the problems that have been mentioned previously.  To change the 
organisation of the party nationally, it proposed that the three wings of the party – the 
parliamentary party, voluntary wing and the professional staff, should be united as one 
body with a single constitution, rules and a national membership, not remaining separate 
formal entities.
189
 A centralised board meeting six times a year would potentially give 
more power to the leadership to centralise initiatives, and impose discipline upon the 
party in disseminating central initiatives. Central Office would take control of a drive to 
recruit more members, communicating with members nationwide, and holding 
information about all these members in a centralised database. Such responsibilities had 
hereto been carried out by the local party associations. There was also more power for 
members. They would have the opportunity to play a part in deciding who became the 
leader of the party. Instead of the leader being decided by the parliamentary party, MPs 
would now vote to whittle leadership candidates down to two, at which point there would 
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be a nationwide ballot of party members. There would be a one member one vote system 
in voting for association chairmen. Changes to the rules would allow for ballots of the 
membership on key party policies.
190
 Although the power of local associations was pared 
down by the Hague reforms, they gave more power for ordinary members over the 
central activities of the party. This tallies with the framework, the influence of the middle 
level management of the party reduced, at the same time the influence of „ordinary 
members‟ was apparently increased.   
Thereafter, the Conservative leaders mostly consolidated the new structure.  Iain Duncan 
Smith made little formal changes to the structure of the party. Michael Howard did 
attempt to, but failed. He challenged the rule that party members should have a decisive 
role in choosing the party leader. In the summer of 2005, Howard attempted to change 
the system of leadership election to a more complicated arrangement, where the final 
vote would be among MPs, with the only involvement in the process for ordinary party 
members being indirect, through the National Conservative Convention (a body made up 
of senior figures from the voluntary wing of the party) who would rank the candidates in 
order, with the top candidate being automatically sent through to the final round of the 
vote among MPs. But these proposals did not gain enough support in a constitutional 
college in the autumn of 2005, meaning that the 2005 leadership election was conducted 
under the „Hague Rules‟. So it is in their entirety that these rules still provide the context 
of the formal structure within which leaders of the opposition conduct their relationships 
with the Conservative party. 
From our general analysis of the Conservative party before and after 1997, we see that it 
has been a party in transition. In its formal structure, it has moved on from the magic 
circle, and to some extent the parliamentary party, and gives the final say to its members 
in electing a leader. In theory, the membership has the power to be consulted and vote on 
central leadership initiatives. On the flip side, the leadership now can utilize possible 
areas of control and consolidation over the parliamentary and voluntary wings of the 
party, which are now one legal entity instead of a mish mash of individual local 
associations and groups. This has been a party where Thatcherism was the strongest of 
factions within the Conservative party, but not so dominant over competing factions that 
it achieved hegemony. The party was defined by, but not necessarily united by, 
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Thatcherism. But how have the party leaders interacted with this party base, and how 
have they actually utilised the formal and informal powers granted to them? It is this we 
shall explore in the next section. 
4.2 The Intra Party Balance Between Party and Leader 
This section deals with the intra party balance of power, between the leader and the rest 
of the party. This has to be divided into two parts. The first part is what formal changes 
were made to the balance of power within the party, and what actual effect these had. 
How did the different leaders actually use the powers granted to them by the formal 
structure they were working within? The second sub section is about the informal 
changes in the balance of power within the party, the extra constitutional methods the 
leader may have employed to increase his power relative to that of his party. Did he 
attempt to bring in outsiders? Was he able to exclude key party groups from decision 
making and influence? Did he appeal directly to the voters and use a connection with the 
voters to get his way with the party?  
 
4.2.1 Formal Changes In The Party 
Any of Hague‟s changes were revolutionary in themselves, but presented as a package 
they did fundamentally change the formal make up of the Conservative party. But did 
they make any substantial difference to his power relative to other members of the party? 
Firstly it must be said that these organisational reforms had not played a major part in his 
leadership election victory. Hague had identified organisational reform as one of the 
main priorities of his campaign to win the leadership.
191
 Hague said his reform of the 
party would be based on the principles of unity, democracy, decentralisation, 
involvement, openness and integrity. He wanted to increase the power of existing 
members of the party who had been somewhat neglected by the central party - “I want to 
give you power." By doing this they would attract new members, especially from groups 
that had traditionally not become involved in the Conservative party.
192
 In practice, while 
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giving the base level of members more power, the proposed changes actually gave 
Central Office and the central leadership team more opportunity to centralise power and 
control over what had traditionally been a fragmented and autonomous network of local 
party associations and members. But did this actually work? Although it never reached 
the level of the chaos of the Major years, Hague had to deal with episodes of party 
disunity and disloyalty where it was not obvious that the increased powers the new party 
constitution gave him helped him exert control over elements in the party who were 
opposed to his position. 
Hague had a readymade inspiration in place, Blair and New Labour. Party reform had 
founded Blair‟s image as a reformer. But Hague‟s victory was predicated more on the 
past, and his support from Thatcher, rather than future reforms. Hague taking over the 
Conservatives was very different to Blair taking over Labour - throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, the Labour system had come to be seen by some as archaic, favouring 
undemocratic internal votes over letting the leadership get on with implementing their 
strategy and policies. In contrast the Conservatives were trying to counter an accusation 
that they had left their party membership without any meaningful say in the running of 
the party.  Although it was accepted by the commentaritat and academics that there was a 
need for the Conservatives to change their organisation, there was little evidence it had 
been a decisive issue during the leadership election. And Hague‟s analysis of Blair‟s 
success was arguably based on a fundamental misunderstanding - Blair had provided 
evidence of a commitment to change before reforming the organisation of the party. The 
ground work for changing the party‟s image was done before, with party reforms being 
the symbol to the public that New Labour would be more than temporary.  Did changes 
in the institutional structure create a more powerful leader, or were they the consolidation 
of a stronger leader‟s position? They certainly had little effect on their own. Hague had 
publically stated that he hoped that one of the effects of the reforms would be to treble 
membership of the Conservative party to one million. This was not without some 
grounds, as this expectation flowed from the belief that being a member of the party 
would be a more attractive proposition after the reforms were enacted. There had been a 
rise in membership of the Labour party after Blair‟s reforms. But despite a large 
marketing campaign exhorting people to join the party, Conservative membership stayed 
largely static.
193
 Organisational reforms in themselves were not enough to increase the 
leader‟s power. If Hague had been able to attract more members to the party then it 
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would have been a boost to his leadership, as these new converts to party membership, 
like the influx of new members to New Labour, would have initially at least been great 
fans of the new leader, provided a solid base of support for Hague in any votes he 
conducted, and created a belief that some of the membership was directly dependent on 
Hague remaining as leader. But this did not happen, and the fact it did not happen is not a 
surprise politically. Hague‟s personal popularity ratings were very low, as were those of 
the Conservatives. The lack of a rise in membership would only have been surprising if 
the reforms had been accompanied by a surge in Hague‟s popularity. Organisational 
reforms in themselves were not enough to achieve the objective of more members. 
Hague was consistently caused problems by party MPs or members rebelling over 
sensitive topics and causing him embarrassment.  Since taking over the leadership of the 
party Hague had introduced a structured series of meetings, reports and targets that the 
Shadow Cabinet were supposed to operate to, a culture that would supposedly be an 
improvement over the Major years, where cliques developed in a divided Cabinet, and 
some Ministers ended up doing largely „their own thing‟ with little input or consultation 
with the Prime Minister or the team at Number Ten. Again, the new structure at the top 
was not in practice a help to Hague, despite the theoretical improvements it offered. The 
lack of stature and popularity Hague had was part of the problem. The row over tougher 
sanctions for using cannabis at the 2000 party conference showed this. This was caused 
when Shadow Home Secretary Ann Widdecombe made a speech at the conference 
calling for much tougher enforcement of the law about criminal penalties pertaining to 
the use of cannabis. This was immediately undermined by the anonomyous disclosure of 
most of the Shadow Cabinet that they had smoked the drug in their youth. Despite 
Hague‟s support for the policy, the disagreement of most of the Shadow Cabinet and 
clandestine admissions that many of them had smoked the drug left it open to ridicule, 
and led it to be dropped as party policy.
194
 This was at a turbulent time for the party in 
general, with splits over Europe, and the „modernising‟ and „traditionalist‟ way of 
viewing the world out in the open. It was seen over the next few months in the run up to 
the general election, where Hague struggled to keep control of the party. The furore over 
the Conservative MP John Townend in 2001 showed this difficulty. The extra control he 
had over the local parties did not lead to any control over what Townend said, when he 
came out with comments that allegedly had racist overtones. Hague had little power over 
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Townend, a departing MP, and faced the fact that the local association were protective 
over their MP. But the initial reluctance to take action against the renegade MP led to 
criticism of Hague, and insinuations that he was not able to control the more extreme 
sections of his own party. Another example of Hague‟s tenuous grip over his own MPs 
was when Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine appeared with Tony Blair on a public 
platform appealing for Britain to join the Euro, a direct contradiction of their party 
leader‟s strategy.195 Although Hague fulminated against this in public, he had little 
concrete options to punish and discourage the two men. Now that they were 
backbenchers, Hague could not throw them off the front bench, and though he could have 
withdrawn the party whip, this would have created an immediate confrontation with the 
media and the local party branches. The fact that Hague had centralised control over the 
local party branches did not change the fact that Heseltine and Clarke were figures whom 
it would be very hard to move against. The increased powers that Hague had over the 
party branches may have given him more power over the information that flowed to local 
party members, but the use of this power seems most useful in the long term, not in the 
short term game of establishing immediate power over the party. And even if it did, a lot 
of this power rested upon the personal standing of Hague, which was never strong 
throughout his leadership. This was a theme that was continued throughout his 
leadership.  
One of the most eye catching initiatives relating to party democracy and openness was 
introducing policy plebiscites. In theory this was supposed to establish Hague‟s power 
over dissidents in his own party, as he would be able to easily refresh the leadership‟s 
mandate over key policy questions. But it is doubtful whether the reform really worked 
in this fashion, and also questionable whether it really achieved the aims of increased 
democracy and accountability of the leadership that was the public aim of such a reform. 
It must be noted that the way this system worked was not systematic, but in a flexible 
way that was skewed in the leadership‟s favour. There was no prescription of what the 
leadership had to ballot the membership on, or if they had to do this on an annual or any 
other timeframe. Instead the situation was that the leadership could ballot the 
membership on any issues or policy programmes they desired, but on a subject and at a 
time of their choosing. This above all has probably contributed to the experiment being 
used in a piecemeal and irregular fashion. If it had been an annual „test‟ for the 
leadership‟s plans, it would have maybe become an annual political „event‟, bringing 
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more discussion and debate about the leadership‟s strategy, although of course taking the 
chance that the leadership could be defeated on an important issue, or that the party 
would be exposed as fundamentally divided, something that the Labour party had 
experienced during the 1980s with a system that often prioritised internal party 
democracy, even when it wrecked the plans of the leadership. As he was entitled to, 
Hague used the device sparingly. The first time it was used was in 1998 when Hague 
took a party vote on the leadership‟s policy on joining the European Single Currency.196 
Ruling out membership of the Euro for the duration of the next Parliament was approved 
by an overwhelming majority. By staging this vote, Hague hoped that internal critics of 
his European policy would be forced to accept a clearly expressed will of the party 
membership. And indeed, Hague did find it reduced the intensity of the European 
arguments, as when party members defied him on the European issue, he was able to 
now credibly claim that they were defying the democratically expressed will of the 
party.
197
 But despite this, Hague did not use the device for another two years. When a 
vote was taken on a mini–manifesto Believing In Britain in 2000, the results were much 
less impressive. Only 16.7% of the Conservative membership bothered to vote, although 
98% of them voted for the document.
198
 In this case, the usefulness of the referendum 
was lessened, as Hague couldn‟t claim a ringing endorsement from the party when well 
over 50% of the membership hadn‟t voted. Unlike the referendum on the Euro, there is 
little evidence that Hague referred to it as a reason to back his leadership. Although he 
had won on paper, there is little evidence that this win either helped him establish control 
over those in his party who were being difficult, or that it reinforced his mandate to lead 
the party. There was a natural constraint to such referenda - if it was not on a topic that 
excited the membership there was the chance little would vote, which would make the 
„endorsement‟ seem less worthwhile. But asking questions about too many issues and 
ending up with one that was unpopular with the membership, led to the chance it could 
be rejected. Other issues may have been harder to pass, and carried the potential for a 
large amount of trouble, as even approval by a small majority could have been damaging 
to Hague. So even though the Euro plebiscite was successfully used by Hague (although 
it did not certainly end all European divisions), it was not a tool he was able to apply 
throughout the term of his leadership. This was the problem with many of the main 
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Hague reforms to the party - they increased the scope of potential influence for the leader 
over the party but the powers were dependant on the political success of the leader, who 
needed to be in a politically strong position to actually utilise them.  
This informed the attitude subsequent leaders took to the formal rules that governed their 
relations between the leader and the party. Hague had made significant changes to the 
formal relationship between the leader and the party, but they had not brought electoral 
or political success, and it had not stopped the party causing him moments of severe 
discomfort, and actively rebelling against him. Not surprisingly, since it had been shown 
to be an inadequate panacea for the Conservative position, little significant formal 
changes were made after 2001. Duncan Smith, when he first took over the party 
leadership, had a radical agenda that hit upon relatively new ground for the Conservative 
party. But there were no plebiscites on his policies, even though Duncan Smith released a 
document outlining the principles that the party should stand for in 2002.
199
 There was no 
massive drive to recruit more members either. Much of what Duncan Smith did relating 
to the Shadow Cabinet actually moved away from the Hague model of giving the 
members more power. Duncan Smith insisted that his style of conducting the Shadow 
Cabinet had been very consensual, with the Shadow Cabinet members taking positions of 
some power in being able to block or delay Duncan Smith initiatives. Duncan Smith 
drew attention to the way when he started as leader he set up a special policy unit who 
had a responsibility to look at policies, and commission papers about them. Duncan 
Smith had a policy board with members of the shadow cabinet and guest members, 
proposed policies would go to Shadow Ministers, who would bring them through for 
approval by the policy board, and then the Shadow Cabinet. Duncan Smith said Shadow 
Cabinet had to approve policy and the policy board “would make final decisions about 
it.”200 There was no place for the party referendum devices during Duncan Smith‟s 
leadership, instead the Shadow Cabinet had a high degree of veto over plans before they 
even got to be publicised to the wider party membership. So while other devices like the 
central dissemination of information and the centralised membership scheme were 
consolidated upon during the Duncan Smith years, some of the devices Hague had made 
provision for in his party reforms lay relatively dormant.  Ironically, although he had 
departed as leader, it was Hague who had the largest impact on the relations between the 
leader and the Conservative party. Why was this? It was because Duncan Smith was the 
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biggest beneficiary of the „Hague Rules‟ for leadership elections and would have 
struggled to win without the final membership vote. But the way he was elected affected 
Duncan Smith‟s leadership; MPs were less inclined to give him space to carry out his 
programme, as the parliamentary party had never given him a conclusive mandate. 
Duncan Smith‟s mandate had been from the members, and in this sense it is surprising 
that he did not utilise the devices Hague had bequeathed him to communicate with and 
consult members more, given that his mandate had been from them. The nature of his 
relationship with the parliamentary party was perhaps always destined to be tense, but 
could Duncan Smith not have built upon his relationship with the members more to 
counterbalance this? 
Michael Howard did not make many formal changes to the structure of intra-party 
relations. During his short period as leader, most of his energies were focused on the 
relatively immediate prospect of a general election, not changes to the party constitution. 
Howard achieved many improvements and efficiencies in how the central leadership 
team operated and how they were able to impose their will upon the party, but this was 
not through new formal changes to the party constitution. What Howard did share with 
Duncan Smith was a further move away from consulting the grassroots membership. He 
did not have any votes of the membership on his policy or strategy, and of course the 
nature of his accession to the party leadership was to some extent casting the party 
membership aside. Although the fact that he was able to rise to the leadership unopposed 
deprived the opportunity for the parliamentary party to take their part in the process of 
electing the leader, there were some differences with the situation of the party members. 
The parliamentary party had implicitly agreed to Howard taking the leadership (albeit in 
a coerced/peer pressure situation) as by definition if any of them had stood against 
Howard the full leadership election process would have been necessarily triggered. Many 
of the public justifications by leading public figures in the party of not having an election 
concentrated on the time, effort and most importantly expense, that an election would 
have cost. But when we think about this, this was stressing the unsuitability of the 
membership element of the contest most. With ballots of the parliamentary party, the cost 
and time for the party was relatively low, as the contest could be commenced quickly, 
and all MPs balloted centrally at Westminster. In contrast, the membership election 
required the expense, and two or three months of effort. While all MPs did not have a 
direct role in the election of Howard, they had an opportunity to contribute to and to veto 
in some way his unopposed election, which most actively decided to wave through. In 
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contrast the membership were not consulted, and powerless to have their say when the 
party declared that there was only one candidate for the leadership and that he was being 
waved through. The most significant tinkering Howard made to the formal constitution, 
ironically, was a change he did not make, as it had implications for the election of David 
Cameron. Howard‟s first use of a plebiscite was during his „lame-duck‟ period, to change 
the process of electing the leader to one that would contain more involvement for the 
MPs. Howard said his main concern was “I was keen that there should be a long process” 
because he didn‟t want people saying that the new leader had been a snap judgement - “I 
wanted the party to have a good long look at all the candidates..... they won‟t be able to 
say we rushed into....it made it much more difficult to snipe at my successor.” Certainly, 
despite not getting his new system of leader selection through, Howard achieved this, the 
time taken to draw up the new system and vote on it causing a considerable delay, 
Cameron not being elected until December. Howard said that even the eventual muddled 
way of using the old system had worked much better than the 1997 election. 
201
 
David Cameron marked some sort of renewal with the Hague policy of engaging the 
party membership. But although his whole leadership had been based around the need for 
the party to change, he did not go to the same level as Hague in making formal changes 
to the party constitution. For Cameron, changing the party was as much about portraying 
himself as a changed Conservative, and bringing in a new membership who would 
change the internal dynamics of the party. He did conduct a vote on a document named 
„Built to Last‟. This was a document that chimed with the platform he had won the 
leadership on, with some traditional Conservative aims like encouraging 
entrepreneurship in society, or defending national institutions, but others that decidedly 
resembled New Labour in the language they were couched in. One was to “fight social 
injustice and help the poor by building a strong society.” Another was to “enhance the 
environment and increase general well being.” The party also pledged itself to respect 
diversity by encouraging reverse discrimination in selecting parliamentary candidates, 
and to take the lead in the fight against global poverty. The introduction also repeated 
Cameron‟s claim that there was such a thing as society, it was just not the same thing as 
the state.
202
 Despite the apparent challenge to Thatcherism, the document was passed 
overwhelmingly by a vote of the party membership, giving an extra mandate to 
Cameron‟s pledge to change to the party. Cameron‟s attempts to bind the party into his 
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mainstream values were accompanied by efforts to alter the party to make it look more 
like the nation. The most formal attempts to do this were through promoting the A-List of 
parliamentary candidates. Indeed, the A-List was the measure that attracted most 
controversy within the party, with successful attempts to overcome or subvert it 
attempted by local associations. An „A‟ list would promote women candidates, split 
50/50 between women and men.
203
 This was a temporary measure that had no defined 
precise end point or date, and had not been voted on nor enshrined in the party 
constitution or rules. It threatened local party autonomy, and was the scene of the largest 
revolts, and was partially prevented by some local associations. The party had real 
structural power and was able to use it to obstruct Cameron.  
Hague is certainly unique among the four leaders that are the subject of this study, in the 
scale or extent of his formal changes to the party. His internal changes to the workings of 
the party were the largest in a generation, and nothing as big was attempted by the 
subsequent three leaders. But as we have seen, these changes alone did not win Hague 
more independence from dominant alliances within the party, and while shifting power 
towards him, did not appreciably allow him to exercise it effectively. So this leads us to 
the second part of this question, whether a leader could gain more power and 
independence within a party by other, more subtle, methods? 
4.2.2 Other Ways of Altering the Intra Party Balance 
What about the other proposition of our conceptual framework, that leaders had devised a 
series of ways to communicate with members and voters that increased their power 
relative to their party base, independent of the structural changes we outlined in the 
previous section? By nature this section is less precisely defined than the previous 
section, we are not measuring the precise changes in formal rules, but more nebulous 
distinctions. Was the party leader able to establish more power over his party by 
recoursing to other methods apart from changing the formal rules - communicating 
directly with members, or claiming a mandate with the electorate that gave them power 
to change the nature of relations with their party?  
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There were techniques Hague used to try and change the party to match his own early 
style. A tactic he used, and all the leaders since 1997 have used to some extent, was to 
place emphasis on the need for the party to change, especially in the area of economic 
and social policy. This has to be placed in the context of the 1997 leadership election, 
which had shown the Thatcherites were in a dominant position numerically within the 
party. Much of the rhetoric concentrated on the split between the aspirations of the 
electorate, as most visibly demonstrated by the 1997 election, and the aspirations of the 
Thatcherites. This defied the large body of Thatcherites within the party that thought they 
just needed „one more heave‟ to return to government. Hague made it clear that he did 
not accept this analysis, and that the worst option for the party would be to stay the same. 
He told MPs and local activists that they had to look afresh at the reasons for the Labour 
general election landslide "without any trace of self-delusion....No change is not an 
option.” 204 If Hague wanted his party to absorb some of the lessons from the landslide 
election defeat, and act accordingly, then this could not be compelled through formal 
measures.  He would have to do it through non formal measures. He had to offer a carrot 
of electoral success and make the whole process fit his image as a leader. The message of 
change matched the initial attempts by his central team to portray Hague as youthful and 
in touch with modern Britain. Telling the party to act more like him was a natural 
extension to this. It would show off Hague‟s youthful image and contrast him to the rest 
of the party, and would establish his power over Thatcherites in the party. He 
acknowledged that his party had created the impression that it was "obsessed with 
economics" and implied that in future it would seek to fight on other fields, notably 
cultural and social values. He vowed to rebuild the party as a "fresh, open, clear, clean, 
out-going, listening" outfit.
205
 His first conference speech distanced himself from the 
party‟s previous emphasis on laissez faire, and Europe, and apologised for the way “Our 
Parliamentary party came to be seen as divided, selfish and conceited.”206 He was setting 
the party challenges; if he could cajole or incentivise the party into passing these tests, 
then he would have demonstrated his ability to be an effective leader, respected by his 
own party. The stress was on the short term popularity of the leader, and his vulnerability 
to challenge without demonstrating his popularity and authority, even if they were not 
permanent. The first test was for the party to absorb and learn the lessons of 1997. The 
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second test, was to apologise for the way the party had come to be seen as arrogant, and 
establish a more open minded culture in the party. And the third was to end the damaging 
and vicious divisions, and stop the public perception that the party was completely 
divided. Although the second test could be somewhat achieved by the formal changes to 
party membership, which may have incentivised new individuals from different 
backgrounds to join, all three needed Hague to change his party‟s behaviour through non-
formal methods. Analysis of Hague‟s time as leader shows that he was largely 
unsuccessful at establishing a sense of authority over the party by the non formal appeals 
he made to the party, and shifting the balance of power towards himself and away from 
the rest of the party. 
One of these failures was decisive in the eventual breakdown of his leadership, his 
confrontation with the party over „kitchen table conservatism‟. This showed that Hague 
was in too weak a position to make the party learn the lessons of the 1997 defeat as he 
saw them, and was unable to prevent the divisions and power bases within the party 
overriding the will of the leadership. Kitchen table conservatism was a philosophy 
heavily influenced by focus groups, which had found the Conservatives to be seen as out 
of touch and obsessed with economics and Thatcherism. It was an attempt to make the 
Conservatives talk less about dry economics, and change their style to one that was more 
concerned with the median voters‟ concerns. It was to be integrated into policy, publicity 
and communication activities. It was admitted the Conservatives had not had a proper 
strategy for a long time, and that "People still don't have a clear impression of William 
Hague, what sort of person he is, his background or what he stands for, so they continue 
to project all the party's negatives on to him.” To counter this the document said that the 
party must talk and look more like the rest of Britain, "neutralise our vulnerabilities on 
key issues” like health and education and restore a reputation for economic competence, 
all accompanied by "10,000 volt initiatives" designed to prove that it was for “bold, 
decisive and often confrontational” moves against groups such as the Carlton Club.207 
But when the message was put into a Peter Lilley speech on the 20
th
 anniversary of 
Margaret Thatcher becoming Prime Minister, it attracted fury on the right, not least from 
Thatcher herself. By pledging to "emphatically accept that the free market has only a 
limited role in improving public services like health, education and welfare", Lilley, at 
Hague‟s behest, was attempting to neutralise a Conservative weakness on health and 
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education where they regularly trailed Labour in the polls.
208
 But it was a strategy Hague 
was unable to carry through the rest of his leadership and this was down to the aggressive 
challenge of the Thatcherites. Although Thatcher did not publically intervene or make a 
statement against the speech, there were plenty of stories in the press that expressed her 
disquiet at the situation. There were fractured and angry Shadow Cabinet meetings.
209
 
The policy was deeply unpopular with the majority of the party membership.
210
 This 
stunned Hague into returning to attacking the Government on Europe, the Euro and lower 
taxes, with little of the ideas of kitchen table conservatism. 
211
 The most visible example 
of Hague‟s „surrender‟ to the Thatcherites was the sacking of Lilley.212 It appeared as if 
Hague had been railroaded into a more Thatcherite stance. 
This backdown had an adverse effect on Hague‟s ability to assert that he was gaining 
more power over his own party. It forced him down a policy and presentational direction 
that rendered much of what he had been saying in the first couple of years of his 
leadership redundant. In such circumstances, it was very hard for Hague to make it look 
like he, and not the rest of the party, was gaining power, and it indeed emboldened the 
elements of the party that had forced him to back down. The fact that it changed the style 
of his leadership meant that it became a lot harder for the party to pass another test that 
Hague had set it early on in his leadership, that it should show an openness to outsiders 
and change its internal culture, because Hague had effectively stopped setting that test 
altogether. Suddenly, from saying how the party had been wrong in the past and faced a 
need to change, he was now saying it had been right all along, that he was proud of its 
values and what it had done in the past. This was symbolised most acutely by the way 
that Hague took Tony Blair‟s phrase about the „Forces of Conservatism‟ and 
enthusiastically made it part of his pitch to the party at conference, associating himself 
with the base opinions of the party.
213
 In turn this meant that the initiatives that had been 
intended to further greater engagement by the party with outside groups were largely cast 
aside, and logically so, for if they had been kept they would have conflicted with 
Hague‟s rhetoric that the party had got the big questions right in the past.  The most 
prominent example of Hague‟s willingness to establish closer connections with the world 
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outside the party had been the „Listening To Britain‟ scheme, that involved Shadow 
Cabinet members travelling around the country, to events with non-party members
214
, 
which appeared to have had little influence on Conservative policy, or the culture of the 
Conservative party in any significant way before it was dropped. Plans for a new party 
name and logo were dropped.
215
 Such a volte face on strategy was a major concession to, 
even a defeat of, the Thatcherites. And the Thatcherites were still the dominant force in 
the party precisely because Hague had failed in his objective of broadening the party 
membership, and attracting many outsiders, with many of the sub-formal initiatives he 
had in place to attract them being quietly sidelined.  
It was difficult to see that there had been a firm shift in intra party power to Hague. As 
more protracted battles like the one over kitchen table conservatism showed, Hague was 
not able to unite both wings of the party, but also was faced with the unedifying prospect 
of making U-turns on key policies only to then find he was now taking flak from the 
opposite side of the party. There appeared to be no way to square the circle. Whatever 
Hague had tried, whether it had been apologising for mistakes in the early part of his 
leadership, being a kitchen table conservative, or acting against the liberal elite in the 
latter part of his leadership, he achieved no significant breakthrough. At no point did 
Hague have the option of using the polls as a weapon against dissidents, being able to 
accuse them of derailing genuine prospects of election victory in the near future.  
Duncan Smith to a greater extent than Hague relied on a more subtle series of statements, 
which attempted to entice the party into changing its way of doing things. As Duncan 
Smith himself admitted, if the party had any chance of being elected, it needed to counter 
the charge that it was obsessed with a couple of Thatcherite issues, especially Europe and 
the Euro.
216
 But any attempt to move the party away from these values was impacted by 
the same problems as Hague had faced, that it would require threatening the Thatcherites 
within the party. But successfully doing it, or at least having the party acquiesce, without 
divisive fault lines appearing, would increase the perception that Duncan Smith was 
gaining power over the party. The series of attempts to subtly distance the party from the 
Thatcherite consensus which had dominated the Hague Conservative party since 1999 
were largely subtle, like when he reportedly banned Thatcher from attending where no 
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doubt she would have been rapturously received by members.
217. 
Duncan Smith said that 
the Conservatives needed to prove they were actively engaged in finding examples of 
how public services were well run in other countries. Polling showed the public services, 
especially health and education, were a priority issue for most Conservative voters and 
identifiers already.
218
  Duncan Smith said that “Mrs Thatcher was a phenomenal 
success..... But she was dealing with problems that were relevant to when she was Prime 
Minster.....times were different when she came in.”219 In one speech he claimed that “We 
must first understand the way life in Britain is lived today, and not the way it was lived 
20 years ago. Yes, it is right to be proud of the past, but it is wrong to try and live in the 
past. This country has moved on and so must we” and “We made people financially 
better off, but money isn't everything and in other ways the quality of their lives 
declined.....beyond this hall people too often remember the hurt we caused and the anger 
they felt......Until people see that our party has learnt the lessons of 1997, we will go on 
getting the result of 1997.”220 The strategy was clear enough, but there was one 
inconsistency. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Duncan Smith had been elected 
on a platform of defending Thatcherism from Clarke, and had relied on the votes of 
Thatcherite MPs to make it through to the final ballot. Now Duncan Smith was arguably 
attacking them. Duncan Smith said that although he agreed with those like Thatcher who 
said that Britain had an “inherent clash of aims,” with the EU, he did not think this 
should become the sole focus of the Conservatives. Indeed he said he wanted to avoid 
another Hague leadership, which had become in his words, “dominated” by the question 
of Europe. To do this Duncan Smith made an early decision to rule out membership of 
the Single Currency, not subject to any circumstances whatsoever - Hague had left open 
the possibility of joining after one parliament of Conservative Government. “I feel as 
strongly as the next person about Europe, but I don't think we should be dominated by it 
all the time, because the public doesn't see it as the number one dominant issue...they 
think we only care about Europe, every now and then immigration and tax reductions.”221 
The strategy here was very explicit, to end the perception of the Conservatives as a 
eurosceptic, sub-single issue party, and get them to talk about the issues that rated as 
primary concerns for most of the public. But although the strategy was very clear, there 
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was a clash with the way Duncan Smith had been elected, mainly due to the issue of 
Europe, which he had not been afraid to use it as a weapon when debating Ken Clarke 
(he admitted to me that he had been afraid Clarke as leader “would have split the 
Conservative party” on the issue).222 Duncan Smith‟s Shadow Cabinet was seen as 
favouring the Thatcherite Eurosceptics within the party. Maintaining and reinforcing this 
Thatcherite and Eurosceptic status quo appeared to be confirmed by Duncan Smith‟s list 
of Shadow Cabinet appointments, and it was covered this way by the media.
223
  
As during Hague's leadership, a difficulty in moving the party‟s focus away from 
Thatcherism was the continued public prominence of Thatcher herself.
224 
Personally 
Thatcher was using even more strident language on Europe, saying Britain faced an 
“intense struggle,” with Europe over a “clash of aims and ideals.”225 But even figures 
who were key to the Thatcher project like John Redwood, were adamant that 
Thatcherism was a 1980's project, a product of its time, and it had been a mistake to give 
the impression under Hague that the party was wedded to every aspect of it.
226
 There was 
a larger space opening up in the party for those who wanted to reassess its relationship 
with Thatcherism.  
There was much less trouble from the Thatcherite, or the pro-European wings of the 
party over Europe in general. But if the European issue was less fractious, and was less 
of a challenge to the leader, then there was another schism that had opened up in the 
party that caused Duncan Smith serious trouble, the debate between „modernisers‟ and 
„traditionalists‟, often called the debate between the „Mods and Rockers‟. This was 
between social conservatives and a more socially liberal wing of the party.  Michael 
Portillo‟s defection to the moderniser camp, and the controversy his confidants had 
engendered around their alleged attempts to undermine Hague‟s leadership, spilled over 
into Duncan Smith‟s term of leadership with a vengeance, especially in his second year. 
Many of his initiatives as leader were characterised as modernising or traditionalist. 
Duncan Smith said the debate between modernisers and traditionalists was a 
“complicated, artificial one,” and the modernisers with their “buzz phrases” could often 
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be “puerile and childish.” This raised questions - had he felt forced into the modernising 
agenda, or less likely, unwittingly fallen into it, or was he just bitter at those who had 
removed him? For whatever reason, the modernising agenda became a much less 
prominent part of his leadership from late 2002 onwards. Duncan Smith suffered from 
not enjoying the benefits of his early modernising position by his change of tack and the 
earlier alienation of the traditionalists, and not being able to demonstrate electoral 
success to either. Especially after the local elections in 2003, and symbolised by the 
removal of key modernisers from his staff, his leadership became much more aggressive. 
Suddenly he started talking of a “fair deal for the middle classes,” which included 
building more roads, putting 40,000 more police on the beat, giving head teachers more 
powers, and cash vouchers for hospitals.
227
 As poll ratings had declined and panic and 
criticism within the party increased, Duncan Smith was forced to move towards 
Thatcherism again, which meant his leadership began to float from issue to issue with 
little discernible focus.  
The event that most publically encapsulated Duncan Smith‟s problems reconciling the 
modernising challenge to the larger Thatcherite wing of the party was a bill to legalise 
gay adoption. This was typical of the constraints the moderniser/traditionalist debate put 
on him - he was hard pressed to satisfy either side. Although traditionalists were 
dominant within the party, the modernisers were a vociferous and well-organised group 
that was able to call Duncan Smith‟s powers into question, and destabilise him enough to 
get the media speculating about his leadership. Duncan Smith imposed a three line whip 
to vote against a bill that allowed unmarried and gay couples to adopt. In itself this was a 
strange move for an opposition to impose a three line whip, especially on an issue that 
had the potential to be decisive, and was not one of the main planks of Duncan Smith‟s 
plans. After all, with the Government‟s massive majority there was no hope of the 
Conservatives preventing the bill passing even with a three line whip, and every chance 
of a rebellion. Eight Conservative MPs defied the leadership and voted for the Bill. But 
more significant than the relatively small numbers, was the identity of those who voted 
with Labour. Seven of the eight were former Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet members. And 
two of them were Duncan Smith‟s two closest challengers for the leadership, Michael 
Portillo and Ken Clarke. Also voting against was John Bercow, who resigned as Shadow 
Work Pensions and Secretary on the day of the vote. To make matters even worse, during 
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the debate Portillo launched a withering attack on Duncan Smith, asking why there had 
been a three line whip and quoting back at him his conference speech where he had 
delivered the line about recognising life as it was lived in Britain today, not twenty years 
ago.
228
 This was a demonstration of the line Duncan Smith had to straddle between the 
two sections in the party, and the consequences if he got wrong. And among the wider 
public, there was quite strong support for the bill - 76% to 19% wanted to allow 
unmarried couples to adopt.
229 
Duncan Smith appeared to
 
be taking the side of the right, 
and going against majority opinion. At first Duncan Smith took on the rebellion.
230
 He 
issued a stark challenge to his critics - he called some MPs “the enemy within,” and 
appealed to the party to “unite or die” or it would be “sabotaged by self indulgence or 
indiscipline.” He also claimed he had “begun to reconnect the party with the views and 
attitudes of contemporary Britain” and that the party “elected me to lead it in the 
direction I am now going.” This was somewhat hard to understand given he had been 
elected on a rightist platform, much of his leadership had progressed along a modernising 
path, and now he was having a massive falling out with the modernisers.
231 
As the 
speculation and criticisms mounted, Duncan Smith was forced into a public apology to 
the party, admitting that he had made errors in insisting on a three line whip.
232
 This 
exposes some idiosyncrasies in the Conservative approach to opposition at this time. 
Firstly it exposes a concern by the leader that he should show firm leadership on a broad 
range of issues, even those that were not necessarily closely related to the main points of 
the Conservative platform. Secondly, the memory of his past disloyalty to Conservative 
leaders dogged him, and made it more „justifiable‟ for his party to rebel against him, and 
harder for him to make appeals to party loyalty. The battle to achieve cohesiveness in 
government took over much opposition activity as well.  He emerged with worse 
relations with both sides in the party, and a very public demonstration that even a 
minority in his party could throw his leadership into crisis, even over what had at first 
seemed a minor issue. 
In fact, reviewing the episodes of the Duncan Smith years, it is possible to argue that in 
these two years there had actually been a shift of intra party power away from the leader. 
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Often both sides of the „moderniser traditionalist‟ debate would use Duncan Smith‟s 
decisions to paint him as an extremist or surrender to Labour. Despite his protestations 
that it was an “irrelevant” debate, it appeared to lie behind much of what made his 
leadership so difficult to establish authority over the different factions of the party. 
Duncan Smith faced the same problem as Hague, in that what he did as leader was often 
appreciated by one side of the ideological divide in his party, but rarely both, and the 
„disaffected‟ side were often not deterred from being very vocal with their criticisms of 
Duncan Smith, undermining his claims to strong leadership. The fact he appeared to row 
back from his policy of persuading the party to make social justice its number one 
priority in the second year of his leadership was very confusing and damaging to his 
attempts to show that he was establishing more power over the party, as like Hague it 
appeared that he had given in to the party. 
Michael Howard followed a similar pattern to Hague and Duncan Smith. He started out 
his leadership promising to change the party‟s outlook, and relate it more closely to what 
Britain was really like, and listen to people around the country. But this was not 
accompanied by internal changes, but more the mix Duncan Smith had used of making 
personalised appeals to the party to change, and trying to provide firm leadership. He 
promised to make the party look more like Britain and campaign on the issues most 
prioritised in his initial speech, which as he acknowledged in an interview with the 
author, was worked on in close consultation with leading moderniser Francis Maude.
233
 
But the divide in the party was a problem, as it had been with Duncan Smith. Howard 
admitted at the time of his first speech that “I was not a wholly committed moderniser” 
but it was an “attempt to try and position the Conservative party in the centre of the 
political spectrum.” The ambiguity of both actions increased the suspicion and volatility 
of both sides. Howard said “I would lead this party from its centre” and that “Twenty 
First Century Conservatives must show they understand twenty first century Britain”234 
Certainly, although Howard professed to be not a wholly convinced moderniser at the 
time, the speech has to be seen closely in the modernising pantheon, and was received 
this way by most elements of the media at the time. Howard wanted to emphasise that the 
general aim of his first speech as leader was not “centred around changing the 
Conservative party in any way shape or form” and born more out of a desire to make 
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clear that he was not a tribal element in British politics. At that stage, Howard thought 
the “Conservative party needed to broaden its appeal and that‟s what I was trying to do.” 
Howard draws the distinction between changing the party and broadening its appeal, 
although in some ways this is a misnomer as broadening its appeal could have had an 
impact on the nature of the party, such as the need to attract and keep new voters, or 
attracting a new membership. Again, using the concept of the tests that Duncan Smith 
and Hague had set their party, it is unlikely at best to conclude that Howard was not 
challenging the party to change, or at least acquiesce in his attempts to carve out a 
different image for it. Even though Thatcherism was not necessarily incompatible with 
this attitude, the fact that Thatcherites were in such a powerful position within the 
Conservative party, with effective power to depose any leader if they acted as a united 
body, meant that any attempt to change the nature of the party, and „move on‟ from the 
Thatcher years of government was always presented as a struggle of power between the 
Thatcherites, which of course makes the conflict such an effective barometer of the 
power division between leader and party.  
Assessing the whole of his leadership, we can assert that, like Hague and Duncan Smith, 
his style and tone of rhetoric was significantly different at the end of his leadership than 
it had been at the start. “Leading the party from the centre” and “measured criticism” 
seemed to be two parts that had fallen by the wayside. The Thatcherite wing of the party 
loomed large in his calculations. While he had started off his leadership with pledges to 
make the party look and feel different, he was quickly forced to return to more traditional 
Thatcherite issues like tax and Europe as his poll situation worsened. For Howard a 
particular catalyst to this change in tone was the 2004 European elections, in which the 
Conservatives were pushed hard by a flourishing UKIP. With many expressing 
astonishment at the fact that the Conservatives were not leading the polls due to Blair‟s 
bad reputation over the Iraq war, Howard bound the Thatcherites in with tougher 
rhetoric. Conservative leaders since 1997 had started off with hopes of moving the party 
to the centre ground, but had always had to placate the Thatcherite base as the poll 
position refused to improve. But Howard denied that, saying the rise of UKIP in summer 
2004 “did not have any influence on our policies at all” although it did harm their 
electoral prospects, and made it more difficult to persuade the media they could win. 
Howard said it ruined a whole series of plans he had to launch keynote policies on the 
reform of the public services after these elections. Health and education were highly 
individual services, and they needed to guarantee everyone‟s right to choose, with money 
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following patients and pupils. Labour did not “own the freehold of the debate on this 
issue” and Howard said he would invest an extra £49 billion a year to prove the 
Conservatives would as well.
235
 But these comments didn‟t get the attention he had 
hoped for, undermining his attempts to look a centrist.
236
  
What Howard did do, and do a lot more convincingly than Duncan Smith, was promote 
the idea that all MPs should be tightly „on message‟ at all times, to not undermine his 
platform of restoring trust. Unlike Hague and Duncan Smith, he was able to impose 
sanctions on individuals who stepped out of line. His ruthless treatment of Boris Johnson, 
and particularly Howard Flight, showed this. Johnson was sacked from the Shadow 
Cabinet for making what Howard deemed were offensive remarks towards the people of 
Liverpool. This was done despite the fact that Johnson was popular with the right and a 
well known figure nationally. Prospective Parliamentary candidate Danny Kruger was 
also prevented from standing in the general election when it was revealed he had made 
statements on public spending that were deemed too hawkish by the leadership.
237
 The 
Flight episode was arguably even more ruthless than what had happened to Johnson. An 
unaware Flight had been secretly recorded telling party members that the Conservatives 
were looking forward to making larger public spending cuts than they had promised if 
they won power. This had played up to Labour attacks that the Conservatives were 
planning savage cuts to public services that they would not make public until they won 
power. Howard agreed that his treatment of Flight had been harsh. “It was rough on 
Howard Flight” but he felt it conflicted with the overriding goal - “my job was to do 
everything I could to win the election.”238 However, one thing for sure is that whatever 
Howard had done, after Flight‟s comments he would have been exposed to severe 
criticism from at least one side of the party, which would have been used aggressively by 
the media, who as we have noted, increasingly prefer controversy and personality clashes 
to detailed policy arguments. In the same way as happened to Duncan Smith and Hague, 
this have would undermined Howard‟s claims to be a strong leader in control of his 
party. Howard had managed to establish a degree of greater control in what party 
members said, even if they were Thatcherites. As he said, his overriding goal was to win 
the election, and to do that he needed, in the political environment that pertained, to 
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appear a strong leader, who could control dissidents in the party. Although this had been 
at the expense of decisions he regretted, it seemed to have had some kind of effect. 
Although there was still the usual anonymous briefing against him in the media, there are 
not as many examples of individual MPs or other party members speaking out publically 
against the Howard regime as there had been during the Hague and Duncan Smith years, 
suggesting Howard had achieved some sort of success in bringing power to himself and 
away from the party, however dependant and temporary the success may have been.  
David Cameron may have been expected to build upon this, but he would have to do this 
from a different starting point. As has been noted previously, David Cameron took on the 
leadership with a different relation to the dominant Thatcherites than the other leaders. 
Also unlike them, he had been consistent in elaborating a modernising direction before 
he became leader. Cameron‟s first speech, while not being a direct challenge to the 
Thatcherites, certainly appeared like an indirect challenge to the hegemony and 
orthodoxies they had built up over the years in the Conservative party. Most of the 
content of the speech was directed at the party and the need for it to change. He set his 
face against a "move to the Right'', saying that would turn the Tories into a fringe party, 
never able to challenge for government again. He said that at the next election the Tories 
must have a relevant message - "that shows we love this modern country'' - and must 
understand “that the quality of life mattered as well as the quantity of money." Telling 
the party that they must give up a “pathetic” resistance to change, he said "We have got 
to change our culture so we look, feel, think and behave like a completely new 
organisation."  Stories emerging that Cameron had proudly used the „I am the heir to 
Blair‟ phrase, gave the impression that the opinion of Conservative members was not his 
top priority.
239
 Despite regularly attacking policies which had long been held to be 
important to the Conservatives, polls of grassroots members showed his ability to win an 
election and appear convincing in the media was valued more highly.
240
 Unlike the 
previous leaders, Cameron had not been picked for his ideology, but his electability. And 
in the context of how we have analysed the balance of power that held sway under the 
other leaders, it is clear that Cameron was very much taking the position that he would 
set his party „challenges‟. They were in essence the challenges that every party leader had 
set, but extended and linked to what Cameron saw as many of the good points of New 
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Labour and Tony Blair, which none of the other Conservative leaders had gone as far to 
say before. It must be noted that Cameron knew he would not be under the pressure of 
having to fight Blair at the next general election, but it would still have been near 
impossible to imagine a previous Conservative leader taking the same attitude. 
Cameron‟s attitude was certainly a challenge to Thatcherites, whose critique of New 
Labour had been largely based on the assumption much of it was a mirage, purporting to 
accept the Thatcherite analysis on the economy while on the sly undermining Britain‟s 
competitive advantage in global business and markets, and increasing the size, but not 
effectiveness, of the state. 
241
 
In the first stage of his leadership, Cameron generally emphasised issues that previous 
Conservative leaders had not brought up at all, emphasising his differences with the 
Thatcherites, as they had become synonymous with a narrower range of subjects. 
Cameron pointed out that climate change was a concern the Conservatives had 
previously neglected, and that he would not shirk from the “tough decisions” that were 
needed to combat the danger.
242
 He even showed personal support for green living, 
ordering a wind turbine for his roof.
243
 The recruitment of individuals like Bob Geldolf 
and Zac Goldsmith to the Conservative policy review groups indicated a willingness to 
include people whom many members had regarded with scepticism.
244
 He dropped the 
plan to impose immigration limits to Britain
245
, and ruled out immediate tax cuts.
246
 But 
this contradicted senior figures on the right like John Redwood, who thought that there 
had been a sea change in public opinion since 2005, and that the public now believed 
there was massive waste in government, and it could be cut.
247
  Cameron even ruled out a 
move to a mixed, insurance model of funding the NHS, which had been held open as a 
possibility under Duncan Smith, and had actually become more popular.
248
 Could being 
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pictured in the North Pole viewing the effects of climate change really increase the 
Conservative share of the vote? Stephen Dorrell thought that the significance was in the 
image it projected - not of an environmentalist or a socialist, but a man who was 
“comfortable in his own skin and comfortable in his own party” and not constrained by 
the dynamics of the debate within his own party, unlike his predecessors. 
249
 Dominic 
Cummings thought that taking the line of least resistance, and a desire to impress the 
BBC and other „mainstream‟ media was behind Cameron‟s language. By doing this he 
would decontaminate the brand of the Conservative Party and show it was not just 
obsessed with the same issues.
250
 But by decontaminating the brand, Cameron had to 
deviate from the Thatcherite world view on many occasions. 
One immediate announcement Cameron made was that he would set up groups that 
would review and write reports on Conservative policies. This had the dual effect of 
binding in representatives of both sides of the ideological divide and non-members of the 
party into the Cameron machine. Although the groups were headed by experienced 
Conservative politicians like John Redwood, Stephen Dorrell and John Gummer, they 
also contained outsiders selected by the Conservative leadership, and of course their 
opinions were filtered into the reports by the report chairmen. Once the reports were 
concluded, Cameron conducted media events with the report authors and decided what 
areas would be included in the manifesto. The members whom we spoke to emphasised 
that the policy groups were independent. Dorrell said that for the working of his group, 
on health and social services, he had employed a test, that any policy proposal must be 
practical and would reinforce the Conservative ability to win an election, not the opposite 
- as he put it, “that‟s the job of a university.”251 Baroness Perry said the “groups were all 
given a free hand, but in considering recommendations, the authors tried to be realistic 
about the degree of expense involved”.252 John Redwood disagreed however - he said 
that public opinion was not considered, and the committee had a “blank cheque” to 
conduct analysis.
253
 Iain Duncan Smith also emphasised his independence, in his case the 
organisation that conducted the report (the Centre for Social Justice) was independent of 
both parties.
254
 When I spoke to him (June 2008) he said that the party had adopted about 
50 out of 190 policies his report had proposed, but he expected a lot more to be adopted. 
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The most happy was Redwood who said he was “delighted” at the “magnificent” policy 
of cutting inheritance tax unveiled at the 2007 conference, and the other policies from his 
report also adopted about deregulation, transport, and competition.
255
 It is relevant to 
question how much of a reaching out the groups really constituted given that outside 
forces were mediated and to an extent controlled by the party, and that it was very hard to 
quantify how much of an impact the interaction with the outside actually had on the 
implementation of the reports. However, it is certainly evidence of at least a willingness 
to interact with people the Conservative party may not have in the past, actually prove for 
the first time to these groups that the Conservatives were serious about certain issues like 
health - Dorrell thought that “it wasn‟t primarily a media event, we got, we got I think in 
the health field quite good coverage in the health specialist press....recognition of the 
value of the work we were doing. I think in the education world it was quite noticeable 
we had a dialogue with people the Conservative party hadn't really had for some time. It 
was more valuable than at a 6 o'clock news level.”256  
The biggest structural changes in the intra-party balance of power were conducted under 
William Hague, and they served to give more power to voluntary members and take 
power away from middle level elites. But while representing more power in theory for 
Hague, in practice the changes did not produce it, as he was not able to assert his 
independence from dominant alliances within the party, especially after his defeat over 
kitchen table conservatism. Hague was relegated to a core vote strategy that would firm 
up his position with party elites after the election. Iain Duncan Smith and Michael 
Howard did not conduct the same internal changes, but faced the same problems, trying 
to effectively balance the triumvirate of appealing to the electoral centre ground, the 
dominant Thatcherites and the noisy modernisers. Both faced a credibility gap, as they 
turned from Thatcherites to modernisers, and then had to turn back again. David 
Cameron did not face this problem, being elected as a moderniser in changed 
circumstances. He was the biggest challenge to the existing structure of the party since 
Hague, with his proposals to change how the party looked backed up by concrete 
measures like the A list. The party were made to vote on Built to Last, although like 
Hague, Cameron‟s reliance on plebiscitary methods waned after the initial part of his 
leadership. But he did not face as many constraints on his leadership as the other three 
leaders. Unlike them, he offered the realistic prospect of winning an election. And he was 
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consistent with the modernising platform that he had stood for the leadership on. But 
there seems a common pattern. While leaders started off with plans to engage the 
membership more, bind them in with votes, and expand the membership base, often these 
efforts fell by the wayside as cultivating party elites became more important. Little of the 
formal balance of intra party power between the leader and the party changed in the 
period we have been assessing. However there was an informal balance of power, which 
was dependent on the leader being able to offer a genuine prospect of winning the next 
election. In practice, this defined the maximum width of the operating window in which a 
leader of the opposition could depart from beliefs held by the majority of his party 
members, usually to move closer to the centre ground. This is seen by the way Hague, 
Duncan Smith and Howard were overwhelmed by party opinion on key initiatives, and 
were always under assault from both sides of the ideological divide in the party. This is 
in contrast to Cameron, who despite going further than the other three leaders in 
disassociating himself from the mainstream of his party and challenging his party to 
change, was afforded an easier ride by the party. The only time when the atmosphere 
turned febrile as in the past, and talk of Cameron‟s removal began to surface, was when 
Cameron suffered a decline in the polls to Brown, and it looked like the Conservative 
party was about to imminently lose an election. The modern environment, with the leader 
being the conduit for how many see the party and intend to vote, does appear to go along 
with a willingness by parties to give the leader more power and mute itself, even if it is 
not in the interests of the members, but this power is contingent on the realistic power of 
electoral success. 
4.3 Leader Competing for the Mandate 
This section is an extension of the previous section, based on the second condition of the 
conceptual framework. Was the leader competing for the electoral mandate, and not the 
party? Was the leader able to construct his own set of reasons for voting for „him‟, 
independent of his party?  Given the nature of the question, we must look for instances 
where the leader‟s image has moved beyond that of his party‟s, and became independent 
of it. To do this, we must discern what the main constituents of a leader‟s personality and 
values are, and what we would expect if they were to become independent. Were the four 
leaders granted significant freedom by their party to pursue agendas that were individual 
to them, and to rebrand the electoral proposition in their own image?  
 132 
The problem with assessing what Hague‟s personality and values were was that the 
portrayal of them varied so much during his leadership. When Hague was first elected, 
his media team tried to portray him as a modernising, youthful candidate. But this 
completely conflicted with the picture Hague tried to portray in the last two years, when 
he painted himself as a rebel towards the liberal establishment. Hague still stuck to 
elements of the old kitchen table strategy, for example in a keynote speech where he gave 
a guarantee that the NHS would not be privatised and said he found it “offensive” that 
anyone would think the Conservatives had plans to do so
257
, but overall these became 
isolated examples, in a sea of speeches about Europe, crime and asylum. The public 
picture of Hague was therefore muddled, and unclear. And he did not feature much in 
Conservative advertising, which was overwhelmingly negative and critical of Labour, as 
we shall see in the next chapter. The ferociousness of the plotting against him, and the 
backing of Portillo as a better candidate, indicated that they did not think the leader 
trumped the party, and the polls indicated this. But Hague had not given the party a clear 
picture of what he was all about, with the wildly varying messages he sent out during his 
leadership. If the leader was competing for the mandate, it was unclear what exact 
mandate Hague was competing for - as a modernising Conservative, or insurgent against 
the liberal elite. Whichever persona he tried, he was not given autonomy from criticism 
by his party. Was this because of his status as a compromise candidate? And the 
difficulty was Portillo appeared to stand for such a cohesive mandate himself. 
Duncan Smith was another leader who found it a struggle to gain autonomy from the 
different factions within the party. He had two main ideas to change the perception of the 
Conservative party and make it more popular. The first was talking a lot more about the 
public services, learning from European examples and having extensive plans to improve 
the public services.
258
 The second was to do much more for the least well off, „Helping 
the Vulnerable‟. Duncan Smith maintained that the inspiration had been a visit to the 
Easterhouse estate in Glasgow during early 2002, one of the poorest estates in Britain, 
although it must be noted that fliers given out promoting his leadership campaign 
mentioned the subject, so it was clearly not out of Duncan Smith‟s mind before this, but 
this probably shows us the rhetorical narrative politicians are obliged to put on keynote 
policies as much as anything. He frequently talked about the spirit of Easterhouse in his 
speeches, giving examples of the personal suffering and poverty he had witnessed in the 
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area and that renewing areas like these was a “mission fit for the new century.”259 
Shadow Cabinet members were mandated by the leader to spend time with public service 
workers and the poor, shadowing them for a day, to persuade them that in the leader‟s 
words they understood people‟s hopes and fears.260  But 'mission' implies a deep 
commitment, something that will be pursued at all costs, and the only inconsistency in 
Duncan Smith‟s attitude to the process was that he did not keep up the emphasis on the 
programme throughout his leadership. Dominic Cummings, Duncan Smith's former 
Director of Policy, did not think this happened, saying that Duncan Smith was too easily 
distracted by other events, and a need to appease the right of the party and the media.
261
 
But even if it had not been sustained across all areas, if Duncan Smith had kept Helping 
The Vulnerable as the main part of rhetoric right through his leadership, would he have 
been afforded autonomy by the party? The conclusion has to be he would not, judging by 
the reception to the policy. The right were deeply sceptical, and did not see how it fitted 
with their world view. They were sceptical of the policy, if not the man. Modernisers in 
the party, however, welcomed the policy, but were sceptical of the ability of the man to 
carry it out, and his suitability for leadership in a presidentialised age. Again, the party 
did not give him autonomy to put his personality to the public, more concerned with 
imposing their own factions and policies on him. Like Hague, Duncan Smith did not 
have the prospect of election victory to demonstrate to the party, if the leader was the real 
competitor for the mandate then the Conservatives had leaders that were appreciably less 
popular than Blair.  By the end of the Duncan Smith leadership, there had not been much 
change in the ratings for the Conservatives. Although the appreciation for Labour had 
declined, it had not been replaced by appreciation for Duncan Smith‟s policies at any 
point during his leadership. The approval for Conservative policies on key issues like the 
public services or the economy stubbornly refused to rise much above 20%, if at all, with 
Duncan Smith‟s Helping the Vulnerable strategy, or his later more aggressive style, not 
appearing to make any impression.
262
 If the leader was securing the mandate, then Hague 
and Duncan Smith did not have any good news to show the party. While Duncan Smith 
had more of a personal story to tell, it did not appear to bring success in the polls. And in 
common with Hague, Duncan Smith had not been offered much autonomy to carry the 
strategy forward.  
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Michael Howard used his personal background and life a lot in his speeches, and 
admitted there was a conscious decision to use him in the election campaign and before, 
and he certainly overshadowed his Shadow Cabinet colleagues to a greater extent than 
Hague or Duncan Smith. The factionalism in the party, the public expressions of it 
anyway, significantly declined, and Howard proffered this as one of his greatest 
achievements, that the party was reasonably united and gave him the autonomy to carry 
out the style of campaign he wanted.
263
 Howard put a lot of effort into emphasising the 
contrast between the duplicitous and lying „Mr Blair‟, and the honest, accountable 
Howard. But it is questionable whether this was able to merge with the leader‟s 
personality in any way, given the widespread distrust of politicians. When asked if he 
had ever lied himself in a television interview, Howard had to say “not knowingly,” a 
frustratingly vague answer, summing up the difficulty in tying himself to the strategy.
264
 
Could it ever have been more than a series of negative attacks on Blair? However, it is 
notable that the party gave him far more autonomy to carry this strategy out than they 
had ever give Hague or Duncan Smith. In some ways the Howard leadership was the 
opposite of the Duncan Smith years. Duncan Smith had a more extensive idea of what his 
personal mandate would be, but was given little autonomy by the party to carry it out, 
and had to move away to subjects that would be more enthusiastically received by his 
own party. In contrast, Howard, probably helped by the ad hoc way he had taken over the 
leadership from Duncan Smith in the middle of the parliamentary term (it would have 
been nearly unthinkable for the Conservatives to change their leader again before the 
2005 general election) was given more autonomy by the party to carry out his strategy 
(there was less overt briefing against him than there had been with Duncan Smith), but 
had a less clearly defined concept of how his personality and policies would mesh 
together into a coherent whole. 
David Cameron has incorporated the „modernising elements‟ of Howard and Duncan 
Smith, having a clearly defined idea of what his political personality was, while being 
given autonomy by the party to carry it out. Certainly, unlike Duncan Smith, this was 
consistent with the way he had been elected as leader. Compared to the other leaders, 
Cameron defined the party‟s marketing and publicity efforts in a way they had not. 
Under Cameron, there was a concerted effort made to make people aware that he did not 
fit the picture of a traditional Conservative. His frequent references to his personal life, 
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his respect for society as it was, and his determination to change the party all highlighted 
this. With the policy reviews constraining Shadow Cabinet Ministers in terms of making 
and announcing new policy, Cameron was able to dominate the Conservative agenda in 
policy, media and personality terms. There was little challenge or confrontation from the 
Shadow Cabinet as there had been under previous leaders. The change of the party logo 
to a tree reflected Cameron‟s concerns over the environment. Initiatives like 
WebCameron increased the separation between him and his party. Extensive efforts were 
made to not make the WebCameron initiative seem like it was in any way part of the 
Conservative party, with no visible Conservative branding on the site, and all the focus 
on Cameron himself.  He was given autonomy to do this by the party, and was able to 
roll it out across the party in a centralised way, which the Hague reforms perhaps made it 
even easier for him to do. The two areas where he ran into resistance were over the A 
List and the re-branding of the party in a by-election as „David Cameron‟s 
Conservatives‟, which backfired as the Conservatives lost heavily. In the case of the A 
List the party actually had the power to resist Cameron‟s changes, and did until he was 
forced to water them down. It must be noted that the trouble about this only started after 
it had been an electoral disaster. Largely Cameron was given autonomy to pursue 
modernising strategies as long as he was doing well in the polls. And it was a reasonable 
supposition that more of this was down to him than the party. And of course this was 
very much grist to the mill of the Cameron leadership strategy and style, which was all 
about reaching out to those groups that had never traditionally felt at home in the 
Conservative party. Significantly, despite a high net approval rating for his leadership, 
most agreed with the proposition that Cameron was a new face but the party had not 
really changed much at all.
265
 It seems here is a leader who was given the autonomy by 
the party, despite the fact he was often at odds with them. Most of them were not 
impressed with his tax policy, thinking that „sharing the proceeds of growth‟ would not 
lead to smaller taxes and a smaller state. But, as per Heppell‟s analysis, the 
Conservatives had elected Cameron not for empathy or ideology, but to win. By 
recognising this, the party had made a concession to the leader competing for the 
mandate. They also showed this in their attitudes towards Cameron‟s forays into 
unconventional issues. They largely left him undisturbed to carry out these changes. 
There was little protest or resignations, with the only constant criticism coming from 
those like Norman Tebbit. There was much less talk of leadership challenges than there 
had been under the three previous leaders, even during Cameron‟s wobbly phase when 
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Brown was in the ascendancy. Over hoodies, redistribution, sharing the proceeds of 
growth, the campaign for the NHS and other issues, the party was surprisingly quiet 
about opposing this desire. The most serious row came in an impassioned debate about 
grammar schools. David Willets had made a remark about there being little evidence to 
support the theory grammar schools helped those from a poorer background. After 
criticism by party members,  Cameron came out aggressively against the right, saying he 
would be not be dragged into a "pointless debate'' about creating a new generation of 
grammar schools. But Conservative activists were sparked into uproar, and Willets was 
savaged in front of a 1922 meeting of MP‟s.266 Shadow Minister Graham Brady resigned 
over the leadership stance.
267
 In some ways the affair was bizarre, as the Conservatives 
had not created any new grammar schools during the 1979-1997 period of Government. 
There were those on the left of the party, like Stephen Dorrell, who thought that the real 
issue was to get more high performing schools, not ration them.
268
 But among the right of 
the party (and indeed in the right wing press) there was a strong emotional bond towards 
Grammar schools. Despite his strong talk, Cameron was eventually forced to back down 
over the affair, allowing that new grammar schools could be created in areas that already 
had them, and eventually reshuffling Willets away from the education brief.
269
 After this 
Cameron endured an awful summer, with his rebranding of the party as „David 
Cameron‟s Conservatives‟ only leading to a miserable by election in Ealing, in a 
performance that gave many critics ammunition to say that he was trying to mould the 
party in his own image far too much.
270
 And it had spectacularly backfired in Ealing. 
This refers us back to the theory at the centre of the conceptual framework, that power 
over the party was dependent on the (prospect of) electoral success. When the 
personalised branding and focus on new issues was working in the polls, Cameron was 
given autonomy, but when a personalised campaign, like in Ealing, failed, the criticism 
was savage. Cameron‟s only shaky moments over personalised branding had been when 
he had been looking like he would imminently lose an election in the autumn of 2007. 
But notwithstanding, at the conference of that year, despite the party chatter about his 
reputation, his personalised speech to conference won many plaudits, and was 
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enthusiastically received.
271
 But, this may have been down to the announcement of an 
Inheritance Tax cut which was seen as the Conservatives moving back to the right on tax, 
and the more partisan atmosphere engendered by the seeming approach of an election, as 
much as the style of the speech itself. 
As he went up in the polls, Cameron seemed to have largely free rein to embark on his 
„brand decontamination‟ of the party, despite the fact it involved neglecting the 
„forgotten majority‟ over immigration, and accepting Labour spending totals should the 
Conservatives win. Leading Thatcherites remained remarkably quiet compared to their 
volubility in the Hague and Duncan Smith years. Figures like John Redwood have 
backed Cameron‟s leadership, saying he admired Cameron as a leader and thought that 
he was taking the party in the right direction.
272
 But again, shields against Thatcherite 
criticism were at their strongest when Cameron had a secure poll lead, and depended on 
the issue at question. The grammar school row, and the contention created over 
Cameron‟s trip to Rwanda in summer 2007, was an example of how the Thatcherites still 
had the power to cause the leader embarrassment and force him to back down on some 
issues. Cameron‟s leadership showed that the party could tolerate the leader competing 
for the electoral mandate in a personalised way. But it was subject to the need for 
electoral success, and needed to be carried out in a sustained and cohesive way. 
At the start of this section we posed the question of whether or not the different leaders 
had formed their own „distinct‟ political personalities, and independent reasons to vote 
for them. Were any of them able to construct this set of reasons, like a US Presidential 
candidate can? The evidence is mixed. William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, and 
Howard, after at first trying to say they would „change‟ lots about their party, rowed back 
in behind a more traditional set of concerns. Taking Hague first of all, the U-Turn 
especially hurt him, because it was the most dramatic of the three, making the reason to 
vote for „him‟ much less persuasive. He had stood at the 2001 election as a self-
appointed „common sense‟ warrior against the liberal elite. This would have been more 
coherent if he had not tried to pose as a „caring Conservative‟, comfortable with modern 
Britain, during the first two years of his leadership. Combined with the fact that his party 
was obviously signed up to the main parts of „Common Sense‟, meant there were not lots 
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of obvious reasons to „vote for Hague‟. Duncan Smith took a similar trajectory to Hague, 
starting of wishing to „change‟ his party, and then moving to the right. But Duncan Smith 
did identify his „mission‟ to help the very poorest, a cause that had been traditionally not 
associated with the Conservatives. This offered more of a reason to „vote for Duncan 
Smith‟, in the sense that he would change the party, even though it was not successful. 
Howard went down the other route, dropping modernisation very quickly, but 
emphasising his competence and prospective ability to get things done - the main reason 
to vote for him was not his ideas, but his competence, and how he would turf anyone out 
of the Cabinet who did not match to his standards of competence. Cameron has been the 
most enthusiastic of the leaders for carrying through policies to „change‟ the party and 
make his own personality clear. He has even gone as far as putting them down on the 
ballot paper as „David Cameron‟s Conservatives‟. And even when incidents of his „PR 
stunts‟ have dropped, he has held that „changing‟ the party is one of his greatest 
achievements. There always has been a visible reason to (or not to) „vote for Cameron‟.  
4.4 Concentration of Power Resources in the Leader’s Office 
This section concentrates on the proposition of our conceptual framework that there 
would be a concentration of power resources in the leader‟s office, and such resources 
would be more devoted to the building up of the leader‟s image than the party‟s. We are 
looking for signs that the leader was able to build up a strong central team, and was able 
to do this relatively unhindered by the party, and without their efforts seeping into party 
firefighting.  
Certainly Hague had a close knit central team. Platell especially was fierce in her defence 
of Hague, and took on his opponents and the briefing in the Portillo camp. But were the 
power resources Hague had directed towards burnishing the leaders‟ image and not the 
parties? As mentioned, particularly after the recruitment of Platell, the (not entirely 
successful) rebranding of Hague as action man, a warrior against the liberal elite, had 
proceeded apace. But this went hand in hand with his affirmations that he was „proud‟ of 
Conservatism, and his sidelining of calls for the party to change. But overall, a lot of the 
effort was directed away from the leader. The Shadow Cabinet were able to take control 
of policies over drugs. The constant murmurings of a leadership challenge from Portillo 
kept Hague on his toes and reduced his authority over the party. Background briefing by 
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modernisers affected Hague and effectively limited his manoeuvre to reshuffle 
individuals. There were allegations that Hague and his central team were not able to keep 
a tight enough rein on the Shadow Cabinet. As we have seen already, there are two main 
charges against the effectiveness of Hague‟s central leadership team. The first is that it 
frequently leaked details of internal discussions, often leading to embarrassment for 
Hague and sometimes even limiting his room for manoeuvre. On issues like the argument 
over drugs, the conduct of the election campaign, the tax guarantee and many more, what 
were claimed to be verbatim reconstructions appeared in the newspapers, often predicting 
what Hague was about to do before he did it. Although this may have been the fault of 
modernisers in the Shadow Cabinet, it raised questions about the Hague leadership 
team‟s ability to inspire respect, and exercise authority over elements opposed to the 
direction they had taken. The second charge was that Hague was, and his central team 
were, often unable to take decisive action against prominent MPs defying the party line. 
Again, no matter how efficiently Hague had reputedly organised his central team, its 
inability to discipline members of the party when they were openly defying Hague was a 
large question mark over the statement that power resources were concentrated in the 
leader‟s office. 
Duncan Smith was even more hurt by the party, with chaos forcing him to make changes 
in his central team, and eventually removing him. This was doubly damaging to Duncan 
Smith, having the practical effect of changing the composition of his central team to one 
he didn‟t want, and effectively placing a huge question mark over how much authority 
the leader‟s office had - if it could be controlled from outside, then how could it exercise 
effective control over the party? He was forced to apologise to MPs for the confusion 
over the appointment of Barry Legg, in a 1922 Committee meeting, where he admitted he 
had made mistakes and “badly handled the situation.” 273 It became worse when Legg‟s 
role in the homes for votes scandal was revealed, and Duncan Smith gave in to the 
pressure to sack him, with the Conservative board having demanded his removal.
274
 This 
made him look weak and in hock to the party, an impression that was reinforced by him 
being told by an MP that he had to be “faultless” from then on to avoid a leadership 
challenge.
275
 And of course, it was ultimately some of these modernisers who were 
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responsible for ending his tenure as leader, as they achieved enough signatures for the 
vote of no confidence which Duncan Smith then lost. The fact that Duncan Smith did not 
have the outright power to even choose who would be a part of his own office is a 
significant deviation from the assumptions of the conceptual framework. Presidential 
politics insists upon leaders having strong central teams around them, able to operate 
independently and be able to dictate to the middle management of the party. In contrast, 
during the Legg row, Duncan Smith found himself unable to assert his authority over the 
changes in personnel he wanted, and indeed found himself in effect dictated to by the 
modernisers. To some extent this shows the tensions inherent in the Presidentialisation 
thesis, because Duncan Smith did not come close to conforming to our expectations of a 
presidential leader, and indeed was pushed around by his party colleagues in a more 
forcible manner than predecessors from the distant past. This is seen to an extent with 
other leaders, and must be an integral part of our conclusions. Like Hague, Duncan Smith 
had not had the benefit of good poll figures to keep dissidents at bay, and the process of 
disillusionment within the party, a danger to an unpopular leader in a presidential age, 
was even more volatile, vicious, and quicker, than it had been under Hague. Duncan 
Smith‟s lack of ability to demonstrate electoral victory was plausible was undoubtedly a 
major factor behind this.  
The man he hired as Director of Strategy, Dominic Cummings, was witheringly critical 
of the leadership and structure put in place with the Shadow Cabinet. He says that when 
he arrived there “was no plan or people to think about.” And even later the only direction 
was to “turn up in the meetings and say what‟s in the papers.” In Cummings‟ opinion 
there was “no attempt to think about policy,” and a “machine saying this is policy and 
media, and how to integrate the two,” did not exist. Cummings said he wanted to 
establish an organisation that took long-term approaches, went beyond leadership 
managerialism, and make a concerted effort to “move opinion in the direction we want in 
terms of policy and process.” His first three months with Duncan Smith were spent trying 
to deal with these issues, but it was not matched by a similar desire in Duncan Smith to 
plan for the long term. This contradicts the impression that Duncan Smith gave of a plan 
to move away from Europe and robustly engage with the public services agenda. Indeed 
Cummings went further and directly contradicted this. He said he had passionately 
advocated “addressing head on,” the perception that their Conservatives only cared about 
the rich, which Duncan Smith agreed with. But he says Duncan Smith would not commit 
to this and he says that “policy was intellectually bankrupt,” and reverted to an old style 
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of “no more policy process than documents to hand - give a speech and the public easily 
forget.” Cummings thought it needed a concerted effort of six or more months for most 
people to even notice.
276
 In response Duncan Smith vociferously disagreed with 
Cummings‟ analysis, saying he was talking “rubbish,” and what he had said was to do 
with a “bitter personal view about my administration,” and saying that the whole point of 
leadership was sometimes to be reactive to fast moving events. He also said that 
Cummings had been brought in to sort many of these problems, so in a way was 
criticising his own conduct. Duncan Smith was at pains to emphasise the collegial nature 
of many of the decisions he took. 
277
  
In contrast, Howard had a stable and consistent central team, that stayed largely the same 
throughout his time as leader, with much the same individuals.  Unlike the previous two 
leaders, the leader‟s office was a seat of power, and Howard was able to act quickly with 
„harsh‟ sanction against MPs who had defined the line set out by the leadership team. 
This team was also noted by the press for the efficiency and discipline with which it had 
run the party, which, coming so soon after the disorganisation of Duncan Smith, probably 
helped its authority. This was reflected in a very tightly run election campaign, which 
was not criticised for its organisation, and did not find itself being often undermined by 
dissenting voices within the party, during the campaign anyway. This was the same with 
David Cameron, and it carried through to a long attempt to burnish the leader‟s image. A 
large percentage of resources was directed at measures which strengthened the leader‟s 
image, that were centred solely on the leader – WebCameron, his internet channel was 
one. Another initiative centred around Cameron was „CameronDirect‟, where Cameron 
went around the country holding meetings in community centres open to anyone, and as 
the party claimed, answered unvetted questions for an hour, with the video of each event 
posted on the Conservative website.
278
 As we saw in the last section, Cameron had 
persuaded much of the public that he was a changed Conservative, without necessarily 
persuading many that his party had changed. And his central team really was something 
new to the traditional conservatives. As Cummings tells us, the new team was heavily 
steered by Steve Hilton, a new „socially responsible‟ conservative whose background 
was in the industry of corporate social responsibility, and steered Cameron towards a 
more compassionate, optimistic tone, founded on issues the Conservatives had 
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traditionally not talked about, like the environment or hoodie culture.
279
 Although in 
more recent times the influence of Hilton had been counterbalanced by ex News of the 
World editor Andy Coulson, it still consists of the „Notting Hill‟ set, like George 
Osborne, Michael Gove, Oliver Letwin and Frances Maude, a set of people at odds with 
majority opinion among Conservative members, who were able to push through the new 
initiatives on the environment, society and so on. Unlike the other leaders, Cameron had 
a broader based Shadow Cabinet, that contained leading figures of the right like William 
Hague, but in a strange way this strengthened Cameron, as figures from the right fell into 
line behind initiatives like Built to Last, with little of the briefing and plotting that 
occurred under the other leaders. Cameron was able to keep his central team largely free 
from party interference.  If anything, Cameron has had the opposite problem to Hague 
and Duncan Smith especially, in that the central team has been so close knit that 
Conservative MPs have complained that they often have had no idea what the central 
leadership team is thinking or about to do, and the central team are blasé about keeping 
in regular communication with MPs and making them feel like they are important parts 
of the Conservative opposition. 
280
 
Of the four leaders here, we see markedly different ways to run a central leadership team. 
Hague‟s, despite being apparently organised on a business consultancy model, was 
unable to keep many key discussions confidential and impose its authority on MPs. 
Duncan Smith‟s leader‟s office was reputedly disorganised and chaotic, and it found it 
hard to impose its authority on MPs who never agreed with Duncan Smith, especially in 
the later years of his leadership. In contrast, Howard‟s leadership team was stable, 
organised, and got its way in power disputes with the party, a feather in the cap Hague 
and Duncan Smith could not claim. Howard was probably helped by the way he had only 
taken over as leader in the middle of a parliament, meaning that there was an increased 
expectation on the party to be loyal as a general election was always assumed to be close, 
and removing Howard was never really an option until after the election. Cameron, 
taking power at the start of the parliament, has largely managed to maintain these aspects 
in the central leadership team, at least when he is electorally popular, but at the expense 
of being seen as aloof by his party, increasing the possibility that he might face their 
wrath when his popularity deserted him. What this section shows is that situating power 
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in the leadership office is not just about good organisation, it is about having being able 
to project the will of the leadership office across the party. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In coming to conclusions about the material covered in this chapter, we must refer back 
to the original premise of the thesis. In the introductory chapters, we posited that the two 
main tasks of the research questions were to find the balance of power between the 
Conservative leader and the party, and the place of opposition within the British political 
system. The research questions here fall into the category of the relationship between 
Conservative party and leader, and this must inform the overall generation of these 
conclusions. 
In this section we have looked at the shift in intra party power to leaders, whether the 
leader competes for the mandate, and the structure of power in the leader‟s office. In the 
opening chapters we also asserted that this thesis would be different to most of the other 
literature about Conservatives in opposition since 1997 by broadening the scope of 
analysis to not just one centred around agents, but one which incorporates an awareness 
of structural influences, and is not just all about personalities or individuals. The 
relationship between agents and structures informs the conclusions. This interplay is 
shown in the first research question about whether the formal and informal balances of 
power changed in favour of the leader. The formal balance of power looks at the 
structural set up of the party, while the informal powers refers to the efforts that the 
leader made to bolster support for him individually. Under William Hague there was a 
massive amount of change to the constitution of the Conservative party, which gave the 
leader more formal powers over a more centralised party. However, we have seen that 
these formal powers are not protection from opposition within a party, and whenever any 
of the four leaders studied here have tried to go further than the party wants to, they then 
have been robustly challenged by the party. They immensely changed the structural 
environment the leader had to conduct politics within. In practice, Hague was not able to 
realise the potential of these powers, as party elites (on all sides of the ideological 
divides) retained the ability, status and influence to embarrass, undermine and question 
the leader. This happened on an even larger scale with Duncan Smith, and a lesser extent 
with Howard as well. To attempt to get round this, these leaders used variations on a 
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more subtle strategy that related to informal powers and their attempts to gain power as 
individuals - selling the party a message that it needed to change in order to win an 
election again. But all were forced by various events to largely shelve their attempts to do 
this, and modify their message, to mollify the party. David Cameron was able to deploy 
the original strategy more consistently. Unlike the other leaders, it was a strategy that 
was more consistent with the wing of the party he came from and what platform he stood 
for the leadership on. Contrary to what the conceptual framework asserts, the power to 
communicate directly with the party was not a panacea for the leader against strong 
middle level party elites. Did 16% of the membership voting for a mini-manifesto really 
help Hague in the dark days of a Shadow Cabinet rebellion over drugs, and the constant 
sniping from the „Portilloistas‟? Did the commitment to social justice and the poor 
endorsed by the party in „Built To Last‟ really help Cameron when the Conservatives 
were in ferment over grammar schools? If anything, the power of this middle level band 
of MPs and party grandees has increased, with them enjoying a greater range of ways to 
bring their criticism of the leader to light. This sheds light upon the nature of opposition 
and how it became to be seen in the 1997-2010 era.  There was a high degree of 
expectation on the leader of the opposition to lead an institution with the cohesiveness of 
a government across a very broad spectrum of social, cultural and international issues. If 
the leader of the opposition was not able to do this then the criticism from the party of the 
leader would be intense, way above what it had been in previous Conservative periods of 
opposition, where loyalty to the leader had held more sway. Even if it was the leader 
competing for the mandate, and even though the party was much smaller than it had 
been, it did just not lie down and become subservient to the leader, and the power to 
bypass levels of their party was not necessarily a great boon to the leader. This has meant 
that leaders have struggled to establish an independent mandate from their parties.  It 
appears that the two choices open to a leader are establishing a mandate built on force of 
personality and ideas, or on competence. Hague and Duncan Smith went for the first 
option, but their U-turns in the face of party opposition wrecked their effective claim to a 
mandate. Michael Howard went for a mandate based on competence, which he was given 
autonomy to do by his party, although as we shall see in the next chapter, the evidence is 
that this „limited mandate‟ of competence did not resonate with the voters. David 
Cameron has consistently stood for changing his party, and given perhaps the most 
compelling independent reason to vote for him, although in doing this he has left himself 
open to attack from his party, and as we shall see in later chapters, by the media as 
unprincipled. But there is one other tool that the perception of a leadership mandate has 
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given the leader of the opposition. As we have seen, especially with Cameron, a leader 
offering the prospect of electoral success was able to go a lot further in obstinately 
offending his party while suffering far less of the consequences in briefing against him, 
interference with his central team and so on. Once in that position, a leader can use the 
benefits of presidentialised politics - leader driven electioneering, strong central 
direction, binding the whole party in. The flip side also applies - the party was extremely 
jumpy at poor (potential) electoral performance, and was quick to get rid of leaders seen 
as not up to it. From our analysis of the media treatment of leaders in this section, we saw 
that the media made the test of „could you see him as Prime Minister‟ an integral part of 
awarding  their own mandate to leaders, and this played a large part in controlling the 
impressions insiders were given of leaders and the public profile they developed. The 
theory that leaders needed to offer (the prospect of) electoral success to reap the benefits 
of Presidentialisation rings true here. Howard and Cameron only encountered large 
discomfort from the party when they suffered declining fortunes in the polls. Hague and 
Duncan Smith were not able to offer the prospect of electoral victory, and as we have 
seen suffered for it, with the middle rank of the party (MPs below Shadow Cabinet level) 
being particularly volatile. And this impacted on their ability to drive things through from 
the centre, with a strong team moulded by them. As we saw in the third section of this 
chapter, there has not always been the concentration of power in the leader‟s office that 
Poguntke and Webb predicted. Often the leader‟s office has been susceptible to leaks, 
and unable to coordinate the party effectively, or give a clear sense of direction to the 
party. Under Hague, Duncan Smith, and Cameron, the credibility of certain members of 
the „inner circle‟ has easily been discredited by those in the outside. It got to the point 
where under Duncan Smith he was forced to drop members of his inner circle by the 
party. Michael Howard ran the tightest inner circle, that was effective in imposing on 
party members who spoke out of line. But again, although in some ways the leader had 
achieved more prominence in the modern environment, the rest of the party, especially 
middle level MP and party ideological factions, had gained power to make life 
uncomfortable for the leader especially when he was not looking like he would be 
electorally successful.  
Between these sections we can see common themes emerging. Only one leader, William 
Hague, made extensive formal changes to the relationship between the leader and the 
party. On their own, they offered the potential for the leader to be able to exert more 
centralised control over a historically fragmented and autonomous party, as well as 
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bypass party elites and communicate with, and win endorsement from, the members. But 
even despite these powers, and the theoretical incentives for giving the leader more 
power and autonomy, often the party had not done so, or demanded a very high prospect 
of electoral success and a solid public image as a future potential Prime Minister before 
doing so.  
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5 Leaders and Elections 
In this chapter we cover the activities of leaders of the opposition during the general 
election campaigns of 2001 and 2005. The chapter revolves around the debate about the 
place of leaders within General Election campaigns. In an environment that is heavily 
influenced by the media and where the shape of the electorate has changed, definitions of 
„electoral campaigning‟ have also changed. From traditionally fairly concentrated affairs, 
campaign activity is now intense a long time before the election. Some think the present 
political environment requires a „permanent campaign‟, a constant sensitivity, receptivity 
and proactiveness towards public opinion.
281
 It therefore becomes much harder to 
delineate between election times, and outside. As the leader of the opposition targets 
above all else getting elected as Prime Minister, this further blurs the analytical line 
between electioneering and „normal‟ politics.  Overlaying all this, there has been a wider 
debate about the role of leaders within election campaigns that has by no means settled. 
Presidentialisation literature has combined with the way elections have developed, to 
create a view that campaigns are now centred around the leaders, and that leaders have 
the most effect on voters. But while most experts concede that the visibility of leaders 
has increased, not all of them think leadership ability and image are prime effects on 
voters.
282
  
As per the conceptual framework, the chapter will divide analysis into three main areas - 
the amount of emphasis on leadership appeals in electoral campaigning, the media‟s 
treatment of leaders, and significance of leader effects. Do they convince parties and 
campaign planners it is necessary to personalise campaigns? Here we relate the leaders 
and their actions to the changed political environment through the prism of 
Presidentialisation - in this case the increased visibility and prominence of leaders, and 
the increased effects, or perception of increased effects, that make it a vital part of 
election strategy for the parties to hand over prominence to their leaders. 
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5.1 Overview of the 2001 and 2005 Campaigns 
The 2001 campaign resulted in another landslide for the Labour party. The Conservatives 
only achieved a net gain of one seat. The Conservatives and Labour ran very different 
campaigns. Labour‟s was based around its leader, with Blair featuring prominently in the 
manifesto and election broadcasts by the party. The central message was that Labour had 
run the economy well, and that the Conservatives would not match the massive increases 
in spending that Labour would be affording to schools and hospitals. There were also 
high profile embarrassments, most notable when John Prescott punched a voter, Blair 
was left looking helpless after he was confronted by an angry member of the public, and 
discontent between him and Brown surfaced. But these incidents did not deny Labour 
another landslide majority. Hague‟s campaign was derided for not concentrating on the 
most popular issues, health and education, and being a „core vote‟ campaign, that had 
aimed to increase turnout amongst those who were already inclined towards 
Conservative policies. Hague had come into the campaign with all sorts of question 
marks over his leadership, chief amongst them the threat from Michael Portillo, who had 
been rumoured to be less than enamoured with Hague‟s „core vote‟ strategy. Hague made 
aggressive assaults on the Government over tax and immigration, under „Common 
Sense‟ and „Save the Pound‟ branding. He warned that the election was the only chance 
to save the pound, and the only chance to save the country. Attempts to emphasise the 
Conservative commitment to the public services were made late in the day, and as the 
campaign drew to a close, Hague drew attention back to the Euro, launching a 
countdown about how many days there were to Save the Pound, urging the uncommitted 
that it was the last chance to vote for Britain as it was, and to send a message to Blair. 
Portillo at times appeared to run his own campaign, like when he toured ethnic areas 
saying the Conservatives should not neglect them, soon after Hague had made a tough 
speech about asylum. Thatcher also appeared, as she made an impassioned speech saying 
it would be treason for any party to consider joining the Euro, appearing to go further 
than official Conservative policy, leading to Labour attacks that Hague did not know 
what he was doing and was a puppet of Thatcher‟s. 283 
The 2005 campaign took place in a very different political environment. Blair‟s 
popularity with the public had waned dramatically after the war in Iraq, and as a result he 
was a much less prominent part of the Labour campaign. His likely successor, Brown, 
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despite having been embroiled in a feud for years previous with Blair, was almost joined 
at the hip with him on the campaign trail. On the Conservative side, unlike the 2001 
election, Michael Howard was not challenged by a figure in the Shadow Cabinet that was 
as large a threat to him as Portillo had been to Hague. There were also no appearances by 
Lady Thatcher in support of the Conservative campaign. Against a weakened Blair, in 
theory the Conservatives should have been hopeful of outright victory. But the 
Conservatives only polled 32.3% of the vote compared to 35.2% for Labour, winning 
197 seats, an improvement on the previous election, but still nowhere near Labour‟s 355 
seats. The 2005 campaign was characterised by a campaign on „micro issues‟. One 
academic has thought this is because the Conservatives realised they would not be able to 
turn round the big Labour leads on the public services, and instead concentrated on 
attacking Labour‟s record on individual issues like cleanliness in hospitals or discipline 
at schools, where they were at their weakest.
284
  Howard had run a much more 
disciplined campaign than Hague‟s, revolving closely at all times around six pledges - 
„lower taxes, more police, cleaner hospitals, controlled immigration, school discipline 
and accountability.‟ It was emphasised that Howard was a pragmatic and honest 
politician, while Blair was a liar, „all spin and no delivery‟. Howard was criticised after 
the election for running a „dog whistling‟ campaign under the guidance of Australian 
campaign specialist Llyton Crosby, targeting voters who were worried about 
controversial subjects like immigration with subversive messages. Although the actual 
amount of time the Conservatives devoted to immigration was not apparently excessive, 
it became a byword for the campaign among the media. In 2005 both main parties gave 
considerable thought to how they could appeal to the floating vote, and it is likely many 
policies and words were constructed on the back of these efforts. The targeted seats 
campaign financed by Lord Ashcroft was potentially responsible for the seats the 
Conservatives added over their performance in 2001. The Conservatives targeted 
individual groups of voters, and key swing seats through new technology. In the face of 
the fragmentation of the „old‟ media, parties put more effort into cultivating the local 
media in swing seats, and having the leaders make more appearances, both dumping their 
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„battlebus‟ in favour of helicopter trips around the country. Politicians increasingly 
appeared on entertainment shows which never reported politics but had big audiences.
285
  
5.2 Dynamics of Election Campaigning and Leadership 
This section will look at the incidences of leadership appeals in election campaigning, 
including election broadcasts, posters, slogans, what members of the opposition appeared 
and where they appeared. Was there an obvious emphasis on leadership appeals at the 
expense of the party? We shall look at what is called the “near term campaign”286 and the 
campaign itself. We will start off with an outline of the Conservative strategy for the near 
term and election campaigns, the use of the leader, and the issues this raised about the 
placement of leadership appeals within the Conservative campaign. We will do this first 
for the 2001 campaign led by William Hague, and then the 2005 campaign led by 
Michael Howard. 
At the start of 2001, Hague was on a clear strategic trajectory that had been developed 
out of the failure of the Kitchen Table Conservatism Plan. There was a clear theme of 
attacks on Labour for stealthy increases in tax, that had not improved public services. In 
early January Hague launched a series of posters about this theme. These were more 
concerned with what Labour had done than with what Hague or the Conservatives 
wanted to do. They did not use images of the leader, instead criticising Labour‟s stealth 
taxes, under the generic strapline - „You‟ve paid the Tax, But where‟s the 
operation/police/schools'. But if the strategy of attacking Labour weakness in this area 
was relatively clear, the logical resulting point was not - what would the Conservatives 
do about the problem? Although Hague made many announcements during the near term 
campaign, they were less about his personal appeals or what he planned than about 
responding to Labour. Hague attempted to neutralise the Conservative weakness in the 
public services by a series of pledges to match Labour expenditure on transport, defence 
and the police as well as hospitals and schools, creating a huge volume of government 
spending where he would be bound by Labour plans if he won power. 
287
 By increasing 
the areas where he would stick to Labour spending plans he was limiting the scope for 
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reducing the tax burden, while not being able to offer a concrete guarantee the services 
would be improved. This did not match the image Hague had portrayed of himself as a 
tax cutter. Often, Hague had personally appealed for the need for Britain to keep in the 
low tax band of economies. He frequently referred to his personal travels to Florida, and 
countries in Asia, where they were pushing ahead with lowering taxes and deregulating 
to prepare for the „internet age‟. This new age would make the business environment 
globally ferociously competitive and make „the unfair advantage‟ of lower taxes more 
important for states to attain.
288
 It was a coherent and „modern‟ vision, but not one that 
chimed with the desire to maintain the spending of large public sector departments.
289
 
This initiative was not obviously anchored to the leader‟s beliefs.  
Although there was not a concerted attempt to personalise the early marketing around 
Hague, some attempt at personalisation was seen in a couple of major speeches he gave 
in the near campaign period in 2001. Hague had been emphasising a harsher, more direct 
tone that was linked to a picture of Hague and his character. This picture was of Hague as 
a „common sense‟ crusader against the „liberal elite‟, using his typically Yorkshire plain 
talking and common sense to say the truths that needed to be said, even if it was at the 
expense of short term popularity. Hague‟s conception of the mainstream majority had 
often permeated his speeches. They were people who had been too frightened to speak 
out against the oppressive liberal elite. This construction served two purposes, to identify 
himself with the majority, and to allude to the way that the media and the „Islington‟ 
Labour elite thought that they could keep the thoughts of the „majority‟ silenced. The 
spring conference speech was a very personal appeal, trying to bind a set of ideas with 
personality traits that, constructed or not, Hague had been trying very hard to 
demonstrate over the previous two years. But the speech also showed the difficulty of 
this strategy, as the „leadership‟ part of the speech was not clearly separated from the 
leader‟s relationship with his party. In Hague‟s first speech he had said the party needed 
to change, because it had become out of touch with modern British society.  Now Hague 
professed to be proud of the party as it was, and what it had done in the past. “All of us 
are proud to be part of this Conservative party. And the values that have shaped our past 
must shape our future”. Members of his party had been often marginalised in public 
debate, but he stood with them. “Talk about Europe and they call you extreme. Talk 
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about tax and they call you greedy. Talk about crime and they call you reactionary. Talk 
about asylum and they call you racist. Talk about your nation and they call you Little 
Englanders.” Hague said “let me take you on a journey to a foreign land - to Britain after 
a second term of Tony Blair”- with the Euro, EU interference on tax, criminals let out of 
jail, more petrol tax, and cancelled operations. Hague was aligned with the traditional 
forces and methods that had made Britain great, drawing a line in the sand from attack by 
Blair and his elite. If slightly exaggerated, this was consistent with Hague‟s rheortric that 
a Labour victory would change so much of the fundamental things about Britain. But the 
exact reception of the speech depended on more than just the words. It was „spun‟ as 
tough on immigration, making this the big story (somewhat out of the context of the 
speech) and took attention away from the whole message. Swathes of the speech talked 
about the public services, taxes, and crime, under the „common sense‟ banner, but were 
little reported.
290
 After the controversy engendered by the speech Hague noticeably 
tamed down his speeches, not referring to a „foreign land‟ again.291 This showed the 
difficulty of establishing a personal appeal, especially when the leader‟s central team had 
let it be so bound up in the debate within the Conservative party.  What Hague said in 
speeches was important. However, it was not all about what Hague said, but how it was 
„spun‟, and interpreted by the wider world. 
But beyond this there was a deeper schism that unavoidably imposed itself upon the 
perception of what Hague did and said. There was one other figure in the Shadow 
Cabinet that was as prominent and had as much political stature as Hague, Michael 
Portillo. Many Conservative policies were not even launched by Hague. 
292
 A major 
problem for Hague was that Portillo did not feel he had to stick to an economic remit, 
and often proletysed about other topics. With the media excitedly speculating about what 
policy division there was between Hague and Portillo, it inhibited attempts to personalise 
the near campaign around Hague. With every policy announcement, there was 
speculation of what Portillo really thought, and whether he was being appeased. 
Effectively, this made any personalised appeals by Hague seem conditional on the 
approval of his Shadow Chancellor, as if his leadership was dependent on Portillo‟s 
grace. If he did not secure this approval, then he faced briefing and rumour that Portillo 
was unhappy, such as over the „foreign land‟ speech. The division between Hague and 
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Portillo over the „liberal elite‟ strategy, meant that even though this had been woven into 
Hague‟s speeches as a personalised appeal, it was very hard for him to speak about it 
without threatening Shadow Cabinet stability. To make it even more difficult, not all 
Shadow Cabinet discussions were subject to a high level of secrecy. There were frequent 
leaks and unattributable briefing by Portillo supporters to the effect that Hague‟s liberal 
elite strategies were narrow minded, futile and would mean certain defeat for the 
Conservatives.
293
 As long as Hague had a figure of comparable stature in the Shadow 
Cabinet who had a very different opinion on the strategy the party should take, then it 
was always hard for him to personalise the message of the near campaign. This affected 
both aspects of leadership appeals – the internal, with the extensive infighting in his 
office, and the external, with the impression created that Hague could not control the top 
of his party.  
5.2.1 The 2001 Campaign 
The general election campaign was generally seen as a failure for Hague and the 
Conservatives. The scale of the landslide meant there were plenty of theories advanced as 
to why the defeat had been so heavy. Commentators thought that Hague had conducted a 
general election campaign that did not show the voters much of his personality at all. 
Other debates and personalities filled the vacuum he left. The Thatcher years loomed 
large over British politics, and the received wisdom was that Hague had not 
differentiated himself enough from Thatcherite Toryism. The question of Portillo‟s 
differing vision also reared its head many times during the campaign. First in this section 
we must undertake some assessment of Hague‟s character. We must look at what 
Hague‟s personality had been shown to be before and how it was shown off during the 
election. In assessing this, we must look at how defined his personality was in the public 
eye before the campaign, and how Hague and the Conservative leadership conducted 
itself during the campaign. We will look at the content of his speeches and how 
personalised was the message that he was delivering. We will also look at the 
presentation of the campaign in a similar way as we did with the near term campaign - 
how posters and promotional material were presented, how Hague was presented, who he 
was with, and who made significant announcements and speeches.  
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Hague‟s political personality was fairly ill-defined before the campaign. He had been 
famous for his appearance as a youngster at the Conservative conference, and had been 
viewed as a rising star before the 1997 election, but had not been obviously aligned with 
an ideological wing of the Conservatives. It was debated whether Hague had ever 
successfully worked out what his political personality was.
294
 This places Hague‟s 
attempts to establish a personal message around the campaign in context. Looking at the 
main topics of his speeches during the campaign, no one theme emerges as dominant. 
Europe and the Euro, and the quest to „Save the Pound‟, was often key to what he was 
saying, but there were major set piece speeches on health, education, crime, immigration 
and tax. It was very hard to attribute an overall „theme‟ to Hague‟s campaign. We can 
divide his campaign rhetoric into different stages, the initial stage of the campaign where 
he was eager to talk about saving the pound and national independence from Brussels, a 
second stage which flitted between a wider range of issues, and the last few days of the 
campaign where he was eager again to emphasise the importance of Saving the Pound.
295
 
Lacing all the speeches were common rhetorical flourishes - that it was time for common 
sense, that Hague was without Labour‟s spin and not afraid to speak out, that the 
Conservatives were the only party to stand up for national independence from 
Brussels.
296
 To see how personalised the campaign was, we have to look at not just what 
Hague said during the campaign, but how it was presented and related to the marketing 
campaign. After reviewing footage of Hague, the conclusions one draws about the extent 
of personalisation are somewhat different from the conclusions taken just reading the text 
of the speeches. The presentation of the campaign often took the emphasis away from 
what Hague was saying, and potentially, the impression he was trying to give. Hague 
appeared at two different types of events during the campaign – morning press 
conferences, and rallies around the country, most of which he held under the “Save the 
Pound” banner. At these rallies, crowds would gather with „Save the Pound‟ banners and 
balloons in the centre of a town. Hague would arrive and conduct a speech, often 
standing on a soapbox, near a van emblazoned in the „Save the Pound‟ livery and logo.297 
Often Hague would hold a Pound coin up when he was speaking for dramatic effect, and 
remind the audience how many days there were to save it. On several news broadcasts, 
this made up the majority of the footage broadcast of Hague, even when he was talking 
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about another issue. Most people would have seen Hague through this footage. This was 
a very effective way of making the campaign seem more like a single issue “referendum” 
on the Euro, even when Hague‟s words were about something different. It conflicted 
with the effect Hague was trying to give of the „common sense‟ man who was telling the 
truth about difficult issues, speaking up for the mainstream majority, in his Yorkshire 
plain speaking manner. If the campaign to „Save the Pound‟ was meant to fit into this 
strategy, then there were some obvious flaws. Far from being a black and white issue that 
Hague could deal with in plain language, his Euro policy was more nuanced. Because of 
the division in his party, Hague had pledged to keep Britain out of the Euro, but only for 
the duration of the next Parliament. This offered room to keep both Eurosceptics and 
Europhiles on board, although it also ensured that the most fervent advocates on either 
side were unlikely to be wholly placated. It was tactics to keep his party onside, not plain 
speaking. The last major rally was typical of Hague‟s approach, where the visual 
symbolism of the anti-Euro message wiped out much of what he was saying. Hague 
made his speech in the middle of a noisy crowd holding placards (many „Save the 
Pound‟). The crowd were boistourous, and at one point Hague accused Labour hecklers 
of wanting to destroy the country. Surely the point of such confrontation was to show 
Hague as an honest, straight talking man of the people. But if that was the case, then why 
was the Euro so prominent at these events - by nature his policy was a compromise and 
somewhat nuanced.
298
 The Euro was not also necessarily a subject closely associated 
with him personally. Hague had not been a prominent member of the eurosceptic 
insurrection during the Major years, and had owed many of the votes he gained during 
the leadership election to being seen as a centrist. And of course he had made a virtue of 
moving the party on to talking about other issues outside Europe at the beginning of his 
leadership. So until the European election campaign of 1999, and the Save the Pound 
roadshow which had started in the year 2000, the fight to stop the Euro being adopted as 
the national currency, or indeed the fight against the increasing power of the European 
Union, had never really been central to the political personality and life of William 
Hague. But it dominated the visual, and many of the political, aspects of his campaign. 
While the European policy may have been deeply important to his campaign, he was 
competing for coverage with figures who had longer, and more personal associations 
with the subject.  
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The two centrepiece slogans - „The Common Sense Revolution‟ and „Save the Pound‟ - 
did not make obvious reference to Hague. But the „Time for Common Sense‟ slogan did 
fit with some things Hague had been attempting to put across about his personality. 
Hague professed to be appalled by some of the complicated schemes and laws New 
Labour had introduced, and was anxious to roll them back in areas where they hindered 
law-abiding, hard-working people. Hague claimed that this had been informed by his 
background, his work for his father‟s soft drinks business, and his chats with ordinary 
people. „Common Sense‟ as a phrase linked to Hague‟s clashes with Labour and the legal 
system, and his portrayal of a knowledgeable and sensible majority cowed by the 
extremist Islington elite. „Save the Pound‟ rallies round the country, speaking on 
soapboxes and talking to ordinary people, were designed to show him as the antithesis of 
the spin and slickness of Tony Blair. But Hague was also not averse to „spinning‟ certain 
elements of his delivery either, such as when he insisted that the election was the most 
important for generations, and that the whole future of Britain as a sovereign nation 
depended upon a Conservative victory.
299
 The overall impact of the message was diluted 
by the way Hague often changed his tone in the middle of the campaign in response to 
outside criticism, like about the inner cities.
300
 „Time for Common Sense‟ was replaced 
by „Common Sense for all‟. This appeared a response to criticism that the campaign was 
not „inclusive‟ enough.301 But it did go against the grain of the image he had been putting 
forward for two years, and watered down the common sense message. Although Hague 
was often the personal bearer of this, it did not carry through to a sense that Hague 
dominated the campaign. But why was this? There was some division at the top about 
strategy. A “schizophrenia” developed in the Conservative campaign, between the 
theoretical campaign and the rhetorical and media campaign. Much of the manifesto was 
centred around public services. But most of Hague‟s pronouncements were on “Europe, 
tax, the single currency and asylum seekers.” Rather than the majority of the advertising 
reinforcing the central campaign message and what the leader was saying, in the end the 
Conservatives “ran two virtually separate and parallel campaigns.”302 This feeds into a 
wider theory that Hague had conducted the general election campaign as the first stage of 
the leadership election that was threatened afterwards. With Portillo pursuing an obvious 
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alternative style and strategy, it merely heightened this impression that Hague was unsure 
of what to do and anxious to mollify the party. Party concerns took precedence over 
establishing a personal mandate. The Conservative campaign of 2001 appears to be a 
campaign that William Hague was bolted onto, albeit in a prominent place. It was not a 
campaign that was designed around him, or rested upon his appeal. 
This impression was re-inforced by the way that before the election, the Conservatives 
went to active lengths to avoid using Hague‟s image in their promotional activity. Unlike 
Blair, Hague did not appear in many of the Conservative election broadcasts, and did not 
have one devoted to his personal history. The Conservative poster campaigns about the 
tax burden, petrol taxes, Labour being soft on crime, and seven days left to save the 
pound, eschewed Hague and politicians altogether. The manifesto did not make use of 
Hague‟s image like the Labour manifesto did of Blair. The party broadcasts continued 
this relentlessly critical theme. They consisted of constant dark, menacing sound and 
video that pointed to a bleak future under Labour. It was “telling” that the last broadcast 
was the only one to feature Hague, briefly repeating his pledge that he would give people 
back their country.
303
 The absence of Hague indicates the lack of confidence the party 
had in promoting Hague, actively trying to hide their leader when they had total control. 
Before the campaign, Hague could not rely on the same public profile as previous 
Conservative leaders, so he was vulnerable to his party.  The danger of making the 
European policy the (visual) centrepiece of the campaign was that Hague would end up 
being eclipsed at certain points by those who had had invested more in the topic. This 
was certainly true of Thatcher‟s „Mummy Returns‟ speech, which despite its relative 
brevity, had been the defining moment of the campaign for many. It instantly became the 
top campaign story. The actual speech contained little new about Thatcher‟s views that 
wasn‟t already known. It criticised the Labour Government‟s remorseless increases in 
stealth taxes and welfare dependency, and Labour‟s European policy. The section on 
Europe was especially passionate. “The greatest issue in this election, indeed the greatest 
issue before our country, is whether Britain is to remain a free, independent, nation state. 
Or whether we are to be dissolved in a federal Europe. There are no half measures, no 
third ways - and no second chances.”304 This related to maintaining the nation‟s currency 
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-   “a country which loses the power to issue its own currency is a country which has 
given up the power to govern itself. Such a country is no longer free. And neither is it 
truly democratic. To surrender the pound, to surrender our power of self-government, 
would betray all that past generations down the ages lived and died to defend.” Even for 
a politician who held such strong views as Thatcher this was strong talk. In a way it did 
match, and support, Hague‟s claims that there were only a few days left to save the 
pound, and that abandoning it would be an insult to national history. But did this help this 
message to become more personalised around Hague? On balance we would have to say 
not. The substance of the Hague policy on the Euro was actually rather nuanced, and 
offered at least some nods to the pro-Europeans in his party. While Thatcher did not 
disagree with the substance of the „one term no‟ policy in her speech, could people really 
believe that a politician with her long stand against the creeping power of the European 
Union (at least out of office), uttering such visceral language about the Euro, really 
agreed with what was essentially an intra party compromise measure, no matter how 
much it was dressed up by the Save the Pound roadshow? And in turn, this opened up 
dangers for Hague.  
The immediate danger was that Hague‟s nuanced policy would be undermined when 
Thatcher wanted to go further than him, and Hague would then not be seen as the true 
and authentic voice of Conservatives. Would Hague have to match Thatcher‟s promises, 
or stick to his tight policy and look a pallid type of Thatcherite? But there was another 
danger, that by supporting Thatcher, he would be seen as a puppet, not an independent 
strong leader in his own right. This was raised in the famous Labour party advertisements 
that merged Hague‟s face with Thatcher‟s hair, and talked of the need to vote Labour, or 
„they‟, (not Hague), would „get in‟.305 The danger of bringing such a prominent figure 
into the campaign was that Hague‟s own personality would be obscured, restricting the 
scope for personalising the campaign.  Thatcher was widely seen as a larger personality, 
probably the largest personality in British politics since the war. She had been admired 
and reviled for her willingness to speak her mind, and rebel against the „liberal elite‟, two 
things that Hague was now trying to claim were part of his own political personality. But 
was Thatcher in a stronger position to exhibit these characteristics, given her strong 
personality and beliefs, and the freedom conferred upon her by being out of office? 
Arguably, she was more convincing than Hague at the political personality he was 
claiming for himself, and more likely to invoke nostalgia for her style of leadership than 
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of an appreciation of Hague‟s. There was a danger the campaign would turn into a debate 
about what returning to a „Thatcherite‟ administration would mean. Hague had not been 
around British politics long enough, to establish the same deep association with a set of 
values. Therefore any personality he developed would seem weak in comparison, and 
even leave him open to accusations that he was being controlled by Thatcher.  
The same problem applied to another strong personality that Hague had surrounded 
himself with - Portillo. Nominally, Hague had chosen to have a Shadow Cabinet 
reshuffle in 1999 soon after Portillo had re-entered Parliament, and promote him 
immediately to Shadow Chancellor. On face value, this was a sensible, and obvious, 
move that would strengthen his Shadow Cabinet, by including a substantial figure who 
had been so popular among the party. It was generally considered that he would have 
beaten Hague easily in the Conservative leadership election in 1997, had he not lost his 
seat in the 1997 general election and been unable to participate. Polls showed he was just 
as well known as Hague.
306
 But Portillo‟s stature was part of the problem. It led to 
speculation that Hague had only appointed him to such an important job within the 
Shadow Cabinet as a stalling manoeuvre to try and stop Portillo challenging for the 
leadership, and that in reality Hague would have been happier not having Portillo in the 
Shadow Cabinet.
307
 A series of policy changes by the Conservatives on the minimum 
wage, the Bank of England, and the tax guarantee, were treated by the media as defeats 
for Hague by Portillo, and there was constant speculation that Portillo would challenge 
Hague after the election, making his leadership seem conditional. Significantly, although 
Portillo had been on the hardline Thatcherite right of the party, there was evidence that 
his time out of frontline politics had led him to a very different personal conception of 
Conservative politics. Portillo founded much of his analysis around the way the party had 
not been seen as „caring‟, especially about the public services, or embraced the more 
diverse aspects of modern Britain. Portillo‟s language and tone had changed 
significantly. His admission of homosexual experiences as a youth showed a more 
socially liberal outlook. This continued when he became a member of the Shadow 
Cabinet, and was shown in instances like his speech to the 2000 conference. Here he 
barely spent any time talking about his economic brief, and gave a Blair like 
performance, walking around the stage and emphasising his respect for the diversity of 
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modern Britain.
308
 As his return to the Shadow Cabinet almost exactly coincided with 
Hague‟s standing up for the forgotten majority, it opened up a very public gap between 
the two different conceptions of the Conservatives‟ social policy. Portillo represented the 
group in the Conservative party that wanted more of a “cultural transformation,” in the 
party and the way it related to society.
309
  
Damagingly for Hague, Portillo had shown by his actions before the election that it was 
unlikely he would keep his doubts or his willingness to challenge Hague after the 
election quiet, as he could rely on a network of supporters to disseminate his thoughts on 
what Hague was doing wrong. And Hague did not have the option of dismissing Portillo 
as an irrelevance. Sacking him in the middle of a general election would have 
precipitated a disintegration of the campaign, and indeed sacking him at any point in the 
two years previous would have almost certainly precipitated a leadership election. Hague 
did not have many sticks that would make Portillo keep his followers quiet. And 
Portillo‟s stature among voters and party members meant that he could not be easily 
dismissed. All this might have not been so threatening to personalisation of the election 
campaign, if Portillo had not been so keen to espouse his alternative vision of how the 
campaign should be conducted.  
This led to a division at the top of the campaign that Hague could not hide, such as when 
the media thought that Portillo was running a campaign within a campaign that 
emphasised social inclusion, and conflicted with Hague‟s hard line on immigration. It 
was symbolised in a bizarre kerfuffle about how Portillo should be photographed with 
Hague, Major and their wives.
310
 While amusing, for some commentators it actually was 
a neat way of summarising the Conservative campaign‟s problem, that Portillo was of 
equal stature to Hague, and there was a perception that he was biding his time, waiting 
until after Hague had lost the election to run for the leadership. Hague was not helped by 
the fact there were often unattributed briefings appearing in the media saying Portillo 
was pouring scorn on Hague's frequent attacks on the 'liberal elite' and even regarding it 
as a personal affront.
311
 How could Hague be the centrepiece of a campaign rested upon 
his appeal, when he was arguably not the most senior figure within his own party, and 
Portillo and his allies were pushing criticisms of Hague‟s leadership strategy, even 
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during the election campaign when unity was supposedly paramount? Of course there are 
certain aspects of the landscape this overlooks - if Portillo had really been intent upon 
challenging Hague after the election, then he would have had to be mindful of party 
opinion as well. And of course Portillo‟s political and personal personality was a 
complicated one - from losing his seat in the 1997 election as a hardline right winger, he 
had travelled towards a much more socially liberal position. Some of these policy 
positions may have been influenced not purely by his personality or what was popular, 
but by the elite discourse of New Labour, which heavily favoured socially liberal 
positions. It was certainly enough to constitute an alternative vision to Hague‟s liberal 
elite, and just as personally driven round him as Hague‟s strategy was. This clash of 
visions and personalities drove media coverage. The election was not so much 
personalised around the leader as it was the stage for a bubbling confrontation between 
two very different personalities about the way forward for the party. Hague‟s personality 
was not strong enough to override Portillo‟s in this confrontation.  
At the beginning of this section, we outlined that we were going to assess the 
presentation of the campaign and how personalised it was, how Hague and other 
significant members of the party were presented, and whether he was challenged for 
prominence by these other personalities. We have seen that the presentation of the 
campaign was not noticeably personalised around Hague, in fact there were many 
examples where there seemed to have been an active effort to not use Hague. The 
presentation of Hague himself was slightly strange in that although there appeared to be a 
coherent conception of what personality they wanted to present, the issue chosen to do 
this was not necessarily the most suitable to demonstrate this personality.  And behind all 
this Hague faced challenges from two personalities that were better known than him – 
Thatcher and Portillo. 
5.2.2 The 2005 Campaign: 
Again in this section we must look at the leader‟s character, the personalisation of the 
campaign and the presentation of it. There are some similarities with the way the 
campaign was presented in 2005 to 2001- most marketing literature and posters still 
relied on abstract messages and appeals, instead of directly referring to Howard. 
However, what differed is that the message referred to throughout was one that was more 
obviously personally identifiable with Howard - the „Timetable for Action‟,  
 162 
In the period running up to the election Howard made speeches on a variety of issues - 
international development, tax cuts, immigration, choice in the public services, council 
tax and terrorism. Asylum and immigration were the topics he made most speeches on, 
but not overwhelmingly. What is striking about these speeches is that most shared the 
same structure, even if they were about different topics. The speeches all followed a 
similar format - Howard would start with an attack on Blair, usually contrasting a 
promise he had made
312
 with the way he had forgotten “the people who work hard, pay 
their dues and play by the rules.”313 Blair was “all talk.” He never referred to Labour, just 
„Mr Blair‟.314 Unlike Hague, Howard made many attempts to highlight his personal 
background - “I came from an ordinary family. I didn‟t have any special privileges. But 
Britain gave me the opportunity to get on in life.” 315 As well as the personal emphasis 
there was a very definite structure to Howard‟s speeches, much more so than Hague, that 
made many of them seem almost identical. His speeches often ended with the line 
“That‟s what a Conservative government will deliver”316 or “people will face a clear 
choice at the next election” - between „Mr Blair‟ and „the Conservatives‟.317  
During the campaign, Howard kept much the same tight emphasis on the same points, 
heavily based around him and the six pledges. Howard‟s first speech that opened the 
campaign would be typical of many of the speeches he made during it. Howard spoke 
behind a lectern which displayed the Conservative campaign slogan - Are You Thinking 
What We‟re Thinking: Vote Conservative‟, flanked by his wife and several casually 
dressed Conservative workers and officials. In the speech, Howard repeated his pledges, 
and said that people who had had enough of „Mr Blair‟ should vote for the 
Conservatives.
318
 Howard said he would govern by the 'hard-working values' of the 
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British people.
319
 The campaign settled into a rhythm. In the morning Howard would 
give a press conference at Conservative Central Office, usually on one topic, with the 
relevant Shadow Minister. Significant news items often came out of these press 
conferences, like when Howard announced plans to cut stamp duty,
320
 announced tax 
cuts for savings,
321
 denied waging a single issue campaign on immigration,
322
 and set out 
his plans for a managed asylum system.
323
 Howard had greater involvement in the press 
conferences than Hague. But Howard made even more announcements „on the road‟, 
where the events followed much the same format - Howard at a white lectern 
emblazoned with the campaign slogan with his wife and a crowd, or a blue background 
with the name of the constituency on it. Later in the campaign, the slogan on the podium 
was often changed to the more anodyne „Taking a Stand on The Issues That Matter‟.324 
Around the country, Howard continually announced that Blair had told lies to win 
elections, (and had even lost the plot).
325
 The last part of the campaign marked an 
intensification of the themes of accountability and attacking Blair. Typically, this 
message was integrated across the campaign - from Howard‟s speeches, to a poster 
accusing Blair of being a liar, to a vicious advert attacking Blair‟s lies, and interviews 
Howard gave.
326
 The biggest difference with Hague‟s campaign was the discipline of the 
Conservative message. While Hague had used speeches to list reams of policy 
commitments, and had to change various aspects of the campaign due to political 
pressure, Howard kept so many common themes from what he had been saying 
throughout the year leading up to the election, never mind the campaign. So many of the 
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themes Howard would determinedly repeat would be integrated into other parts of the 
election campaign. It was easier to distil the main messages of the campaign.  
This strict „theming‟ and branding of the campaign continued into the Political Election 
Broadcasts. The Conservative broadcasts contained more of the leader than they had in 
2001, but not to the point where he dominated. The first broadcasts were more optimistic 
and less negative in tone than the 2001 efforts, with ordinary people explaining the 
reasons why they were voting Conservative, and then leading members of the Shadow 
Cabinet explaining why they endorsed Howard. The last broadcast was a straight to 
camera piece by Howard explaining why people should vote Conservative. More 
controversial than that was a cinema advertisement the Conservatives used which was all 
about Blair, over pictures of the Prime Minister, music called „take that look off your 
face‟ played, while a narrator accused the Prime Minister, as Howard had in public, of 
being prepared to lie to take the country to war, and therefore probably being prepared to 
lie to win an election.
327
  
The manifesto was an amalgamation of the tactics Howard had used before and during 
the election. It contained only one picture of Howard, and none of any of the Shadow 
Cabinet. The front page repeated the six pledges, with the main slogan of „Are You 
Thinking What We‟re Thinking‟ ablazening it. The foreword to the manifesto, under 
Howard‟s byline, claimed that “Instead of rewarding families who do the right thing, 
work hard and pay their taxes, Mr Blair‟s Government takes them for granted. And after 
eight years in power, all he offers is more talk.” Howard was the “the child of 
immigrants, as a state school pupil, as the first person in my family to go to university.” 
People were “tired of politicians who talk and talk, but fail to deliver. Accountability will 
be our watchword. People have had enough talk, it‟s time for action.”  The manifesto 
then led into six sections that paralleled the six pledges, that started off with teasing 
questions that had formed the basis for some of the Conservative banner advertisements -  
such as „I mean, how hard is it to keep a hospital clean?‟, „Put more police on the streets 
and they‟ll catch more criminals. It‟s not rocket science is it?‟ and „It‟s not racist to 
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impose limits on immigration‟.328 This manifesto echoed and reinforced the themes 
Howard had pushed throughout the year of the election. 
In contrast to the last election, Howard faced a Labour party that was a lot more anxious 
to draft other figures into campaign activity alongside an increasingly unpopular Blair, 
especially Gordon Brown. However, although Blair was not popular, Howard was not 
particularly popular with the electorate either, as we shall see in the next section. So why 
had the decision been taken to place Howard centre stage? Howard himself said that it “is 
inevitable in a general election” that the leader of the opposition will attract far more 
publicity than the other Shadow Ministers, because they “are normally less well known, 
people are normally more interested in who‟s going to be Prime Minister and leader of 
the party than anything else.” Unlike in the previous election, there was no comparable 
figure that would take a significant portion of media coverage away from Howard. 
Indeed the other Shadow Cabinet Ministers were conspicuous by their low profile. 
Howard had been elected unopposed to the leadership, meaning there was no „rival‟ 
figure that he had to beat. Of the three figures that had bestrode the 2001 leadership 
contest, all had faded to relative degrees of obscurity - Iain Duncan Smith had kept a low 
profile since losing the leadership and had had his policies and ideas on social 
deprivation and „Broken Britain‟ largely ignored by Howard.329 Michael Portillo had 
given up on frontline politics after being unsuccessful in even making the final ballot of 
two contenders in the leadership contest, and had announced his intention to step down 
from Parliament at the 2005 election. And Kenneth Clarke, while remaining a candidate 
for Parliament in 2005, had kept a relatively low profile. During the election about 
immigration, overall the potential for arguments over Europe and the Euro, the subject 
Clarke was most associated with, had greatly reduced from 2001. The place of Margaret 
Thatcher was also changed within the 2005 campaign. This was partially down to the fact 
that the European debate on which she had weighed in so forcefully in 2001 had become 
less prominent, but also that after suffering a stroke in 2002, she had stood down from 
public speaking.
330
 Her ability to rouse followers and contribute to the modern debate 
had greatly lessened. Howard had been the first leader who had been able to claim that he 
did not „owe‟ his election to Thatcher. Howard was also helped by the fact that the 
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members who were actually active in the Shadow Cabinet were not very prominent in 
relation to him. The three marquee positions in the Shadow Cabinet were held by Oliver 
Letwin, Michael Ancram and David Davis. Letwin and Ancram were widely perceived 
as not of leadership material. Davis was, and it was rumoured that he was plotting against 
Howard with an intention to challenge him after the election.
331
 However, this did not 
come near the feverish speculation about Hague and Portillo, and Davis‟ vision of the 
future of the party was closer to Howard‟s in substance than Hague and Portillo were.  
The personalisation of the campaign around Howard in 2005 was comprehensive but 
partial. It revolved around a coherent message, that was repeatedly linked to Howard‟s 
own personality, beliefs, and upbringing, albeit one that did not feature him prominently 
in the advertising of the message. What Howard was prominent in was the delivery of the 
message, with it being almost exclusive to him. Thanks to a mix of political circumstance 
and this focus on Howard, it meant he towered way above other Conservative politicians 
in terms of recognition. But there is one caveat, that this message relied as much on the 
personality of the Prime Minister as it did Howard - with a different Prime Minister it 
would have been difficult to envisage the message being the same, as Howard admitted 
himself. However, envisage the same Prime Minister and a different leader of the 
opposition and it is easy to imagine that the same strategy, or something very similar, 
would have been deployed. So although the outward expression of electoral appeals was 
tightly centred around the leader in 2005, their internal logic may have not depended on 
him to the same extent.  
Howard allowed that it was a team effort behind the nature of the public appearances he 
made during the election, between Crosby, Whetstone, Saatchi and Black and 
Sherbourne, with Crosby having a big impact, and Saatchi having a big influence in the 
six messages Howard preached. He refused to say anything more about the balance of 
power within the campaign, saying that it was a unified team.
332
 Certainly it was less 
prone to the detailed leaks that had dogged central office under Hague, but that did not 
mean it was necessarily unified, with it being rumoured that Saatchi in particular was not 
happy at the lack of ideological direction to the campaign.
333
 During the final stage of the 
campaign, Howard deployed an interesting tactic which had not been used to any great 
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extent by Hague, and launched a series of personal attacks on Blair. Howard admitted the 
personality of the other leader was an influence, and was a viable weapon for his 
leadership team to use. 
334
 Undoubtedly the personality of the Prime Minister has an 
impact on the kind of campaign the leader of the opposition can run, and Howard 
admitted when he was interviewed for this thesis that if Blair had had a better reputation 
for honesty then the Conservative campaign would have had to be different. The leader‟s 
personality is not a weapon, but the personality of the other leader is. Of course if we 
take the proposition that the qualities of the Prime Minister can affect the way the leader 
of the opposition conducts his election campaign, then it also follows that this works in a 
negative sense as well. While providing the leader of the opposition with more options to 
attack the Prime Minister and accentuate „good‟ elements of his own personality, it also 
may mean that certain elements of their character become redundant. For example it 
would have been ridiculous for Hague or Howard to accentuate the charismatic areas of 
their leadership against Blair, even if they may have been more charismatic than other 
Conservative politicians.  
The personalisation of election campaigning around the leader has been rather haphazard. 
In Hague‟s case it was almost non-existent, while with Howard it was only in the 
message, not the marketing. In neither case was it total, despite the effect it had on some 
election themes. 
5.3 Media Coverage of Politics and the Leader of the Opposition 
This chapter will analyse the second assertion of the framework: that during election 
campaigns media coverage in a presidentialised environment has increasingly focused on 
leaders to the exclusion of other political actors and is a good reason in itself for this 
process to happen. The section will look at two main areas - political coverage in national 
newspapers, and TV news. It will be looking for the split between policy and personality, 
if the leader dominated coverage of their party, and the key events that affected the party. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the newspaper industry is not a homogenous 
one. There is great variation between the style and amount of political coverage in each 
of the different styles of paper, with the broadsheets generally expected to contain most 
political coverage and treat it most seriously and the tabloids expected to contain the least 
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coverage and in the most relaxed style. So we have to make allowances for the different 
style and tone of coverage a reader would expect from each style of paper. With 
television, the differences are less stark, as at election times broadcasters are covered by 
strict impartiality rules.  
5.3.1 The 2001 Campaign 
The first area we will look at is what happened, in the near term campaign. Analysis of 
newspaper coverage of the budget does not show that the media covered it in a way that 
leaders‟ dominated. A lot of the coverage focused on the implications for the 
Conservative party
335
, and its overall economic impact.
336
 Many stories did not assess 
what each measure would mean for each party, but more in terms of how it would affect 
the economy and the ordinary voter. The leaders of the main parties did not receive a 
major boost in coverage from the budget. More surprisingly, the pages of the tabloids 
showed much the same trend. Obviously, they were unable to devote the same level of 
coverage to the event as the broadsheets could. But they still filled their pages with many 
technical stories
337
, and profiles of the chancellor.
338
 If anything, with tabloids having 
less space, and expectations of a more undemanding style of coverage, we could have 
expected them to be enthusiastic to use leaders as „information shortcuts‟ to giving 
readers an insight into how the budget had changed the political situation. But they did 
not, preferring to present aspects of the budget issue by issue at the expense of the 
leaders. The budget in 2001, to all intents and purposes a fully integrated part of the 
campaign, did not have the leader as a focal point of the coverage. But did this change 
when the actual election campaign was underway? 
We see that the amount of personalised coverage increased. While it was not exclusively 
centred around leaders, they played a much larger role than they did with an event like 
the budget. The tabloids especially hung coverage on the personal promises of the 
leader.
339
 The same was true in mid market papers, in the style of the reporting with 
phraseology like “William Hague came out fighting for votes yesterday,” albeit with 
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some more policy detail than in the tabloids.
340
 It is in analysis of the manifesto that we 
start to see a trend. Analysis would start off centred on policy
341
 but explicitly laying the 
blame and responsibility for sorting things out with Hague - “what still eludes Hague is 
the big idea.” The broadsheets were not much different, “William Hague will seize the 
initiative in the general election campaign”342 was the tone of much of the coverage, but 
with more additional space to include the context of the campaign and the other party‟s 
responses.
343
 But there was a clear split between the front page stories and leading stories 
which summed up the campaign developments and tended to pin things on the leader, 
and the more lucid series of background stories which were often written in a different 
style. There was still room for detailed coverage of policy especially in the broadsheets, 
but it was separated from the main „story‟ of the campaign which revolved around what 
the leaders were doing, or how they were affected by certain events. But what was the 
split between coverage of the leaders and coverage of other personalities? 
In general the rest of the coverage of the 2001 campaign was centred around William 
Hague. It is worth noting that most of the stories were very cutting about Hague, in a 
personal fashion Papers enthusiastically played up incidents like his Dad saying he would 
definitely lose the election,
344
 and Hague‟s „fourteen pints‟ gaffe.345 Even articles by 
Conservative supporting newspapers like the Daily Mail tended to report issues like 
immigration and Europe relatively neutrally, mentioning Hague‟s name and little else, 
despite the fact Hague agreed with much of what they were saying.
346
 It was only near 
the end of the campaign that glowing articles about his personality were written,
347
 which 
tried to reveal the man within.
348
 Hague lost out all ways with press coverage, not 
gaining the adulation afforded to Blair, but getting the blame for party disunity, policy 
problems and so on. The Mail gave the verdict that “William Hague failed.”349 The 
broadsheets were also critical of Hague‟s image, one saying the prospect of him as Prime 
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Minister would be Labour‟s greatest weapon.350 One paper that was against Hague rated 
his personality as the biggest impediment to him winning the election.
351
 Divisions over 
tax policy were presented as Hague‟s failure to get a grip over the party.352 In the last 
section, we saw that the competition from other personalities was a big problem for 
Hague, and that these figures were of a bigger stature than him. Was this reflected in 
newspaper coverage that relied on the leaders to construct the central story of the election 
campaign? Stories of Portillo‟s dissatisfaction with Hague and a possible leadership 
challenge after the election did not challenge the dominance of stories about the leader, 
but they were a constant presence. They provided much of the context for questions to 
Hague or questioning his strategy, such as when Hague was asked if Portillo would make 
a good leader.
353
 Portillo‟s criticisms also provided the background to long articles 
explaining what the motivation was for Hague to pursue a „core vote‟ strategy.354 The 
fact that the „core vote‟ campaign theory has not been developed with the benefit of 
hindsight, but was a concern of the media at the time, showed the extent to which the 
Portillo analysis had resonated through the media. There were also a large number of 
leaks from the Shadow Cabinet that showed the extent of the divisions, including 
verbatim reconstructions of things Hague had said and instructions he had issued
355
, 
adding to the picture that Hague could not keep control of his party.
356
 During the 
campaign, the perils of allowing Portillo so much power became apparent in the media. 
The tax row, when Oliver Letwin said that the Conservatives could make £20 billion of 
tax cuts, was swiftly pinned on Hague, and presented as a problem for him to rectify.
357
 
But when the crisis was brought to some kind of end, it was not Hague who got a lot of 
the credit, but Portillo, for „launching a fightback‟ and denying Letwin‟s claims.358 
Labour even mischievously claimed that they thought Hague was their greatest electoral 
asset, and that Portillo was the real threat, giving Portillo equal billing with Hague on 
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posters mocking Conservative economic policies.
359
 Portillo, being the leading candidate 
to replace Hague after the election,
360
 had created the situation where there was excited 
press speculation about whether Hague would resign immediately in the event of a 
second Labour landslide.
361
  
If the amount of coverage of the personality clash with Portillo was unwanted, then the 
reports of Thatcher‟s intervention during the campaign also posed problems. The amount 
of reporting inspired by the Thatcher speech was remarkable. The rapturous reception she 
received from the crowd of Conservative members was contrasted with the muted 
reception that they had bestowed upon Hague. The speech was even printed in full in 
some of the broadsheets.
362
 Even Hague himself did not get the same treatment from the 
media, let alone any other members of the Shadow Cabinet. Papers on the right loved 
Thatcher‟s address, labelling it „electrifying‟, and claiming that it had injected fire into 
the Conservative campaign.
363
 But even those that loved the speech picked up on her 
willingness to go beyond the official Conservative line about the Euro, and asked if it 
would be a problem for the leadership.
364
 The Conservatives were still “irrevocably split” 
on the Euro, and Thatcher was a “poisoned chalice” that would alienate more voters than 
it encouraged. 
365
  
Overall, the style of reporting among the newspapers is in many ways not surprising. As 
a total percentage of coverage, the personal (and sometimes insulting) was larger in the 
tabloids than the mid-market papers or the broadsheets. But this did not mean that the 
mid-markets or broadsheets were significantly less personalised than the tabloids. Thanks 
to the greater space devoted to politics, they were able to accompany personalised 
reporting with more detailed policy analysis, and unsettlingly for Hague, comprehensive 
coverage of the plots and briefing that so interfered with his leadership. What united all 
the styles of papers was that near the end of the campaign, when it was truly apparent 
that the Conservatives were not going to win the election, they were unanimous in 
blaming Hague for the copious amounts that were written about Portillo and his alleged 
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plotting in the shadows, there were very few articles blaming Portillo for the campaign‟s 
downfall. Although coverage was not personalised all the time, blame almost always 
was.
366
 
On television, both parties faced a common set of problems. Declining viewing figures 
for the main news programmes indicated declining interest in election campaigns. The 
average time politicians were seen speaking had declined, to almost twenty seconds, with 
more time given to journalists giving expert pronouncements on the leaders and „real‟ 
strategies of the parties. The amount of coverage and direct quotation of Hague was 
almost exactly the same as Blair due to impartiality guidelines.
367
 This was unlike the 
situation in the print media, where he received less direct quotation, around 15% of 
Conservative coverage. The Conservative party overall had around 35% of the total 
television election coverage, just like Labour. But what television could do was report 
the incessant speculation around Hague‟s leadership, and the mix of personalities and 
intrigue which threatened his authority. In reporting of issues like the row over cannabis 
at the 2000 conference, alleged plotting against Hague by Michael Portillo, and the 
rumpus over Kitchen Table Conservatism, television reported stories that, although they 
were pinned around the central concern of Hague‟s leadership position, often revolved 
around what other figures were doing and what Hague‟s response would be. It certainly 
did not give him an opportunity to put his own message across about what type or person 
and leader he was. Television could still focus on leaders, but with pictures of the leader, 
and interpretations of what strategising was behind their actions. Typical Hague quotes 
were in blocks of twenty seconds against larger blocks of analysis.
368
 Other BBC reports 
centred around the confusion in the leadership strategy, raising question marks over how 
effective Hague really had been at leading the party.
369
  
5.3.2 The 2005 Campaign 
This section will also look at political coverage in national newspapers, and TV news, for 
splits between policy and personality and if the leader dominated coverage of their party. 
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The coverage of Michael Howard in the 2005 election was somewhat different. While 
Hague had been relentlessly lampooned, even by the newspapers that supported the 
Conservatives, Howard was treated in a more detached manner, not hitting the heights of 
praise and lows of abuse that Hague had. Coverage of the election did not have a 
convincing peg to hang itself on, and instead seem to relax into a series of assertions that 
the two main parties were too similar.
370
  
As we have seen, the style of the Conservative campaign was to place Howard at the 
forefront, and it did not leave a lot of room for other senior Conservative figures. The 
media reflected this, but there was a lot of coverage about the technicalities of the 
campaign and tactics, not the leaders or the political philosophies. There was a lot of 
speculation as to the influence Australian Lynton Crosby would have over the campaign 
371
 and how the new Conservative Voter Vault targeting software would work.
372
 Crosby 
was often cited as the inspiration behind the amount Howard talked about immigration 
early in the campaign, although Howard denies this, saying it was a team effort. 
Compared to the Hague years, most writing about internal structures of power was based 
on speculation. The number of leaks coming out of the Conservatives was much fewer 
than in 2001, meaning that there was less opportunity for the media to stir the pot. In its 
place, they reverted to criticising policy and strategy more. There was criticism that the 
Conservatives had let the campaign develop around Howard so much when he was so 
unpopular.
373
 Another strand of criticism was that, in the early part of the campaign 
especially, Howard had adopted far too strident a tone which would just turn people off 
the Conservatives while only appealing to the committed. The manifesto was criticised 
for being inconsistent and populist.
374
 A noticeably prevalent view with the papers of the 
right that were nominally supporting Howard, was that his package of policies, especially 
tax, was far too timid, and represented a sort of surrender to Labour in policy terms. 
Although these criticisms had been voiced during the 2001 campaign, they had been 
largely drowned out by the clash of personalities at the top. Howard was blamed for the 
“fatal mistake” of not basing the campaign around a smaller state.375 The majority of 
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Telegraph coverage was about tax.
376
 The Mail concentrated fire for raising taxes on 
Labour but savaged Howard for his tax cuts only amounting to one penny.
377
 There was a 
general feeling on the right that Howard was flirting with the point where it would make 
little difference to the size of the state in electing a Conservative Government. There was 
a withering verdict to the four billion of tax cuts the Conservatives proposed. “Scarcely 
seems worth an election, does it?” And this was in a paper that had been consistently 
advocating the need for tax cuts.
378
 The Mail accused Howard of being “bogged down” 
in a debate about public service reform that little understood, and pursing economic 
policy that was “essentially the same as Labour's.”379 Howard argued against this, 
preferring to assert that many had recognised his plans to reduce waste and cut taxes, for 
some papers it was patently a major concern.
380
 But some from the right wing press like 
the Mail seemed to be reluctant, and expended more effort on attacking Blair and 
securing his removal than to extolling Howard's vision of Britain.
381
 
If the broadsheets were largely antipathetic to Howard, the tabloids were even colder. In 
the tabloid press, the Conservatives or Howard did not really have any big cheerleaders, 
and indeed had to cope with the antipathy of the Daily Mirror who reserved much vitriol 
for Howard, reminding readers of what they thought was a bad record as a Minister, and 
even mocking him up as a vampire for their election front cover. The Sun was a lot 
friendlier towards Howard, agreeing with his policies steadfastly on issues like 
immigration and Europe. Despite their notable areas of agreement, the Sun backed 
Labour in the election, in the opinion of many because they had to be seen to back the 
'winning side' to save credibility with their readers.
382
 Analysis of their coverage just 
before and after the election showed that they were largely positive in their attitude 
towards Howard and the Conservatives. They produced stories saying Howard was right 
to propose controls on asylum and immigration as they were backed by 97% of Sun 
readers.
383
  They forcibly debunked Blair's “scaremongering,” that the Conservatives 
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planned 35 billion pounds of cuts in key public services.
384
 They backed Howard's 
sacking of Howard Flight over his spending gaffe.
385
 And columnist Richard Littlejohn 
kept up a constant barrage of savage attacks on Blair and Labour, even if elsewhere in the 
paper readers were being urged to vote for Labour, and the paper as a whole backed 
Labour. Of course, such dissentions from the editorial line are rare in tabloids, especially 
in The Sun.
386
 After the election, The Sun described Labour, the winners, as having had a 
drubbing, with the Conservatives enjoying a thrilling result that marked their path back to 
power - even when other papers were describing the performance in much less excitable 
terms.
387
 They even claimed Howard had been proved right - people did want to talk 
about immigration and crime.
388
  
With Howard, it was noticeable that many papers would avoid mentioning him, in favour 
of concentrating on Conservative policy implications. Was this because so much of 
Howard‟s leadership was established on the base of the ten word pledges, and it‟s simple, 
minimalist pragmatism? Papers like the Sun could back Blair (never Labour), while 
supporting many Conservative policies, and only allowing that Howard was a man of 
good intentions. Although on face value the paper seemed to have more in common with 
Howard and the Conservatives, their admiration for Blair‟s leadership was prioritised 
over policy concerns. While The Mirror often attacked the Conservative leader as a 
ruthless, uncaring Conservative, this was not followed by many of the other papers. Such 
attacks were mostly about process and policy, and less about the unsuitability of the 
leader, a world away from the vicious attacks on Hague and Duncan Smith. But there 
was little of the fulsome praise that even Hague had received from a minority of quarters 
for his election campaign in 2001. Was this because of a realisation that Howard would 
not win? Was it just because Blair had been such a big figure in British politics for the 
previous decade, and he was competing in his last general election? Or was it because 
Howard, with his limited pledges, and focused attacks on Labour over immigration, just 
did not give the media enough material to work with? The coverage was centred around 
the leader overwhelmingly, but the substance of it did largely not attempt to go behind 
the surface and subject his personality and suitability for the leadership to the same level 
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of analysis as Hague and Duncan Smith. The attacks on Howard were centred on policy 
and ideas, not his character or his perceived suitability to occupy Downing Street.  
The greater cynicism and lack of enthusiasm for Howard and the election was reflected 
in the television reporting of politics. The trend of using experts to analyse the coverage 
was repeated. The typical format of bulletins would open with quotes from the leaders 
and then break into a longer analysis segment. Leaders‟ events provided most of the 
footage to which analysis and quotes were set. But as more people acquired access to 
more and more channels then the number of people watching these bulletins was steadily 
declining.
389
 Again, in the absence of being able to give partisan views, television mostly 
occupied itself with the strategies of the campaign. This probably worked against 
Howard, due to the media obsession with his „dog-whistling‟ strategy.  
We can divide the coverage of the Conservative party into discrete areas, all of which 
have their unique features. Newspapers made their coverage of leaders very personal, 
especially the tabloids. In broadsheets, there was more policy, strategy and opinion, but 
most articles were filtered through the leader. Papers on the right were most susceptible 
to getting involved in detailed policy debates, and framing debates and stories about the 
Conservatives around ideology. However, even the broadsheets tended to bring many of 
these debates down to the leader, what they should do, and how much of an impediment 
they were to the ideology. If there was still a lot of the media coverage that did not 
revolve around the leader, it tended to lay most of the conclusions at the leader‟s door. In 
television, they were not able to cover the personal traits of leaders as much, questioning 
their trustworthiness and so on, but they were able to ferment leadership speculation.  
5.4 Growing significance of leader effects in voting behaviour 
Analysing for the effect of leaders on the vote is a question that has divided political 
scientists. As we have seen, authors like Mughan have come to the conclusion that 
leaders have had sizable effects over voting intention, while other authors like King have 
asserted that leadership effects are not as significant as most think. Given these 
contentions, we have let this section be guided by the findings of the BES when they 
looked for the existence and extent of leadership effects at the 2001 and 2005 general 
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elections. This is not because of their position about leadership effects, but because they 
have conducted a very extensive analysis of exactly what we want to look at in this 
section, using extensive voter surveys, and controlling for many other important 
variables to discern the extent of leadership effects. As such a comprehensive study on 
exactly the question of this section, we shall let these findings dictate the content of this 
section, with extra relevant data added from our own analysis of ICM and MORI polls.  
The BES study for the 2001 General Election shows that Hague was an unpopular leader 
who nevertheless had had a strong effect on Conservative voting that was more 
significant than other factors. The Conservative campaign had failed to win over the 
public. It had been relatively unsuccessful at changing the views of voters on what the 
most important subjects were, and what party was best placed to handle them. The 
Conservative projected share of the vote had resolutely failed to rise throughout the 
campaign.
390
 As the authors state, Hague‟s image was a “significant impediment” to a 
Conservative victory, in a world where logically, voters were relying on heuristic clues, 
especially over image, and in an atmosphere of valence politics, competence, especially 
on the economy.
391
 Hague had a lower rating than Kennedy or Blair, with the respective 
rating on a like score 3.9 to Blair‟s 5.7, a massive gap. Over the course of the campaign, 
Blair maintained a sizeable edge over Hague on both components of leader image - 
competence and responsiveness. On the competence dimension Blair had a 50% 
advantage over Hague. On only two areas of leadership rating („caring‟ and „sticks to 
principles‟) did he achieve bare majorities giving him approval. Going into the election, 
Hague was only viewed by 12% as a capable leader, and 28% viewed him as out of touch 
with ordinary people. But despite this, Hague‟s effect on the Conservative vote – 0.37 – 
despite not being near the 0.76 record of Blair on the Labour vote, was bigger than policy 
issues or party identification.
392
 
Howard had some significant advantages over Hague. He entered a more favourable 
public environment, where Blair‟s personal rating had collapsed, and Labour had taken a 
hit in the polls. Apart from the crash in Blair's ratings, there were other unfavourable 
signs for Labour. The consensus in favour of higher spending had shattered. 52% thought 
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the Government was spending too much.
393 
Having said all this, health and education 
were still usually the most important issues or near the top for those polled. Blair had lost 
a lot of popularity and trust after Iraq, although BES data shows he recovered this during 
the campaign, and was still more popular than Howard. Just generally, Howard was not 
very popular. The BES study in 2005 used a model of influences on voting decisions that 
controlled for enduring values, election specific issues, assessments of the government‟s 
record, social background variables, various indicators of partisanship, and perceptions 
of the party leaders.
394
 They concluded that appraisals of Howard were “significantly and 
strongly related to vote,” and that in the Conservative case Howard‟s lukewarm 
popularity had cost them a chance to win the election as Blair‟s declining popularity had 
had an effect on the Labour vote. Leadership evaluations were far more important than 
either social structure, issues, or party identification in influencing the vote.
395
 Howard‟s 
image had had too many “resonant connections” to the 1997 defeat.396  His leadership 
image was a small improvement over Duncan Smith but almost always below Blair‟s. On 
a ten scale of party leader satisfaction, Howard‟s went from 4.4 to 4.3 during the 
campaign, while Blair‟s went from up from 4.7 to 4.9.397 This interacted with a campaign 
in which the dominant predictors of vote were leader identification and valence issues.
398
 
Disturbingly for Howard, he was not highly rated by the public as an honest politician, 
the one factor he had based the campaign on above all other. Only 14% thought that the 
Conservatives kept their promises.
399 Despite Howard‟s attacks on Blair, 19% trusted 
Blair more than they trusted Howard.
400
  
The BES studies of both General Elections share common themes. In separate ways, 
Hague and Howard‟s relative lack of popularity among voters were a significant 
impediment to their chances of success in the General Election. This was because, even 
when leaders were relatively unpopular, leadership was shown to have a significant effect 
on the vote in the control issue study, more than party identification, social standing or 
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policy issues. Conservative leaders, despite the fact they did not lead their parties to 
victory, were significant effects on voters, and more popular leaders would have been a 
way to drag the Conservatives nearer General Election victory. 
5.5 Conclusions 
There were three research questions that dictated the content of this chapter. The first, 
like the party chapter, focuses on the balance of power between leader and party. It 
questions how prominent a role the leader of the opposition took within election 
campaigns. The second two research questions, about how the leader of the opposition‟s 
role had become more prominent among the media, and if leaders of the opposition have 
a sizable effect on voting intentions, relate to the second broad question of the thesis, that 
of the place of opposition within the wider political system.  
Looking at the first section, we see that both campaigns were not wholly personalised 
around the leaders and a lot of this was down to the party exercising its power. With 
Hague, despite the way he portrayed himself in his speeches as a crusader for „Common 
Sense‟, there was little attempt to integrate this into the marketing of the party before and 
during the election. The concept was also hard to promote convincingly when it had been 
such a change from the first part of his leadership, and Portillo threatened what 
hegemony he had within the Conservative party.  Margaret Thatcher also overshadowed 
Hague. The campaign never had much of a chance of being personalised around the 
leader thanks to the infighting at the top of the Conservative party, and the willingness of 
other lower political actors to contradict what Hague was saying. With the additional 
disadvantage of facing a charismatic leader in Blair, the utility of the Conservative 
campaign being centred around Hague was not very high, and indeed was nearly 
impossible to do, given the febrile state of the party. The party had real power to 
undermine the leader during an election campaign. But in 2005 the Conservative leader 
was much more successful in damping down the power of the party to disrupt the 
campaign. Howard was in a very different situation, where there were no equivalent 
figures from the party that threatened him. He also had an incentive to attack Blair‟s new 
weakness - honesty and trust - and indeed he themed the whole campaign around this. 
But if Howard dictated this message, and was the one who most often delivered it in his 
speeches, there was still a reluctance to prioritise the leader in the marketing of the 
 180 
message. The promotional material of the 2005 campaign was not centred on his image, 
but the message he was trying to promote of accountability and honesty. It was a 
message that was closely associated with him, but did not use his image to market it. 
Even if there had been an incentive for parties to promote their leaders all ways they 
could across the campaign, the effect of these two unpopular leaders overrode it in much 
of the 2001 and 2005 campaigns.  
The other two research questions relate to the place of opposition in British politics – 
how leaders of the opposition shaped media coverage of politics and opposition, and if 
leaders of the opposition had sizable effects on the vote. The media offered surprisingly 
detailed coverage of policy, but used leaders as short cuts to blame failing party strategy. 
In Hague‟s case, it was the media that fuelled the coverage of the outsiders, that only 
drew more publicity to the disagreements and division within the top echelons of the 
party. This was very different to the coverage afforded to Howard. He was mostly 
attacked on policy and not his personality. Again, he was shouldered with most of the 
blame for the „wrong‟ policies, but precious little of the coverage focused on the 
personality he had been trying to put across. With both leaders there was often a criticism 
that although they were vigorous in their campaigning, they had failed to give direction 
to their campaigns, and had let them get derailed into „single issue‟ pressure movements 
at times. This was a criticism uttered just as much by television as by the written press. 
The responsibility placed on the shoulders of the leader of the opposition to give this 
direction to the campaign is something that is generally comparable to a US Presidential 
candidate.  Compared to previous periods in opposition, Conservative leaders faced an 
environment that was less concerned with oppositions‟ place as representing an 
ideological or social group. Instead the media tested the leader against his willingness to 
impose good strategy and unity. And of course, as we have shown, the effect of two even 
unpopular leaders on the vote was real, and was a significant impediment to the 
Conservatives chances of General Election victory. This was also a major tests for a 
leader, because they could not hide from the fact that the leader had substantial effects on 
voting, not matter how campaigns may be arranged. 
If the Conservatives could „actively‟ avoid putting the leader centre stage sometimes, 
there was a „passive‟ sense in which they could not. Media coverage put a massive 
degree of responsibility on the shoulders of the leader of the opposition for the message 
and success of the campaign. And it was the leader who dictated this message in 
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speeches, comments and actions. The leader cannot delegate responsibility, or hide from 
these commitments. The balance of power between the party and the leader needed to be 
in favour of the leader for them to effectively build a campaign around themselves, and 
the volatility of relationships within the Conservative did not help. In terms of the place 
of opposition it was one that was much more prominent among public and media than it 
had been in previous times.  
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6 The Leader of the Opposition and the Wider Environment 
This is the third of the chapters based on Presidentialisation theory as set out in our 
conceptual framework. It is all about the wider environment that is not directly 
controllable by the leader of the opposition, but does have an impact upon him. The 
chapter is split into two broad sections that deal with what leadership environment the 
leader of the opposition has to exist in, and what relationship the leader of the opposition 
has with the changing influence of the executive. The first section of this chapter is based 
around the supposed development of a space in British politics which Michael Foley 
called a „leaderland‟ that affects the way leaders conduct themselves. The old way of 
public leadership had leaders, no matter how persuasive, as fronts for their party, not 
separated from their party‟s image in any meaningful way.  But to adapt to the new 
requirements of political leadership in order to win elections, leaders have had to reveal 
more of their personalities and establish leadership as an independent political issue. This 
placed great importance in showing an ability to lead the public, but also to identify with 
them. Leaders now partially detach themselves from their party, and refract the party‟s 
identity through the personal vision and manifesto of themselves. Parties would allow 
this to happen not because it enhanced their political position (it had the opposite effect) 
but because of fears of competitive disadvantage in elections. This was the “pole star” for 
parties accepting and encouraging this evolutionary change. 
401
 
But these theories are by no means universally accepted in academia. Other authors argue 
British politics is still parliamentary, with a degree of conditioning of voters and political 
expectations that can only be explained with reference to the party system.
402
 If parties 
are making the conscious decision to place more emphasis on a leader‟s ability to lead, 
these leaders still rely to an overwhelming extent on their parties for their political 
standing. With mass communications being threatened by more chaotic forms of 
communicating and organising politically, the possibility has been raised that it may 
actually become harder for leaders to synthesise messages through themselves, and 
politics may fragment back into discrete, single issue debates. Widespread levels of 
cynicism and distrust of politicians also make it harder for them to pretend that they are 
on a similar personal level with voters and maintain credibility. A presidentialised style 
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of conducting politics was not necessarily one that was effective on a long term basis, the 
politics of personality not necessarily being suited to the processes of government.
 403
 
Bearing all this in mind, how does the following chapter propose to give an insight into 
the development of a leaderland? It will concentrate on the core areas of the presidential 
dimension. They are that it is a space, stretched away from parties, within which 
leadership is an independent variable, where the battle to become Prime Minister is seen 
as a leadership role that has to be filled by individuals with proven credentials for 
leadership, and who play up to these roles.
404
 Firstly we are looking for the techniques 
leaders used to prove their credentials for leadership. This splits into two parts, the 
techniques leaders used to „identify‟ with the public, and the techniques they used to 
prove they had good leadership qualities. This will help inform some overall conclusions 
about the thesis and the political environment. In the second section we shall move on to 
look at if the media had started viewing leadership as this independent arena. 
In the second half of this chapter we shall consider the relationship between the leader of 
the opposition and the executive. Accounts of Presidentialisation have mostly prioritised 
the executive in their analysis. The leader of the executive is top of the hierarchy in the 
British political system, most akin to the US President, inevitably making him the first 
port of call when analysing Presidentialisation and how it has affected British politics. 
His position is relevant to the debate about the changing nature of the system, because it 
has been construed in so many different ways. While some academics have claimed 
Prime Ministerial experience shows the British system is becoming presidentialised, 
others have asserted that the system is now all about networks and the core executive, 
while others have variously used it to support the case for Prime Ministerial Government, 
or Cabinet Government. Traditionally, the debate had been all about Prime Ministerial 
and Cabinet Government. Cabinet Government had been the dominant theory, with there 
being many post-war examples of the Prime Minister being constrained by his 
Cabinet.
405
 Prime Ministerial theory insisted that the Prime Minister was becoming more 
powerful, and the Cabinet had become a „rubber stamp‟, with discussion and dissent not 
tolerated. Core Executive theory, while also accepting that the Cabinet had declined in 
power, held that this was down to the number of international and domestic actors that 
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were involved in government decisions. There were a series of power networks that each 
Prime Minister needed to work through, and with.
406
 The most recent theory of all about 
the Prime Minister has been Presidentialisation, which has been viewed as an 
evolutionary change in the position of the leader of the executive within the political 
system, that parallels developments with the US President. But the leading works on 
Presidentialisation are preoccupied with the work of the governing party within the 
executive. As this study is preoccupied with the opposition certain differences have to 
apply to the working of the concept. Obviously the internationalisation of politics and the 
growth of the state do not impact the leader of the opposition as much as the Prime 
Minister. But is there still the possibility that the leader of the opposition has interaction 
with these factors and has some impact upon the nature of his job? Although the leader of 
the opposition does not have the direct control over these factors that the Prime Minister 
does, he still has to to interact with them. This second section splits into two main areas, 
how the leader of the opposition interacts with the international political environment, 
and how the leader of the opposition has interacted with the increasing amount of power 
that the Prime Minister has gained through executive Presidentialisation, and what they 
say about the powers of the leader of the opposition under this dispensation. 
6.1 The Leadership Arena 
6.1.1 Empathy With The Public 
This section looks at the techniques leaders used to show that they possessed an empathy 
with the public, and that they had the required qualities to be a good leader. Techniques 
that showed an empathy with the public were especially to the forefront, although this 
was not necessarily always to the leaders‟ benefit. 
The Conservative party had a natural difficulty in demonstrating an empathy with the 
public. Although by 1997, the top ranks of Labour had become largely middle class, (and 
were led by an Oxbridge, public school, alumni), they (perhaps unfairly) had a reputation 
as more representative of the whole nation than the Conservatives, who were seen by 
many as the party of the rich, and after the 1997 election were the third party in Scotland, 
Wales, and large parts of the north of England. This was a perception any leader after 
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1997 would have to defy. The strategy of William Hague early on in his leadership 
indicated that he wanted to show empathy, and not just to natural constituents of the 
Conservatives. One advantage Hague had was that he was a lot younger than previous 
Conservative leaders. This meant his leadership campaign could plausibly claim that he 
represented a break with the norms that had defined the Conservative party until 1997 - 
„A Fresh Future‟ was the title of his campaign. Hague defined the mass of the 
Conservative party as unrepresentative and urged it to become more like the public it 
hoped to represent.
407
 To back this up, Hague appeared at events like the Notting Hill 
festival, and went to a theme park dressed in a baseball cap.
408
 These events showed the 
two competing imperatives for leaders. On one hand, there was an impulse to show a 
leader doing fun, relaxed things that he would usually do in his spare time (or at least that 
the leader would like people to think he did) to show he was not just a typical „boring‟ 
politician. On the other there was the impulse to do „popular‟ things, and be seen in a 
context where one would not normally expect to see a Conservative leader. So to be seen 
as „relevant‟, there was a dual, contradictory need to be as „normal‟ as possible, while 
being as „different‟ or new as possible, and carrying off both with a degree of 
plausibility. And all politicians started off with the disadvantage that they worked in an 
„industry‟ that had a preoccupation with intrigue and sometimes arcane matters, and 
often punishing schedules that did not allow much time for leisure pursuits, that could 
preclude attempts to live a „normal‟ lifestyle, with a relatively rich range of family, 
leisure and outside interests and activities.
409
 These contradictions dogged Hague 
throughout his leadership. He was competing with Blair, who had been relatively 
proficient at persuading people that he was „one of them‟. Appearances on light 
entertainment shows, and the frequent leaks to the press of him doing „normal‟ activities, 
like watching football, taking his children to church in a people carrier, or appearing with 
a mug of tea after the birth of his youngest child, burnished the image.
410
 Blair also had a 
skill for being able to make it seem as if he was directly reflecting the thoughts of the 
majority, with his frequent affixing of the term „the peoples‟...(courts, shares, taxes, 
health service etc).
411
 A dramatic example was the events after Princess Diana‟s tragic 
accident in 1997. Although the car accident had no obvious political component, and 
there was no fundamental disagreement between the two parties, Blair managed to 
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emerge seen as conveying the people‟s wishes far better than Hague did. This was 
because of the contrast between the immediate responses of the two men to the event. 
While Hague released a press statement through Conservative Central Office expressing 
his shock at the crash and his admiration for the Princess, Blair made an emotional 
speech outside his local church, using the phrase which became famous, coined by his 
chief media advisor Alistair Campbell, that Diana was the „people‟s princess‟.412 Despite 
there being no real difference of substance between the two men‟s reactions, Blair‟s 
response was seen as evidence of a talent to reflect what many „ordinary people‟ had 
been saying, while Hague‟s reaction was seen as somewhat cold and part of an „uncaring‟ 
Conservative attitude and philosophy. Hague then compounded this by later accusing 
Blair of manipulating the event to gain publicity and improve his reputation, which was 
seen by many as an attempt to make the issue political, in a way Blair‟s speech was not. 
Even though subsequent accounts of what happened have called this into question (we 
know now that Blair‟s „impromptu‟ remarks outside the Church were carefully planned), 
it was not seen this way at the time. It opened up a space between the public perceptions 
of the personalities of Blair and Hague, despite their similarities as two youthful, clever 
and driven leaders.
413
 
What hope did Hague have of realistically bridging this gap? The first attempts to portray 
him as youthful and comfortable with minorities in Britain were not carried through. 
Although they had not been necessarily unusual activities for a man of Hague‟s age, it 
did look very unnatural for a Conservative politician of his age, helping them attract 
derision. The Conservatives needed to find something more believable. Hague‟s new 
director of media, Amanda Platell, put in motion a different plan, to portray him as an 
„action man‟, in what was called „Project Hague‟.414 This called for photoshoots in pubs, 
judo with the Army, and attending movie premieres. Hague took advice from an image 
consultant on changing his timing in speeches and his accent.
415
 It stemmed from a 
realisation that people thought of Hague as upper class, privately educated, and a 
southerner, “aloof, out of touch, remote from ordinary people and weak.” A Conservative 
insider opined that people did not “have a clear impression of William Hague, what sort 
of person he is, his background or what he stands for, so they continue to project all the 
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parties negatives onto him.”416 Although „Project Hague‟ as a whole did not carry on 
after the embarrassment of having it leaked to the media, elements of what was done later 
strongly resembled the intention of the plan. During the election campaign, Hague often 
reminisced about his Yorkshire background, his comprehensive education and how he 
proud he was of his father who had run a successful small business.
417
 But this could be 
easily turned against Hague. An attempt to make himself relevant to ordinary voters that 
backfired was when he revealed that he had drunk fourteen pints a day when he was 
deliveryman for his father‟s soft drinks business. Such a claim was seen as unbelievable, 
and if true then inappropriate. The claim was later rubbished by the owner of a pub 
Hague had drunk in.
418
 This demonstrated the near panic of Conservative officials 
through Hague‟s time as leader, to ward off charges he was a political nerd, and as a 
result running the gauntlet of ridicule. Hague had admitted “I can win arguments in 
Parliament. Now I have to get messages through the TV screen,” a pointer to the fact he 
needed to exhibit signs of personality beyond the Commons. But Hague, with no young 
family, and marrying his wife Ffion in 1999, didn‟t have the same opportunity that Blair 
did to show he was a family man. How did he and his central team attempt to achieve an 
empathy with the electorate? He talked of his domestic life with his fiancée and his 
relationship with his parents.
419
 Hague climbed to the top of Nevis and had a picnic there 
with his wife. His wife appeared with him on many events, including being at his side for 
almost the whole campaign in 2001. Hague was open about sharing thoughts on starting 
as a new married couple.
420
 A story was leaked to the media that Hague had bought his 
wife a pound shaped bracelet, although this was later made fun of by the media when it 
was revealed that Hague had not even bought or chosen the bracelet himself.
421
 Despite 
such embarrassments, to a small extent, the different ways of „marketing‟ Hague‟s 
personality worked. The most popular paper in the land, The Sun, praised him for having 
a hinterland, and being more of an outsider than Blair.
422
 But such small amounts of 
praise had also been at the expense of a lot of embarrassment. Many elements of the 
media were often in uproar over Hague‟s „gaffes‟, and speculated that it all eroded 
Hague‟s stature to such an extent that it hurt his chances of being seen as, let alone 
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becoming, Prime Minister. As president of the Oxford union, having made a speech at 
the Conservative party conference when he was just a teenager and photographed with a 
picture of Margaret Thatcher on his wall, and admitting to reading Hansard, Hague‟s 
background was of a man heavily interested in politics from an early age.
423
 In theory, 
the story of a man who had been passionately driven by his Conservative beliefs from 
youth, and had risen from a comprehensive school to the top of his party should have 
been inspiring, but in reality it was somewhat of a disadvantage, when the majority had 
disregarded politics in their youth, and indeed many disregarded it in their older age. 
They played into Blair‟s accusations that Hague and the Conservatives were “weird, 
weird, weird,”424 however unfair these accusations might have been. To compensate, 
Hague may have had to make „admissions‟ that were barely plausible and further 
reinforced, not dispelled, the perception that there was something strange about his 
character. 
Possibly as a result, Iain Duncan Smith was more reticent about revealing elements of his 
personality. Although he revealed an exotic family history, and certain details about the 
way he interacted with his family, especially his kids, and his life in the Army, there was 
no equivalent to „Project Hague‟. Instead, Duncan Smith styled himself as the „Quiet 
Man‟, who could not offer the glitz and fluff of Blair, but who would be honest. It would 
have contradicted this somewhat to have a surfeit of stories appearing about his personal 
life. But this made it easier for people to argue that he was rather dull, and had too little 
personality to be comfortable in being leader of the opposition, or indeed Prime Minister. 
As we have already seen in the party section, the perception that Duncan Smith did not 
possess the charisma required to be Prime Minister framed much media coverage of his 
leadership, much of which was derogatory towards his lack of personality. It was 
unquestionably a major impediment to establishing his authority and winning an election 
with the Conservatives.  
Michael Howard was also a leader who was careful in what he revealed. Although 
Howard revealed more than Duncan Smith, he did it in a controlled way, and it was not 
at the level of the constant revelations Hague made about his personal life. It was always 
incorporated into his speeches in the same way, that he was a child of immigrants, from a 
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relatively poor background in South Wales, that he had lived the „British Dream‟ by 
going to grammar school, then Oxford and training to be a barrister.
425
 Beyond this there 
were not many other initiatives Howard took part in that gave voters an insight into his 
personality. Barring quite a few references to his favourite football team, Liverpool
426
, 
Howard did not try to expose the same degree of outside interests to the public eye as 
Hague did. Some isolated shots of him playing table tennis were not exactly „Project 
Howard‟.427 But Howard‟s accession to the leadership of the Conservative party 
coincided with a change in the use of personality in British politics and the atmosphere of 
the leadership arena. The Iraq war had become deeply associated with Blair, with many 
calling it „Blair‟s War‟. Debates before the war were especially serious and fractious, 
with Blair appearing on a number of televised question and answer sessions. There was 
no relaxed conversation about family life on these programmes. As the situation in Iraq 
began to deteriorate, Blair‟s ratings in the polls, and especially his reputation for honesty, 
began to slide rapidly. After Alistair Campbell resigned, sources close to Blair even 
started declaring the „end of spin‟. This self enforced discipline made it harder for Blair 
to stage the sort of „ordinary guy‟ moments that had been so regular before. Arguably 
they would have been much harder to carry off anyway, this was now a leader easily 
among the best-known in the world, who had been at the centre of a rift between the 
United States and Europe, and had taken a decision to send tens of thousands of soldiers 
to war. The 2005 election campaign was the only time Blair went back to the old ways, 
amongst other things being interviewed by little Ant and Dec about what he bought his 
wife for Valentine‟s Day, and giving a highly personalised interview in The Sun.428 But 
even then, it was greeted with incredulity that a long-serving Prime Minister was the 
„ordinary guy‟. With Howard emphasising how he preferred getting things done to the 
spin and glitz of Blair, it was perhaps an appropriate way to conduct the campaign. 
However, it also fuelled the charge that Howard was rather aloof, and not very 
inspiring.
429
  
The leader after Howard, David Cameron, took a radically different approach to what 
image he tried to create for himself. From declaring himself as a candidate in the 
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leadership election, he was remarkably open (or gave the appearance of being remarkably 
open) about his past and his personal life. It was a return to the level of disclosure 
associated with „Project Hague‟. From his experiences with bringing up a handicapped 
child and his use of the NHS, to his romances at university, to more trivial matters like 
his favourite music and what trainers he wore
430
, there was a great deal of information 
put in the public sphere about Cameron that was not relevant to the detail of politics, but 
made him seem more relevant to „ordinary people‟. Cameron started off at a natural 
disadvantage to other politicians, and even the previous Conservative leaders before him. 
His background - rich father, Eton, Oxford, meant he was vulnerable to the charge from 
Labour that he was a „Tory Toff‟, who was biased against ordinary people. Most 
damning were the pictures of Cameron in the garb of the Bullingdon Club at Oxford and 
the stories of the members‟ unruly behaviour.431 Cameron‟s background threatened to be 
detrimental to his standing among swathes of the electorate. This perhaps explained the 
vigour of the attempts to promote things which made him seem like an ordinary person, 
despite the chance opponents would (and did) deride it as being fake.  
Against the potential drawback of his public school background, by 2007 Cameron had a 
potential advantage, as he faced Gordon Brown. Cameron‟s talent for oratory (especially 
sans a script) and relaxed attitude had awoken comparisons with Tony Blair.
432
 In 
contrast, Brown was seen as dour and bad at public speaking. Many Conservative 
strategists thought he would be a liability as Prime Minister, and not be able to match 
Cameron‟s sunny personality.433 But as it turned out, Brown attempted to make this a 
virtue in the early months of his leadership, accusing the leader of the opposition over the 
despatch box as not being concerned about policy, and even producing a poster about 
himself bearing the legend „He‟s not flash, just Gordon‟.434 It was a difficult charge for 
Cameron, that he was obsessed with his personality to a degree that Brown was not. But 
it did not divert him from the course he was on, relying on open disclosure about aspects 
of his personal life. Although Brown did not try and alter his image as a very serious 
politician, there were still many attempts to make him „open up‟ to the voters about his 
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personal life. Even though the economy had taken a major turn for the worse during the 
economic crash of 2008, and leaders were anxious to appear serious, this did not stop 
them revealing personal sides to their character. Brown frequently talked of his support 
of the popular television programme The X Factor, or football, while Cameron claimed 
that some of his favourite pastimes were drinking beer, cooking and even watching darts 
on television. 
435
 Personality and relevance was still a big part of politics, even if it was 
not quite as obvious or constant as in the immediate post 1997 era. In the case of 
Conservative politicians, there was a special imperative for them to reveal details about 
their personal life, based on the disadvantage they had compared to Labour politicians 
relating to their personal image. 
6.1.2 Demonstrating Leadership Qualities 
As well as attempting to persuade the public that they had a natural empathy with them, 
we also anticipate leaders of the opposition would attempt to persuade the public of one 
other thing: that they were „strong‟ leaders, and had the necessary qualities to lead the 
country. This differed somewhat from trying to persuade the public that they could 
empathise with them. For one thing, persuading the public that they were on their level 
usually involved locating the leader in situations and a context where they would be 
portrayed as „nice‟ people, who were at heart just ordinary folk who enjoyed a life 
outside politics. But persuading the public that they were good leaders did not always 
extend to being „nice‟. The ability to get their way, be tough, and stick to principles was 
part of a leader‟s image as well. As Margaret Thatcher had shown in the 1980s, there 
could be a substantial difference between those who actually liked a leader, and those 
who respected them for their ability to get things done.
436
 The desire to be liked by the 
people, and then claim to lead them is somewhat contradictory. The two in theory 
threatened each other - how could a leader seem a friend of the people without 
undermining the authority they needed to rule them? How could he rule the nation, or 
stand to rule the nation, in a firm and decisive manner without undermining his 
reputation as a down to earth man of the people? It was a dilemma not faced by others in 
high profile leadership roles within business or sport - where often leaders were able to 
self consciously elevate themselves onto another plane, and found this strengthened their 
position. It did not necessarily work the same way for politicians. Although Thatcher had 
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won plaudits for her decisive leadership style, many had said she had gone too far, and 
had become too aloof and remote from the public by the end of her premiership.
437
 By 
contrast John Major, who had been almost universally regarded as a nice and decent man, 
did not find this saved him from accusations that his leadership style was far too 
indecisive and dithering.
438
 There was a balance to be struck, but on first inspection it 
appears an immensely tall order for any leader to get anywhere close to the right balance. 
But as we shall see, it did not stop Conservative leaders from 1997 onwards trying to 
mould images of themselves as strong leaders, in addition to the efforts they made to be 
empathetic with the public.  
In his last two years leading the Conservative party Hague portrayed himself as a tough 
man, who was one of the few ready to stand up against the „liberal elite‟ Labour had 
constructed. The man who started off his leadership prepared to listen to people 
disappeared. Instead he was proud of the forces of conservatism and wanted to march 
them forward. Giving him a shorter haircut, his attacks on the liberal elite and 
willingness to venture onto controversial territory, like the right to shoot burglars
439
, were 
meant to show his confidence and lack of fear at being branded an extremist. The 
language was exceptionally tough and strident. He claimed Labour had a “sinister 
agenda” to break up the United Kingdom and give power to the EU. 440 Blair was full of 
“vacuous, smug meaningless waffle.”441 The Government as a whole was the “most 
arrogant, hypocritical, autocratic, opportunistic, two faced unprincipled government this 
country has ever seen.”442 The Liberal Democrats were labelled the “most hypocritical, 
self-righteous, power hungry, egotistical, opportunistic, principle-less, sanctimonious, 
dirty fighting bunch of politicians in Britain.”443 In contrast, Hague would give the 
people “plain, unrehearsed, unstaged, unspun common sense.”444 His self portrayal was 
as a leader who would not be swayed by media and intellectual fashions, and would act 
with common sense and firmness. However, this was hard for Hague to pull off in reality. 
As we have seen, he had changed tack substantially from the opening period of his 
leadership, and he often seemed too enthusiastic to offer inducements to whatever 
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pressure group was flavour of the month with the media (such as over the fuel protest). 
And although Hague may have portrayed himself as tough and willing to do what he 
wanted, he was often curtailed by his own party. Often the party were able to get their 
way, or cause Hague extreme embarrassment over kitchen table conservatism, drugs, and 
the tax guarantee, forcing him to make U-turns, and appear weak. 
The tactic Duncan Smith used at the start of his leadership was very different. He tried to 
portray himself as a contrast with Blair. Instead of supporting various pressure groups or 
„hot‟ issues like Hague had, he vowed to be short of gimmicks, and achieve one big goal, 
re-aligning the Conservative party to make its top priority the battle against poverty. 
There was to be none of Blair‟s glitz and panache, just a determination and quiet 
reassurance that his course was right. This reached its ultimate culmination in the „Quiet 
Man‟ speech to the Conservative party conference in 2002, where Duncan Smith 
reminded Blair “Never, ever underestimate the determination of a quiet man.”445 
Although he did not have the panache of Blair, underneath the quiet exterior he 
possessed the determination to get things done. But in some sections of the media it was 
ridiculed. They said that the self portrayal just again showed that Duncan Smith was ill 
suited to be a leader in the era of modern communications and was a desperate gambit by 
someone who lacked the personality to be a leader.
446
 This is an example of how the 
portrayal of a leader‟s personality would vary, and could constrain exactly what „good‟ 
leadership attributes a leader could lay claim to. In Duncan Smith‟s case, claiming to be 
an insurgent populist against the liberal elite would not have suited his reserved speaking 
style, but the message of the „Quiet Man‟ matched the delivery. The influence of the 
environment was strong – after a whole term of government, patience with the „showbiz‟ 
approach of the Blair Government was wearing thin, and it was more appropriate for 
Duncan Smith to accentuate his „serious‟ side rather than the more informal aspects of 
his personality. But if the intention had been to portray him as a measured and sincere 
leader, then it was not carried through consistently. Duncan Smith did not stick to the 
„Quiet Man‟ pose - his own contributions became „louder‟ through 2003, more 
aggressive and aiming for drama. The fierce attacks on a government of “liars and 
incompetents” became more frequent.447 They culminated in his dramatic admonition at 
the 2003 conference that “The Quiet Man was turning up the volume.”448 Despite the use 
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of the same phrase, this managed to completely contradict Duncan Smith‟s message of 
the previous year. How could a „Quiet Man‟ turn up the volume? This confused the issue 
of what Duncan Smith was trying to achieve in his leadership style, and was not enough 
to impress his party, let alone the electorate, enough for them to let him carry on after the 
conference. 
There was no doubt what Michael Howard was trying to get over about what he would be 
like as a leader. He repeatedly insisted that he was not an ideologue, driven by great 
visions (like Blair had been over Iraq), but would concentrate on small practical issues. 
This was a thing he consistently repeated during the election campaign and the run up to 
it. Howard was only offering small, „concrete‟ measures, but he was guaranteeing that 
they would be delivered, or he would start sacking Ministers. This implied an authority 
that he possessed over them that would have been hard to countenance under the other 
leaders (could anybody have imagined Hague or Duncan Smith making the same 
pledge?). The way Howard took front line control over the Conservative campaign also 
implied that he had more authority over the party than Hague or Duncan Smith did. At 
the start of this chapter, we raised the difficult (nay impossible) balance between 
appearing a likable and „normal‟ person, and a strong, respected and feared leader. If we 
can say that Hague and Duncan Smith, notwithstanding problems in the first area, found 
the second area most damaging to their leadership (lack of authority over an assertive 
party, inability to focus on one large issue and so on), then we can assert that Howard 
found the opposite problem. He was able to highlight a weighty body of evidence that he 
was in control of his party - a structured and slimmer central organisation, facing down 
candidates and members of the Shadow Cabinet who spoke out of turn, and a campaign 
that played heavily to him and his ability to get things done. But on the other hand, 
Howard had a major problem at presenting an image of himself as a warm and relevant 
person. The polls showed that even at a low point of popularity for Blair, Howard was 
even more unpopular. The political weight and authority that his time as Home Secretary 
gave him was potentially weighing down his ability to appear a man of the people, just as 
Blair‟s active and prominent place on the world stage militated against his continuing 
ability to act as a likable man. The balancing act in the arena of leadership was difficult, 
and had hurt Howard as much as Blair.  
David Cameron was faced with the problem of finding the space in between the two 
extremes, and finding a better balance between them than the three previous leaders. 
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From the beginning Cameron‟s leadership was centred on the way he would be a very 
different kind of Conservative. Riding his bike to work, or going to the Arctic to pose 
with huskies, indicated a concern for the environment and a willingness to go beyond the 
traditional issues that a Conservative leader would be concerned with. Speeches on 
subjects as diverse as the price of chocolate oranges to the style of children‟s clothes 
were made.
449
 By defining the direction of travel as such a sharp departure from the 
existing nature of the Conservative party, and wanting the change to be „further and 
faster‟, Cameron was challenging the party, and asserting the strength of the mandate 
from his victory in the leadership election. But this came to the detriment of being 
accused of taking the Conservative party into a complacent and weird position, where it 
would be a weak imitation of New Labour.
450
 In asserting the power of his mandate in 
the short term (and raising the party‟s position in the polls) Cameron was opening up 
areas of discontent that would challenge his authority in the long term. These epicentres 
of discontent fought hard against his efforts to „change‟ the party, in areas like candidate 
selection or grammar schools. Cameron also laid himself open to the charge that he was 
more concerned with presentation, stunts and focus groups than policy and the values of 
the Conservative party. The Labour party in election advertisements branded him a 
„chameleon‟451, who would say whatever it took to be elected. Stunts like posing with 
huskies in the Artic were derided as not being evidence of anything but a thirst for 
publicity.
452
 In this, the danger was not so much even the „un-Conservative‟ policies he 
was espousing, but the perceived motive behind why he was expressing them. On the one 
hand Cameron could be seen as a strong leader by pushing his party in a direction it 
didn‟t really want to go in, but on the other, how could it be strong leadership if Cameron 
didn‟t really believe what he was saying? For that would have been „followship‟, not 
leadership, and would smack of opportunism. The dilemma is shown by the „priorities‟ 
Cameron has been quoted at various times as having. They have been global warming, 
cutting child poverty, tackling global poverty, the war in Afghanistan, maintaining 
spending on the NHS and cutting Britain‟s massive budget deficit. From even a cursory 
glance, we can see that some of these objectives are mutually exclusive, and cover a very 
broad area. Although they might have satisfied different groups, and ameliorated 
concerns that Cameron was just another „uncaring‟ Conservative, when the 
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contradictions are pointed out they are often put down to an eagerness to satisfy 
everyone, and „weak‟ leadership.453 The fact that the political situation changed so 
dramatically after Cameron became leader was unfortunate for him, as it meant that other 
leadership attributes came to the fore.  By Cameron‟s early „caring‟ stance, he had made 
it harder for himself to demonstrate the kind of leadership attributes that were seen to be 
required in the harsher environment. The attacks by Labour on Cameron, that he was not 
a „serious man for serious times‟, and that the economic crisis meant it was „no time for a 
novice‟454, were at some points slightly absurd, but played on a feeling among some that 
Cameron did not have the attributes required to succeed in the harsher political 
environment.  
Another part of the political environment that caused Cameron problems was the new 
Prime Minister he was facing. Brown had been known for his micro-management and 
persistent tactical trickery at the Treasury, but his reputation had been serious and dour, a 
„man of substance‟ (a reputation that was maybe unfair after episodes like the 10p tax).455 
And, for the first few months, Brown‟s lack of glitz was portrayed as a virtue. His 
measured handling of the terrorist attacks and floods just after the start of his premiership 
were seen by many in the media as textbook, responsible leadership.
456
 Blair‟s skill at 
public speaking and his alleged ability to manipulate the public through oratory, acting 
and spin, meant that Brown‟s wooden delivery was probably actually an advantage in the 
first months of his leadership. It helped create the impression he was a more honest and 
direct style of politician, and Brown played up to this by leaking how he would restore 
proper Cabinet Government, and put proposals to Parliament first.
457
 Brown also won 
admiration for his supposed mastery of the nuance of political strategy and tactics. At the 
Treasury he had gained a reputation for being able to plot complicated tactical 
manoeuvres in great detail, which were sometimes often explicitly designed to, and often 
did, completely outwit his opponents. The time around the 2007 conference was the 
zenith of the adulation of Brown, and a nadir for Cameron. Issues that were seemingly 
not relevant to the business of government, or did not have any direct link to Brown‟s 
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policies, such as his promise of „British jobs for British workers‟, (while making the 
opportunist claim that the Tories would „lurch to the right‟ in response), were heralded as 
evidence of Brown‟s tactical genius.458 His invitation to Thatcher to visit Downing 
Street, and comparison of himself to her, was not reported by the media as latent 
inconsistency (Brown had been fiercely critical of Thatcher in the past) but in terms of 
Brown‟s intelligence at exposing a faultline in Cameron‟s conservatism.  Brown‟s 
assessment of himself and Thatcher - that they were both “conviction politicians” - spoke 
volumes for the way leadership was an issue on two levels. First it represented Brown‟s 
attempt to project some favourable leadership attributes onto himself - that fitted into the 
narrative that he had attempted to develop since he became Prime Minister, that he had 
strong beliefs. The second was an attempt to damage Cameron‟s differing leadership 
attributes, and tap into a belief that was concentrated on the Conservative right that 
Cameron did not have any beliefs and would trash any part of the party‟s core policies to 
win a general election.  
But this strategy rapidly unravelled, after Brown, in another move that was initially used 
as evidence of his great mind for tactics, floated the idea of having a general election in 
the autumn of 2007. Although at the time it looked as if Brown would hold it and emerge 
victorious, after a dynamic, noteless, conference speech by Cameron and the popular 
pledge to cut inheritance tax, Brown became more doubtful about his chances of winning 
and humiliatingly called it off, saying he needed more time to set out his plans to the 
country.
459
 Suddenly the way the two men‟s leadership properties were regarded by the 
media totally changed. The „gimmicky‟ Cameron had now demonstrated a flair for being 
leader, and for the second time in three conferences, „saved‟ what looked like a hopeless 
situation, by a memorable speech (ignoring the fact that a lot of the recovery had been 
down to George Osborne‟s announcement of an inheritance tax cut).460 Brown‟s 
tendency to consult and sit on decisions, seen as a strength after he took power, was now 
turned into a weakness, with him being labelled a „ditherer‟.461 Brown looked weak, 
faintly ridiculous, and most damagingly of all, his reputation for tactical genius had been 
torpedoed. Suddenly when he effectively copied the Conservative inheritance tax cut 
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plans, or unforeseen events happened to the Government like a number of disks 
containing personal data being lost
462, Brown‟s strategic direction was seen in an entirely 
different light. Unlike previously, there were no grand claims that the Prime Minister was 
a master triangulator, or that he was calm in a crisis. Instead the accusations flew around 
about uncertainty of purpose, and incompetence. Suddenly, Cameron was able to make 
hay with claims that Brown made decisions in a “bunker” isolated from what was really 
going on, and that the Prime Minister had betrayed colleagues and conducted vicious 
infighting to get the job, but “for what?”463 The leadership environment had changed and 
Cameron was offering more decisiveness and avoiding the chaos at Downing Street. As 
time moved on, the willingness of Cameron to appear in headline grabbing stunts faded. 
Instead there were speeches on controversial subjects like immigration and the health and 
safety culture.
464
 The economic crash in particular placed an onus on Cameron to be 
more sober and serious. This shows the difficulty for leaders, in that „good‟ leadership 
qualities may not always stay the same, and might vary depending on the situation. When 
Cameron had taken over the Conservative party, the economy had been growing at a 
steady rate, his more informal style had been appreciated, and his willingness to accept 
Labour spending plans, and comment on „new‟ issues had been tolerated by the party. 
But a failing economy, and a ballooning budget deficit, required a leader who looked as 
if he knew how to sort the chaos out. The nature of the job was transformed by outside 
circumstances, even though Cameron was leader of the same party, and against the same 
Prime Minister. It greatly changed the way his central team tried to present Cameron. 
Many of his party political broadcasts featured a new initiative he had been taking round 
the country, „Cameron Direct‟, where Cameron held „town hall‟ style meetings, 
answering questions from an open audience. These adverts emphasised how he was 
giving straight answers to straight questions, and how he had a plan to sort out the mess 
that the Labour Government had created.  They tried to show he was honest enough to 
engage with real people and give them straight answers, even when they were answers 
the public did not necessarily want to hear.
465
 This was a shift from his analysis during 
the initial period of his leadership that the Conservative party needed to listen to the 
wider public and make it an urgent priority to represent the moderate centre. Telling 
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people what they didn‟t want to hear was very much a new strand introduced to 
Cameron‟s rhetoric and leadership style. It was not quite the jump from Hague‟s 
„Listening to Britain‟ to being „proud of the forces of Conservatism‟, but it was along the 
same lines, showing flexibility in leadership attributes. But was it at the expense of being 
seen as a chameleon, willing to change to say what was wanted? This was an impediment 
to him being regarded as an authoritative leader, especially during a deep recession when 
so many were looking for a clear direction. 
The analysis we have undertaken on how leaders attempt to show they have an empathy 
with the public on the one hand, and appear strong leaders on the other, shows that 
although the two are somewhat contradictory, they are objectives that political leaders 
seek to fulfil, albeit with great difficulty. On the first aspect, the efforts made by William 
Hague and David Cameron especially were prodigious. Hague‟s strategy wildly varied 
from the start to the end of his leadership, while Cameron‟s was more consistent, but the 
ultimate goal was the same, to make the leader a „normal‟ person, to neutralise the 
aspects of their life which very much militated against them being classed as „normal‟ 
people. The fact that they were employed at such length strongly indicates that they were 
necessary, at least as way of suppressing concerns about the abnormality of a leader‟s 
background. In some cases, as under Hague, these attempts would backfire and lead to 
ridicule in the media, and a setback to his political momentum. However, what we do 
know is that Hague‟s early interest in politics was used by Labour to attack his character, 
and if he had let these stories run without some effort to convey to the public an 
alternative side to his character, his image with the public may well have been even 
worse. With Cameron, the same applied, at various points after 2005 Labour were 
ruthless in exploiting the fact he was a „Tory Toff‟, even basing a by-election campaign 
around it in 2008.
466
 Without efforts to make his image more down to earth (that 
wouldn‟t descend into the realms of implausibility) he would have been at an electoral 
disadvantage. Such actions were not necessarily an optional extra for leaders, but a 
necessity. Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard also partook to a lesser extent in 
strategies designed to make them „relevant‟ to the population, although these were 
heavily stymied by their own personalities. But on their own such efforts were not 
enough for a leader to undertake themselves, as being seen as a candidate with the 
necessary qualities to be a good leader was also vital, and all the leadership candidates 
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also put great effort into doing this. This was potentially even harder, as the requirements 
to be a good leader never stayed static, but altered according to the political requirements 
of the time. This is seen by the way Duncan Smith and Howard naturally gravitated 
towards portraying themselves as sober and honest leaders, after Blair‟s reputation for 
honesty had been trashed. This was especially evident during David Cameron‟s 
leadership, where he had to adapt to the changing needs for reassurance and moderation, 
and a tough, clear response to the financial crisis.  
6.2 Did Leadership Become An Issue? 
The question of whether leadership had become an independent issue requires 
assessment of how the Prime Ministers were regarded in relation to the leader of the 
opposition, and what comparisons were made between them. Was leadership often 
elevated above other issues in establishing political preferences among the media or the 
voters? Was it classified in such a way that it could exist independently of day to day 
political issues? 
The aftermath of the general election in 1997 gives us plenty of material to suggest that 
the media regarded leadership as vitally important. The role of Blair‟s personality and his 
ability to connect with „Middle England‟ was hailed as absolutely vital to Labour‟s 
victory. After the disaster of departure from the ERM, and the widespread sleaze and 
disunity during the 1992-1997 Government, no one was suggesting that Labour would 
have lost the election under a different leader. But the landslide added lustre to Blair‟s 
leadership. Many contended that without Blair‟s charm, his atypical background for a 
Labour leader, and his willingness to challenge his party, there never would have been 
such a giant landslide. Labour‟s record poll ratings were “not an endorsement of the 
Labour party, but of Tony Blair.” Blair was a “presidential figure, above the vicissitudes 
of party politics.” He impinged on the choice of the next Conservative leader in quite an 
urgent way. Hague found himself being talked up for the leadership at a very early stage, 
not because of policy reasons, but because he was a youthful politician, and this was seen 
as the best challenge to Blair.
467
 There were not many voices that thought Hague was too 
young for the job. In the 1997 leadership contest, leadership did become an independent 
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variable, as the youth and vigorous style of Blair interacted with the debate in the 
Conservative party. The leader was not being chosen as a frontman for the party, but on 
his ability to beat Blair.  
As it turned out, this did not reflect what actually happened. Even though Hague was 
youthful, he was not able to make as much capital from Blair out of being a member of a 
„young country‟, his baldness and image as a political nerd not helping him. Blair was 
increasingly charming the audiences of chat and light entertainment shows, not 
Newsnight, and Hague struggled to keep up.
468
 His youth did not absolve him of 
criticism based on his political judgement, and perceived immaturity on certain matters. 
The Conservatives had made a double error, copying Blair‟s approach, when in Hague, 
they did not have the man to do it, losing out on both sides of the coin.
469
 Indeed, there 
were slip ups that Hague made, like misjudgements over the Ashcroft scandal
470
, House 
of Lords reform, Kitchen Table Conservatism and Lord Archer
471
 that contributed 
towards a sense he was too inexperienced to be trusted with the leadership. Although he 
was an impressive performer in the Commons, and had not been expected to produce a 
comprehensive list of policies in the first few months, it was held by most commentators 
that his first few months had been bad thanks to “a string of unfortunate photo-ops.”472 In 
this environment, Hague‟s performances in the Commons were not the great weapon 
they would have been in the past.  
The difference in tone between the two parties was taken as a great dividing line and also 
something that Hague misjudged. Opposition was seen as a matter of looking like a 
potential government, and sounding credible.
473
 By adopting a populist agenda, the 
Conservatives were damaging the government, but reinforcing their bad image. There 
was a definite theme and central idea behind Hague‟s Internet era, and the way it would 
reward low tax, open economies.
474
 But far more emphasis was placed on the weaknesses 
on his personality than his vision. Blair‟s deficiencies were outweighed by Hague‟s 
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perceived weaknesses.
475
 The Sun reminded Blair‟s critics that they should consider the 
prospect of Hague as Prime Minister, and reject it as ludicrous.
476
 Little dwelled upon 
was the old nostrum of governments losing elections, while the media continually 
measured the leader of the opposition against the demands of the job of Prime Minister. 
Blair already passed the test of „can you see him in Downing Street‟, and Hague did not. 
Duncan Smith also faced the same problems in being compared to Blair, and looking a 
plausible Prime Minister. Initially his measured style won plaudits,
477
 but was later to 
bring criticism. Even papers like the Daily Telegraph who had praised Duncan Smith for 
his “secure ground of his obvious personal decency” warned him that it was not enough 
for him to be honest and sensible, but he must master television.
478
  The battle to 
establish leadership qualities required a committed effort to establish them through 
modern forms of communication. Even certain personal qualities were effectively 
redundant unless the leader could master the central properties of a new political 
environment that revolved around television. Duncan Smith had a massive handicap in 
establishing his qualities for leadership, that many simply had no idea who he was.
479
 The 
Sun ridiculed his image - “He lacks charisma and is out of his depth. The Conservatives 
will be in the backwaters of politics as long as he remains at the helm.”480 By calling 
himself the Quiet Man, he was banking on a misguided notion that the country would 
turn against charisma.
481
 Starkly, Duncan Smith was the “wrong leader doing the right 
things” and couldn‟t be envisaged by most voters in Downing Street.482 This is an 
interesting separation, between doing the right things, and being the right leader to carry 
them out. Effectively, having the right qualities to be seen as a plausible Prime Minister 
in a heavily mediated environment trumped policy and strategy. The „can you imagine 
him as Prime Minister‟ argument was even more damaging to Duncan Smith than to 
Hague. The fact that he was believed to be too nice or anonymous to really achieve 
things showed the importance of personality in politics. Again, despite the setbacks 
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befalling the Labour administration at this time, the leadership comparison could still 
reap rewards for Blair and maintain his dominant political position. 
Michael Howard started off with an image as a ruthless politician due to his time as 
Home Secretary.
483
 Howard countered it by insisting he had changed since then and the 
party must too.
484
 His skill in the Commons was credited with bringing politics to life.
485
 
But his attempts at charm were limited
486
, and elements of the media thinking Howard 
being angry and point scoring would not appeal to floating voters.
487
 A leader in The 
Times urged him to open up more - “modern democratic politics is about far more than 
the exterior that is presented by aspiring Prime Ministers to voters. There is now a 
demand to know far more about the interior. This is mostly the consequence of 
television, which both projects and consumes personality.....politics is therefore 
legitimately a question of personality.”488 The politics of personality was not just seen as 
legitimate, but tending to drown out other parts of politics which previously would have 
been more important. For example, Howard‟s sparkling performances and point scoring 
off Blair at PMQ‟s would once have been seen as greatly advantageous, now it was 
mostly a side-issue, or even worse empathised that Howard was only good at „old 
politics‟.489  
The one thing that happened to Blair that changed the battle for leadership in British 
politics was the way his popularity took a giant hit after the Iraq War. This process 
defined the battle Howard would have to fight with Blair over leadership. Blair was less 
popular with the voters, and had suffered particular damage to his reputation for honesty. 
This clearly drove the very personal way in which Howard attacked Blair. By this stage, 
it was doubted Blair was strong enough to make it much past the next election especially 
after his decision to step down.
490
 In a new aspect to the presidential dimension, the 
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Blair/Brown struggle for power dominated the General Election.
491
 As he admitted, it 
dictated the nature of the campaign he ran.
492
 He called Blair a liar and „despised‟ him.493 
But Howard had to prove his own popularity, and he did not do this. Damagingly, his 
reputation for honesty was even lower than Blair‟s, despite focusing his campaign on it, 
so he was in a weak position to win the leadership battle over Blair.   
The media made leadership an integral part of the Conservative story after 2005. This 
first happened in the leadership election, where press and television savaging of David 
Davis rocked his claim to be the leading candidate. In this media environment Cameron 
was the main beneficiary - he was regarded as having an ability to appeal to voters who 
had drifted away from the Conservatives. His personality and tone was seen as ideal to 
survive the political environment Blair had created, and prosper in „decontaminating‟ the 
Conservative brand.
494
 In awful contrast Davis had been accused of making a lacklustre 
speech at the conference and was perceived by many as dull. 
495
 The Sun thought 
Cameron was “articulate, lucid and self-confident...He looks good on television and he 
has the rare gift of making voters feel good about life. These may seem superficial 
qualities. But they are essential in an age where the medium is the message.”496 
Statements about all four of the leaders like this were commonplace. Writers often put to 
one side major ideological or policy concerns over leaders if they showed an aptitude for 
the requirements of modern leadership.  Increasingly, these were not about policy, or the 
requirements of parliamentary politics.  
But there were still traditional Conservatives, who abhorred this style of leadership, who 
thought that Cameron was actually a weak leader, who was just saying what people 
wanted to hear and had no idea of what he would do with power.  Simon Heffer 
characterised him as „Dave‟, with a “vision to turn the Tories into a left wing version of 
New Labour.”497 Some of the right thought Cameron was more motivated by Steve 
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Hilton and his focus groups than political beliefs.
498
 People were divided over if 
Cameron meant all of what he was saying, due to this association with „slickness‟ and 
PR.
499
 His skill at playing the new leadership games in turn raised its own questions, and 
emphasised already stark differences to Brown. This encouraged the media to see the 
clash between the two men as something separate and personal.   
This section shows that there is a distinct way for the media to look at politics that 
implicitly recognises the existence of a presidential dimension. Leaders have made 
extensive efforts to cultivate good leadership images, and this is with good reason, for the 
media have constructed an environment where leadership often trumps other issues, and 
is an independent part of analysis. It is a necessary precondition to be taken seriously in 
the leadership arena for a leader to successfully make his case in the media. There are 
few examples of the media explicitly referring to Presidentialisation, especially relating 
to the leader of the opposition. At the start of this section we asked what comparisons 
were made between the leader of the opposition and the Prime Minister, and asked if 
leadership was often elevated above other issues and classified independently of other 
political issues. We can see examples of both here. During all of the leadership elections 
leadership was elevated above other issues as a criterion for selecting a leader, 
specifically how they would be able to compete with Blair. During the different leaders‟ 
terms of office, they were often judged on their plausibility to fill the office of Prime 
Minister. In the increasing dearth of „policy politics‟, leadership often took priority over 
other issues. Therefore we could have the examples of a leadership policy being praised 
while saying he would never get to Downing Street (Duncan Smith) or that they were not 
really sure what he stood for but he had the right talent to lead the Conservatives 
(Cameron). This took an independent path, with the leaders often being compared to each 
other, or even potential future leaders being factored into calculations of what would 
happen. The media has tracked this dimension closely, if not explicitly, as a frame of 
reference to guide their view of British politics. With frequency, they deploy the 
„plausibility‟ test to leaders of the opposition, and reflect the differing norms of the 
political environment while doing so.  
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6.3 Executive Presidentialisation and its Effects on the Leader of the 
Opposition 
This section is about the changes in the power of the leader of the executive and what 
effects they have had on the leader of the opposition. It is based around the explanations 
of executive Presidentialisation stated in the conceptual framework, the 
internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state. How have they affected 
Labour Prime Ministers since 1997? And what has been the response of Conservative 
leaders of the opposition to them? 
6.3.1 The Internationalisation of Politics 
The internationalisation of politics was a phenomenon that many had been eager to 
highlight even before 1997. There were a number of imperatives that made it harder for 
an individual state to conduct its affairs without reference to, or constraint by, other 
states. Since the end of the Cold War, trade flows between countries had increased. In 
Britain this process was intimately bound up with Thatcherism during the 1980s. 
Abolition of exchange controls, policies that encouraged foreign investment and a greater 
will by the Government not to prop up failing businesses, meant that a proliferation of 
foreign consumer goods and large amounts of foreign direct investment became the 
norm. It became increasingly plausible to claim that the biggest single incentive for 
Britain to keep taxes low, especially on business, was to maintain a competitive position 
among other countries in a globalised economic environment.
500
 The end of the Cold 
War did not mean Britain adopted an isolationist role, with its military often being 
involved in peacekeeping and other missions. And of course there was the EU, which had 
caused so much trouble to the Thatcher and Major Governments. The Single European 
Act which Thatcher signed, although it abolished many trade restrictions within the 
Union, left Britain open to the imposition of all sorts of regulations under the pretext of 
market harmonisation, grew the size of the EU central directorate, and led to Thatcher 
herself dramatically turning against it, most notably with the Bruges speech
501
, and her 
attempts to stop the Maastricht treaty. This Treaty paved the way for more cooperation 
and a process that would end in the creation of a European Single Currency, the question 
of which threatened to rip apart the Conservative party. The European issue was so 
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volatile because it cut across domestic and foreign policy issues, and opened up 
alternative visions of what Britain‟s future should be. Some thought that the EU was an 
unacceptable threat to Britain‟s „special relationship‟ with the US, while others thought 
being an influential member of a powerful EU was the only way Britain could hope to 
project influence in the world.
502
 Domestically, the traditional belief that the EU was a 
capitalist club and would work in the interests of business was now supplanted by a 
belief among the left that the corporatist and social welfare preferences of European 
politicians, and the growing body of EU social legislation being produced through the 
Social Chapter, was actually the most viable way of Britain introducing greater rights for 
workers, after the legislation of the Thatcher years. Many on the right agreed that this 
was happening, but were deeply against it. They thought that the imposition of social 
legislation by the EU, and possible future harmonisation of taxes and social 
responsibilities, was undermining the Thatcher vision of Britain as a competitive low tax 
economy. And this aside from the billions of pounds in budget contributions that 
membership was already costing Britain.  Across all parts of the political spectrum there 
were those who thought that the EU and all the laws it produced were an insult to 
democracy and a threat to parliamentary sovereignty and the unity of the British state. On 
the other side there were „pragmatists‟ who thought that the British Government‟s power 
to influence domestic affairs in a globalised world was on the wane anyway, and that 
pooling sovereignty was a rational response, one that was guaranteeing British jobs, with 
problems of corruption and democracy in the EU surely being better tackled as 
institutions developed. There was a great deal of division between different visions of the 
future for Britain. Perhaps this was not surprising, as a former imperial nation, who had a 
seat on the UN Security Council, was an important member of the EU, NATO and the 
Commonwealth, possessed a „special relationship‟ with the US, in an increasingly 
complex and globalised world environment, meant that there were many different 
competing influences at work, some of them contradictory. Britain was not in a position 
to ignore the international arena, and it would become a key part of what any executive 
did. Disarmingly, as we shall see, the difficulty for the Conservatives was that their party 
contained vociferous elements of both. 
The attitude of New Labour when they entered office in 1997 was coloured by these 
myriad contradictions. The Government came to office with a pledge to repair the 
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damage that the Conservatives had done to Britain‟s reputation in Europe and make 
Britain a key player in the EU, yet recoiled from the opportunity to join the Euro.
503
 The 
Government also pledged to maintain the special relationship with the US, even though 
increasingly often the interests of the US and the EU conflicted. But how did this link to 
opposition and international politics? Were there examples of the Prime Minister being 
able to increase his power over the executive and the political system via the 
internationalisation of politics? With Blair and Brown we will see examples of where 
they attempted to use foreign policy directives as a subset of campaign techniques. Blair 
frequently used Europe to paint the Conservatives as extremist and as evidence of his 
success in fighting for Britain. Blair and Brown made much of their key roles in debt 
relief through the G8, and promoting agreements on climate change. But with Blair we 
can look at this from a different perspective. It is a common assertion of 
Presidentialisation theorists that the increased time spent with other leaders at summits 
and bilateral meetings strengthens the Prime Minister, giving him a higher stature among 
the public, and a practical involvement in deciding issues that are not available to 
opposition politicians.
504
 But being at the top table internationally did not always benefit 
Blair domestically. His close relationship with US President George W Bush was an 
example of this. In the US Blair was feted by those on both sides of the political divide. 
But at home, the association turned toxic in the eyes of some. Although Blairites 
defended the war, Bush was unpopular with large sections of Labour. Many media 
commentators began to refer to Blair as Bush‟s „poodle‟, and a weak leader. This fed into 
a charge that became popular with the public and media, that Blair was too intimately 
involved in international politics, ignoring domestic problems while doing so.
505
 
Commonwealth, G8 and bilateral summits all added up to a lot of time away from 
Britain. During Blair‟s years in office the EU was engaged in the negotiation of many 
different treaties and accords, as well as the regular series of bilateral meetings. 
Amsterdam, Nice and most controversially Lisbon were all signed by Blair during his 
time in office, each leading to accusations that he had „sold out‟ Britain. The whole 
process of the EU constitution was damaging to Blair, who at first denied the need for a 
referendum on the treaty, then was forced to concede that there would be one, reportedly 
under pressure from Rupert Murdoch, again leading to accusations that he was weak.
506
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The question of whether or not to join the Euro also constantly overhung the Blair 
premiership. The „five economic tests‟ conducted in 2003 by the treasury produced a 
seemingly clear cut series of reasons why Britain should not join. However, speculation 
that Blair had wanted to join but had been blocked by Brown was another exposition of 
the way he struggled to control Brown.
507
 By the end of Blair‟s time in Downing Street, 
he had become a major figure in world politics, respected (and feared) by many around 
the world, and his global stature was respected by many Blairites, and even some 
Conservative commentators. But this had not filtered through to his image in Britain, and 
if anything international politics had been responsible for the sharp decline in his image 
among the electorate from 2003 onwards. Although many may have realised that a lot of 
what was agreed internationally directly affected Britain, it did not mean that they liked 
some of the things Blair had agreed to, or his relationship with other world leaders. The 
growing internationalisation of politics was not necessarily therefore a boon to the Prime 
Minister, but could be a drag on him, an arena where he did not have built-in power to 
control developments (such as he effectively did over parliamentary legislation with 
large majorities) and was often forced to follow an agenda dictated by others. Blair was 
continually criticised for how going to war with the United States had made the country 
more likely to suffer a terrorist attack, despite other countries that had not participated in 
the war being targeted. Much of the legislation that spawned the term „health and safety 
culture‟ originated from the EU, but it was Labour who was more often than not pilloried 
as the party that had fed this culture. The internationalisation of politics often led to less 
control with just as much opportunity for blame of the Government.
 
But what was the response of Conservative leaders? Were there any ways they were able 
to take advantage? And what power did they themselves have over international 
developments? What is noticeable is that although foreign policy did not dictate the 
trajectory of the Conservative opposition, there were certain events which caused them 
trouble. Undoubtedly, the war in Iraq had a huge amount of influence on the direction of 
British politics under Blair. From an early stage Duncan Smith decided that he would 
give Blair his full support for joining military action with the Americans in Iraq. The fact 
that Duncan Smith took the same position as Blair limited his ability to speak for the 
majority that opposed the war at that stage. That was left to the Liberal Democrats, and 
the Labour and (small number of) Conservative rebels that voted against the motion. This 
was reflected by the fact that the Liberals went up in the polls, while the Conservative 
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position stayed largely static.
508
 Although Duncan Smith was thanked personally by the 
US Vice President for his role in supporting the Government, and had attended meetings 
with Blair about planning for the conflict, there had been no prominent role for him in 
the lead up, or during the war itself.
509
 Unlike Blair, he had not been constantly meeting 
other international leaders, or making rousing speeches about the need to take the nation 
to war, and had received little boost to a low profile among the public. And any 
statements he did make on domestic issues during this time were greatly overshadowed 
by the coverage of the build up to war. As the involvement in Iraq increasingly became 
problematic for the Prime Minister, the leader of opposition said little, which was 
probably not surprising given the fact that Duncan Smith had supported the war. Michael 
Howard had also supported the parliamentary motion and the war. In 2004 he claimed 
that if he had known that Blair had been exaggerating intelligence about weapons Iraq 
was supposed to possess, then he would not have supported it.
510
 While to a certain 
degree this was a logical position, it immediately engendered confusion and cynicism. 
Many thought that it was an opportunist manoeuvre to use the bad intelligence as a get-
out. Howard had set himself out as opposed to the way Blair conducted politics, and the 
war in Iraq had come to be seen as the prime example of bad things about the way Blair 
tackled politics. Yet he could not attack Blair with full force on the matter because it was 
a matter of record he had supported the war, and he could not change this. This attempt 
to do so came at the expense of alienating allies and making Howard look like he was a 
„bandwagon jumper‟, without increasing the potency of his attacks on Blair. Blair was 
the one with more options over Iraq, reflecting the greater amount of control he had over 
foreign policy as Prime Minister - he could apologise for mistakes made in planning and 
justifying the conflict, link it to his responsibility for the nation‟s security (which Howard 
could not, directly) and be seen to be influencing the Americans about the next moves 
forward in the Middle East, something Howard could not do. In fact the criticism of Blair 
over Iraq actually worsened this problem, as Bush and Cheney cut off public ties with the 
Conservatives for months in protest at Howard‟s critical comments about the war. This 
caused problems for the leadership amongst some of the Conservative party and the right 
wing commentariat that surrounded them, who thought that the party was neglecting a 
duty to work closely with the Republicans, traditional allies of the Conservatives. It led 
Howard into a spat with the Republicans that prompted him to give a lukewarm welcome 
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to Bush‟s re-election as President, and fostered the unusual situation where the 
Conservatives had a distant public relationship with the Republicans compared to 
Labour. 
511
 Due to the nature of the median Conservative and Labour supporter, it is 
unlikely that this lost the Conservatives many supporters at the General Election. But it 
impacted on the Conservatives and especially their leader in other ways. It led much of 
the right wing commentariat to criticise the leader, not just for the individual episode, but 
for weaknesses in his leadership ability and strategic direction, which chimed with other 
criticisms that Howard was running an ideology free zone with little vision. The episode 
fed into a wider narrative, more of which we shall see later, that the Conservatives had 
wild plans for foreign policy that would not be well received by key British allies. It 
deprived the Conservatives of the chance to use their traditionally close contacts within 
the Republican party to engineer meetings between the leader of the opposition and 
important administration officials that would make the leader of the opposition look 
important and statesmanlike, and gain extra publicity at home. Although he had criticised 
Blair‟s approach to intelligence in the build up to the war, there was not any discernible 
difference between Blair‟s and Howard‟s positions on the deployment of military forces 
in the country. For an issue that had consumed much of the discussion of British politics 
in the last years of Blair‟s premiership, Howard, and his successor David Cameron, had 
precious little to say. They were both constrained by their support for the original 
decision to go to war, and a willingness to show support to British soldiers. There was 
not much gain for a leader of the opposition in saying a lot about the topic. There are 
difficulties pertaining to being in opposition, but as we shall see, these appeared 
especially acute pertaining to the internationalisation of politics. More so than over the 
domestic business of government, the leader of the opposition was so obviously divorced 
from international politics, that they often faced near irrelevance over comments they 
made about international politics, or worse fanned controversies they could not control, 
while not having the benefit of the „statesmen effect‟ that the Prime Minister had, with 
the few times the leader of the opposition met foreign politicians being very poorly 
publicised. One of the few times Cameron gained a large amount of publicity for was a 
meeting with a foreign politician who did not even hold executive office, Barack Obama 
in summer 2008, a very brief meeting that was part of Obama‟s much hyped visit in 
London.
512
 The attention engendered by this relatively small scale meeting was a stark 
                                                 
511
 Nicolas Watt, „Howard Refuses to Congratulate Bush‟, 8th November 2004, The Guardian. 
512
 Cole Moreton, „Obama On Tour: Three Special Relationships in One Day‟, 27th July 2008, The 
Independent. 
 212 
contrast to the lack of interest in a visit Cameron made to India, that was supposed to 
signal a step change in relations with one of the world‟s fastest growing economies.513  
The leaders‟ slim power was even true over topics that the Conservatives themselves had 
said were top priorities, like Europe. Over the EU Treaties, the Conservatives were in a 
very weak position to influence what was going on. They had no direct role in the talks 
that led up to the agreements of the treaties, and they were relegated to taking up critical 
positions of the treaties after they were signed. Were there any instances in which these 
criticisms made a difference? In a formal sense they did not, as the legislation passing the 
treaties easily went through parliament. The indirect influence of criticising the treaties 
also did not appear to work. Although most agreed with the Conservative position that 
there should be no more treaties extending integration, the Conservatives did not increase 
the salience of the issue. The Conservatives were still able to secure some hits against the 
Government, although it is stretching it to say that this was all down to the 
Conservatives‟ skill. Two of the main irritants for Labour were the aborted referendum 
on the EU Constitution, and the controversial passage and signing of the Lisbon Treaty. 
But the promise of the referendum actually detracted from what would have been a main 
plank of the Conservative European election campaign, that they would definitely hold a 
referendum on the constitutional treaty. So although the Conservatives had been able to 
cause Labour some short term embarrassment, they did not secure a significant long-term 
gain.  
Subsequently, all the elements of the constitution were signed in an Intergovernmental 
Treaty at Lisbon. Blair, and Brown, argued that an Intergovernmental Treaty didn‟t 
require a referendum.
514
 Cameron gave a guarantee that there would be a referendum 
under a Conservative Government.
515
 But Labour were able to pass the Treaty through 
Parliament, although Brown signed the Treaty after the other European leaders had left, 
accused of an embarrassing attempt to avoid publicity.
516
 But later on Cameron faced his 
own problems, as the Treaty was ratified by all member states, and he was forced to 
admit that there would not be a referendum on the Treaty under a future Conservative 
Government, but they would accept the Treaty under duress and negotiate for opt-outs to 
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social legislation. This drew some criticism from the press and members of his party, for 
breaking a „cast iron guarantee‟ he had given to hold a referendum.517 So although 
Conservative leaders had won the chance to cause the Government short term 
embarrassment, it was at the cost of opening up discord within their own party, and 
vulnerability from attack by UKIP. The Government was vulnerable on Europe, but it 
was an issue that had the potential to backfire on the Conservatives, apart from the 
adverse impact it had on the Conservative image, with the accusations of being a single 
issue party, and this was reflected in the way leaders after Hague utilized it a lot less as 
part of their public appeals. 
This potential meant that the Government had no real incentive to change their position 
on the treaties once they were passed, and were actually able to turn the Conservative 
criticisms against them - under all four leaders of the opposition after 1997, they were 
accused of having „pie in the sky‟ arguments over Europe.518 A major theme of the 
Labour criticisms was that the Conservative position would lead to Britain being reviled 
in Europe, would cause near meltdown in the workings of the EU, and was in some way 
extremist. Hague was regularly derided for his unfeasible plan to renegotiate the Treaty 
of Rome if he won power.
519
 Howard was accused similarly about his plans to hold a 
referendum and the EU Constitution.
520
 Brown often disdainfully referred to David 
Cameron‟s setting up of a new group within the European parliament, claiming it was 
proof of the extremist „same old Tory‟ attitude to Europe.521 What also did not help the 
Conservatives was, as alluded to, Labour were able to rely on appearing to be at the 
„centre of Europe‟, and the Conservatives were not able to publically demonstrate that 
Labour were wrong in accusing them of being isolated. Indeed European leaders often 
criticised the Conservatives, like under Hague, for fostering „alarmism‟ about creeping 
EU powers, and especially after Cameron started a process of withdrawing Conservatives 
MEPs from the European Parliament European People‟s Party (EPP) grouping, they were 
very reluctant to agree to have any kind of meeting with him. The exit from the EPP 
caused a great deal of controversy, and when it was first in negotiation there were eleven 
leaders of right wing Governments and parties in Europe who said that they would refuse 
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to work with Cameron if he withdrew Conservative MEP‟s from the EPP. 522 This gave 
credence to Labour claims that a putative Cameron Government would be isolated in 
Europe. The criticisms of European Governments were not just imagined, but real. 
523
 
Without the Conservatives being in government, they could not counter what were 
hypothetical visions of the future in detail. With criticisms of their tax policies for 
example, they may have been able to point to what levels of tax had contributed to 
making other countries more prosperous, or what the Conservatives had done in the past. 
But the question of hypothetical negotiations in the future with a group of foreign 
countries was so open to question that the allegations could not be countered in a 
comprehensive way, and no doubt the Labour allegations were effective among some 
voters in painting their attitude towards Europe as reckless. Labour had a great advantage 
in that they could choose to discuss their record of agreements in the complicated 
networks of the EU, and spin them as being successful, while hinting that other European 
leaders would disregard Britain under a Conservative Government, something that could 
not be disproved conclusively by the Conservatives themselves. As we shall see with 
their attitude to the expanding state, part of being in opposition was that it made it very 
hard to demonstrate it had passed arbitrary „tests‟ set by the Government. 
6.3.2 The Growth of the State: 
Another major cause of executive Presidentialisation is the growth of the state. How did 
this influence work, and how did it affect the Labour Government and their Prime 
Ministers? Unlike many other western countries, the British state did grow by a large 
amount, since the Labour party took power in 1997. There was a contradiction between 
the need to be internationally competitive, and being able to finance public services that 
were satisfactory to the electorate.
524
 Even though New Labour had been conceived 
round the premise that a Labour Government must not endanger economic 
competiveness, once Labour was in power they were not afraid to implement policies 
which would expand the state, needing more taxes to pay for it. After an initial couple of 
years where Brown stuck to the previous Conservative Government‟s spending plans525 
and actually decreased state spending as a percentage of GDP, paying down some 
national debt, state spending started rising by huge amounts. The initial „prudence‟ of 
                                                 
522
 David Charter, „Leaders From EU Right Turn Against the Tories‟, February 28th 2006, The Times. 
523
 Bruno Waterfield, „David Cameron Warned By Angela Merkel Over Lisbon Treaty‟, 11th May 2009, 
The Daily Telegraph. 
524
 Stephen Dorrell, Interview with Ben Harris, 4
th
 June 2008. 
525
 Stephen King, „The Truth About Spending Cuts‟, 29th March 2010, The Independent. 
 215 
Brown, and the stability of the economy, enjoying high growth, low inflation and low 
interest rates, meant that he had the credibility to sanction the big increase in spending. 
He also had public support as well, with most supporting the rise in national insurance to 
finance improvements in the NHS. Most of the rises were targeted on causes that were 
close to Labour - especially health, with increases coming in at over 10% some years. 
Even the consistent, and record period of economic growth was not enough to pay for 
these spending increases on their own, and the slack was taken up by a combination of 
the Government beginning to borrow money again, and some tax rises, like a series of 
complex adjustments to tax thresholds, and most notably a rise in national insurance.
526
 
As most other European states were attempting to reduce spending and tax rates to cure 
their poor competiveness, Britain was experiencing the opposite phenomenon, having 
been in a very competitive position at the end of the Conservative years in government, 
and being able to raise tax and spending greatly without (apparently) endangering the 
state of the economy, while tackling the perception that British public services had been 
underfunded by the Conservative Governments since 1997. A great many more were 
employed in the more generously funded public sector. By electoral logic, aside from the 
economic arguments for and against, this was a good thing for Labour and a bad thing for 
the Conservatives. Labour had traditionally gained the votes of most public sector 
workers, especially in health and education, the two public services that were being 
expanded most rapidly. These two services were also the most popular of the public 
services, and affected huge numbers of voters some way directly, and in theory the extra 
money going in would make a Labour Government even more popular, and make a 
Conservative comeback to government less likely, unless they could find a way to 
increase the amount of public service workers voting for them quite substantially. 
Studying the strategy of Labour Governments since 1997, it is clear that they thought that 
this was a weakness of the Conservatives that could be exploited. The Labour campaigns 
in 2001 and 2005 revolved around the extra money, and the promises of extra money, 
that government had pledged to the „schools n‟ hospitals‟ combination that Blair and 
Brown kept referring to. Not many chances were missed to raise fears of what „Tory 
cuts‟ would do to these services, and the possibility was continually raised that the 
Conservatives had plans for deeper cuts, and would possibly even privatise parts of these 
services. Even when the figure of £35 billion of cuts that Labour quoted was queried by 
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many as misleading, Labour used the claim throughout the 2005 election campaign.
527
 
Even after the economic crisis, and the sharp falls in tax revenue, Brown pressed on for a 
long time with his „cuts versus investment‟ strategy.528 Even when he relented to pressure 
from the Cabinet to admit there would have to be substantial cuts if Labour won another 
term of office, he insisted that unlike the Conservatives, they would not be carried out 
immediately, thereby not endangering a fragile British economic recovery.
529
 
If the increasing number of public sector workers was a potential problem for the 
Conservatives, then what was their response? A common criticism of William Hague 
was that he had not done enough to reassure workers in the public sector that they should 
not be frightened of the possibility of a Conservative Government. But on the surface, 
there was one very large concession he had made to them. Despite a commitment to be a 
tax cutting Conservative, Hague had pledged to match the massive increases that Labour 
had planned for education and health spending. Later he extended these promises to other 
public services such as the police and the military.
530
 Despite the fast economic growth 
that the country was experiencing, committing to these large spending increases limited 
Hague‟s room for manoeuvre, meaning that to square the circle between tax cuts and 
spending increases he had to rely on slightly vague promises to reduce waste in 
government, and deliver services more efficiently. This was what awakened criticism 
especially among Conservatives, who said that this stance was not credible when taking 
into account the fact that Hague did not have a detailed blueprint to structurally reform 
these public services, making promises that they could run them more efficiently and get 
more value for money sound rather hollow. There were accusations that Hague had, by 
promising to match Labour‟s spending plans, „parked‟ the issue.531 Matching the 
spending would guard the Conservatives to some extent against accusations of „Tory 
Cuts‟, not having detailed plans to reform the services would not arouse too much 
controversy amongst the professionals in these services, while the Conservative 
leadership could conceivably use the campaign to publicise other issues where they had 
leads over Labour, like Europe or immigration, and move them up the agenda, having 
„neutralised‟ the public services. With Hague able to match, but not better, Labour 
promises to the public sector, it appears he was caught in a trap of not being able to make 
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their future appear to be more secure than under Labour, but not promising a radical plan 
of reform that would make it possible for the Conservatives to one day deliver these 
services more efficiently and at a lower eventual cost than Labour were doing. 
Duncan Smith, although he never had the opportunity to contest a general election, 
represented a step change in the way the Conservative leadership dealt with the question 
of the public services. In an interview for this thesis, he contended that the Conservative 
election campaign of 2001 had been far too focused on a narrow range of issues that 
mainly appealed to voters that had already voted Conservative. To improve the party‟s 
fortunes, Duncan Smith wanted a comprehensive set of plans for the public services, 
where no one could accuse them of not talking about the subject in the hope that it would 
be ignored. Duncan Smith encouraged Shadow Cabinet ministers to visit other countries, 
some of them seen as more socialist than Britain, to learn from the way they ran the 
equivalent services, and come up with plans for reform.
532
 This was his public position at 
the time, that the Conservative party should be seen to be coming up with comprehensive 
polices to improve the public services. However, Duncan Smith‟s attempts at „engaging‟ 
with health and education did not bring the Conservatives a breakthrough in the polls, 
nor persuade significant additional numbers of people that the Conservatives had a better 
strategy than Labour for health and education. Again, he was not helped by the way 
Labour held the levers of power. While Conservative plans for reforming the public 
services may have been interesting for some voters and political insiders, they could not 
hope to match the dramatic immediacy of a Labour National Insurance rise „for the 
NHS‟, with all the affinity with the service that this implied. And that National Insurance 
rise had been popular with the public. This put Duncan Smith in a difficult position, 
between criticising Labour for imposing this additional burden on business and hiring 
staff, while not being able to make any concrete commitment to repeal the tax rise. The 
rapid growth in numbers of people employed by the NHS, and its popularity, made it a 
hard subject for Conservative leaders to tackle. As by far the largest item of government 
spending, logically it should have been the first place the Conservatives would look for 
spending reductions that would reduce the size of government and pave the way for 
reducing taxes, two objectives which every Conservative leader since 1997 has said that 
they want to achieve. But the size of the institution and the respect it engendered among 
the public meant that no Conservative leader since 1997 has pledged to cut spending on 
the health service, because to do so would have fed the Labour criticism that the leaders 
                                                 
532
 Iain Duncan Smith, Interview With Ben Harris, 5
th
 June 2008. 
 218 
did not care about the NHS, and would far rather it was privatised. The choice was 
between sticking to Labour spending plans and chance destroying any hopes they had to 
present a coherent plan for reducing the tax burden and the size of the state, or pledge to 
radically reform it and chance becoming very unpopular with the public. 
The platform Howard entered the 2005 election on showed the Conservative difficulty 
with the growing state and how to reform it. Again, Howard had decided to take the 
position that he would maintain Labour spending plans on health and education. But 
these ran alongside pledges that he would reduce the tax burden on the British public. 
Although he was offering less tax, it was only a relatively minor cut. Howard‟s 
prospective spending plans were founded on the James proposals for reducing waste in 
the public sector, which had detailed £35 billion worth of savings that could be made.
533
 
This avoided the accusation that had been made against Hague, that he did not have any 
real idea how to achieve these efficiency savings, although it did not stop Labour 
criticising aspects of the James proposals as being totally unbelievable. Howard planned 
to allocate the £35 billion of savings between more spending on health and education to 
match the Labour spending plans, a reduction in the national debt which had been 
building up for most of the decade, and £4 billion of targeted tax cuts. In a £600 billion 
plus Government budget, cutting the burden of tax by £4 billion was seen as pretty 
uninspiring by some figures on the right, a “rounding error.” 534 And the pledge by 
Howard that these minor tax cuts would be made while expanding the role of the state
535
 
pointed to the confused nature of the campaign - were the Conservatives bound by 
Labour now? Would they stop the expanding state? This was not resolved by the plans 
for public services reform - the plans for patients and pupil passports would actually have 
cost more in the short term. Of course this would be paid for by the generous spending 
increases pre-allocated to these departments, but this meant that the rest of the public 
sector, including traditionally Conservative institutions like the police and the military, 
would face having their spending squeezed, meaning the Conservatives could become 
more unpopular within these sectors. Howard was trying to do many things within tightly 
limited parameters of what was possible, set by the Labour Government.  
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The leadership of David Cameron has attempted to square this circle, but in a way that 
has upset many in his own party, while presiding over an upsurge of those who thought 
that the Conservatives had the best polices about the public sector.
536
 From the very 
beginning of his leadership Cameron was clear that he would not be making huge tax and 
spending cuts, but „sharing the proceeds of growth‟. He claimed that the fundamental 
principle that had underpinned the NHS since its inception - that the services it offered 
should be made free for all - would be maintained under a future Cameron Government, 
and there would not be a fundamental restructuring of the service with part privatisation, 
an insurance model, or a patients‟ passport.537 Going beyond previous leaders, Cameron 
actually said that the NHS was his first priority, and made it a key part of promotional 
activity. Surprisingly, given that he was nominally committed to reducing the role of the 
state, and given the massive spending increases devoted to the sector, Cameron used the 
2006 conference to launch a high profile campaign to stop „Brown‟s NHS cuts‟.538 When 
the economic crisis came, this put Cameron in a difficult position, which he opted to get 
round by insisting his priorities were cutting the deficit and not the NHS.
539
 By doing this 
Cameron guarded his position on the NHS from attack, but this meant that if the 
Conservative target of eliminating the bulk of the structural deficit by the end of the 
parliament was to be achieved then the spending cuts for other departments would have 
to be even more stringent. The claim Cameron had made to be a „compassionate caring 
Conservative‟, was vulnerable to attack that he was planning massive cuts. Against this 
Cameron was able to offer a „Third Way‟ which gave him some chance of claiming he 
was still a compassionate Conservative, but would get the deficit in order. Cameron had 
been an advocate of changing society, he had initially claimed that he wanted to change 
society as profoundly as Thatcher had changed the economy. This desire merged with 
great amounts of policy work produced by Duncan Smith‟s special justice commission 
on „Broken Britain‟. Cameron pledged to tackle the myriad causes of the „Broken 
Society‟. Indeed, at the beginning of the economic crisis he even insisted that to fix the 
broken economy, first a government would have to tackle the broken society. Although 
he dropped this claim, he still made significant references to the concept in the run up to 
the General Election. The increased involvement of charity groups, reform of the tax and 
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benefits system, were all part of Cameron‟s reasoning about the broken society. 540 It 
gave him more credibility than his three predecessors to claim he was a genuine „caring 
Conservative‟, but it was not a position that was invulnerable to attack, that he was a 
closet Thatcherite. 
Like the internationalisation of politics, the growth of the state was difficult to handle for 
the leaders of the opposition. They did not control it, and coming out strongly against it 
chanced antagonising swathes of potential voters. The disconnect and complete lack of 
direct authority the leader of the opposition had over state employees made it difficult for 
them to claim that they could „lead‟ the state organisations. Even Hague, the leader most 
associated with the virtues of a small state, had to issue guarantees to state organisations 
that he would not cut spending on them. All the other Conservative leaders had to issue 
these guarantees as well. Only Cameron made a fierce effort to turn his relationship with 
a state organisation round to his advantage - the NHS. 
6.4 Conclusions 
In this section we have looked at the relationship of leaders of the opposition to the 
political environment. This environment has changed significantly from previous times 
the Conservatives had been in opposition, and changed fundamentally the place of 
opposition from a passive one that relied on government malfunctioning, to an active one 
that had to prove the leader of the opposition was suitable to be Prime Minister, and had 
to react to government actions relating to the state and the internationalisation of politics. 
The media have created a set of high expectations on the leader of the opposition to fulfil 
the test of being plausibly seen as Prime Minister. This placed a large emphasis on the 
leader of the opposition‟s personality over his policies. The increased expectations led 
leaders of the opposition to feel the need to fulfil a complicated balance between being a 
strong leader and a „man of the people‟. In terms of the two of the main drivers of 
executive Presidentialisation - internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state, 
we have seen that it is very hard for leaders of the opposition to respond to both of these 
factors. Commonly, they are relegated to the position of playing a reactive role to the 
activities of the Prime Minister. While this may absolve the leader of the opposition of 
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involvement in controversial decisions such as Iraq, it also impedes his attempts to look 
like a potential Prime Minister. Politically, it creates many constraints for the leader of 
the opposition over the policies he makes and the rhetoric he uses. The interaction with 
the increased power of the Prime Minister is essentially one way, because the leader of 
the opposition has such little power over international politics and the growth of the state. 
Because most matters relating to international politics and the growth of the state are 
administrative, or policy driven, the politics of opposition is mostly ineffective. He gains 
little obvious benefit of publicity for successful meetings or contacts with international 
leaders, yet can still attract adverse publicity when things go wrong, or when these 
international leaders are unhappy or refuse to meet the leader of the opposition. 
Particularly with regard to the growth of the state, the leader of the opposition has to be 
mindful of upsetting a significant portion of the electorate, and this undoubtedly 
influences his tone, and the language he uses. One result of the growth of departments is 
the growth of the Shadow Cabinet, but this has not proved a boon for the leader of the 
opposition, as we have seen in the party chapter, as it is close enough to leak and 
embarrass the leader. A process of executive Presidentialisation may have given a boost 
to the Prime Minister‟s prominence at the heart of government, but it has not given the 
leader of the opposition a similar type of fillip.  
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7 Conclusions: Conservative Leaders of the Opposition 1997-
2010 
In this concluding analysis, we must look to what extent the material in the thesis has 
illuminated the questions raised by the conceptual framework, and which insights it has 
brought, additional to the existing literature.  
7.1 Research Question Conclusions 
This thesis grew out of a belief that there have been changes in the political environment 
that have affected the role of the leader of the opposition, that can be illuminated with a 
study that is not centred around agents, but the structures that surround them. These 
changes have not been wholly reflected by a modern literature that is more concerned 
with individual agents and events than the wider place of opposition or the structure of 
power within the Conservatives. To attempt to make a contribution to the literature about 
the Conservatives in opposition since 1997, a framework was created around the 
principles of Presidentialisation theory, which itself has to take account of the modern 
political environment. This framework was detailed in the second chapter, and outlined a 
structure of party, electoral and political environment chapters, that all apply to 
Conservative leaders of the opposition since 1997.  The final analysis begins by looking 
at some of the answers the three substantive chapters came to, and how the thesis 
worked.  
The first substantive chapter was about the leader of the opposition and his party. The 
research questions this chapter asked were: 
 Did the balance of power between the leader of the opposition and the 
Conservative party favour the leader? Did the formal or informal balance of 
power within the Conservatives change in favour of the leader of the opposition, 
and how permanent were these changes between different leaders? Did the leader 
of the opposition claim the political mandate, or were other figures within the 
Conservatives, or the Conservative party as a whole, able to plausibly claim the 
mandate or water down the leader‟s claim? How much power was concentrated in 
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the leader of the opposition‟s office - were other figures within the Conservatives 
able to challenge or defy the leader‟s office? 
This chapter is largely concerned with the balance of power within the Conservatives. 
We found that the balance has become more volatile, with leader and party gaining more 
powers to use against each other. Before 1997, the Conservative party had been 
organised in a very loose fashion, with autonomous local party organisations, and the 
powerful 1992 Committee taking informal soundings from MPs. This usually worked 
relatively harmoniously due to the tradition of deference to the Conservative leader, 
despite the lack of formal control the leader had over the party. But through the 
Conservatives‟ last decade in government, this conception of power in the party had 
almost totally broken down. Thatcher, despite winning three elections for the 
Conservatives, was ignominiously dumped by MPs in 1990, a move that would cause 
great infighting and disquiet for years to come. John Major‟s leadership was dogged by 
rebellions, especially over Europe. The leader, far from inspiring deference, was often a 
figure of ridicule and seemed powerless to stop the chaos around him.  
The febrile atmosphere and infighting that had grown to define the Conservative Party 
during these years, would affect formal, and informal relationships between the leader 
and the party in the years after 1997. In terms of the formal relationship, the infighting 
was undoubtedly a major spur towards changing the relationship. As we detailed in this 
chapter, there were a series of formal changes to the party pushed through by William 
Hague. These changes established a greater degree of central control over recruiting and 
communicating with members, centralising initiatives through a party board, and taking 
powers away from local party associations and middle level management in the party. 
The three wings of the party - parliamentary, voluntary and professional - were united as 
one single body, with a single constitution, rules and national membership. In return, the 
Conservative grass roots gained more power. The grass roots had traditionally been the 
ignored part of the party, a bystander to the activities of the leadership and to a lesser 
extent the middle level management. Suddenly it found itself with the power to vote in 
the final run off in a leadership election, and on key party policies. In a formal sense, 
these alterations would change the balance of power dramatically within the 
Conservative party, and the Hague changes were long lasting. Since they have been 
introduced, there has been only one major attempt to alter one of the key planks of the 
reforms, the method of selecting the leader, by Michael Howard in 2005, which was 
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unsuccessful. So we can see from the detail in this chapter that the formal side of the 
relationship between the leader and the party has changed a great deal, and in a way that 
tallies with many of the assumptions of the conceptual framework. However, this does 
not take account of the balance of power between the leader and the party, independent 
of the formal rules that govern the party. This has immensely affected the conduct of the 
leader of the opposition, and it is where the rest of the party has, in practice, been able to 
exert more power. Although the changes in formal powers granted the leader of the 
opposition more power in theory, and depressed the power of party grandees and middle 
level management, in practice these powers depended on the state of leaders‟ informal 
relationship with the rest of the party. This was seen in the little used referendum power 
that the reforms had established. It was only used on three occasions, twice by Hague and 
once by Cameron. Although at face value it was a powerful tool for the leader to 
communicate directly with and gain the endorsement of members, against opposition 
from professional party members, in reality it was not used like this. Hague and Cameron 
found plebiscites of the party that were racing certainties to result in a strong victory for 
the leadership attracted low levels of turnout, and interest from the media, heavily 
diluting their impact. Of course a lot more interest could have been created by putting 
more controversial and divisive issues to the party, but then the leader would have had to 
face the unedifying prospect of losing votes, or winning them by such a narrow margin as 
to make the party look divided. When it really could have helped the leaders, such as 
over the kitchen table conservatism debacle under Hague, the „back me or sack me‟ 
fracas over a gay adoption bill under Duncan Smith, or over Cameron‟s clumsy row with 
the party over grammar schools, the option of a plebiscite was effectively non existent, as 
there would have been a serious possibility that the leader would have been defeated by 
the vote. The power was firmly dependent on the pre-existing political success and 
position of the leader in the party. And despite the new arrangement of formal power 
within the party, this position was relatively easy for well known figures within the party 
to challenge. Under all four leaders, major figures were able to speak out against the 
leader, often with impunity, and derail the direction that the leader was seeking to take 
the party in. There was a high degree of volatility among the Conservative party that had 
been unprecedented in previous times the Conservatives had been in opposition, that 
made it so much harder for the opposition leader to run a leadership that was free of 
significant challenges. Even seemingly lowly MPs, heads of party branches, or ex-
Ministers could rush into print, onto radio, television, or more recently even blog about 
what they thought were the leader‟s failures. Of course it is not true to say that critical 
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opinions of the Conservative leader did not exist before 1997, but what is different is the 
ease of reception to criticism of the leader and its wider impact on opposition and its 
place in British politics. There was a greater cynicism about leaders, that they were out to 
deceive or to „spin‟, and so-called „straight talking‟ MPs found their deconstructions of 
leaders gained more currency than usual. Media coverage of the leader placed emphasis 
on him being a symbol of the party, and more voters saw him as one, so when he did not 
unite the party around him he was seen as „failing a key test‟. And the expectations of a 
leader had changed so much even from the last period of Conservative opposition which 
ended in 1979, and certainly from the beginning of the century. This was partially the 
result of a gradual „professionalisation‟ of opposition, which had given it a full range of 
Shadow Ministers and research money to provide criticism of the Government across all 
areas. But what had truly accelerated this process was a fast moving change in the media, 
which had lost much of its attention span, lurching from coverage of crisis to scandal, 
and looked to the opposition, and specifically the leader, to provide a response to most 
government activities, or at least have a policy or soundbite for most areas. This placed a 
high degree of responsibility on the opposition to achieve party unity on a great variety 
of issues, just like for a government, achieving a degree of cohesiveness unthinkable of 
previous periods in opposition. The increased responsibility meant there were many more 
chances for the party to disrupt it, and gave them much more power.   Post 1997, the 
leader often appealed for the party to change its look and feel, and represent the makeup 
of the country, or appealed to the party to broaden its range of concerns. When these 
leaders were forced to divert from these positions by party pressure, they then struggled 
to prove to the media and wider world that they were properly exerting authority over 
their party, and left either wing of the troublesome „mod/rocker‟ intra-party debate 
disillusioned. This then meant that each leader had to exert firm discipline over 
recalcitrant members. Some were more successful than others in doing this. David 
Cameron had to deal with fewer of these rebellions, because appeals to modernise the 
party were more consistent with the platform he was elected on, but they still occurred. 
Much of the deference was down to his perceived ability to deliver electoral success - 
when this ability was in doubt then he endured the rockiest time of his leadership, before 
Gordon Brown‟s abortive election, when it looked likely that he was about to lead the 
party to another election defeat.  
The question of whether the leader and not the party competed for the mandate is about 
whether the leader was able to construct an independent set of reasons for voting for 
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„him‟, by moving his image beyond his parties, and whether the party gave them freedom 
to do it. Part of the problem for Hague was that he kept flipping what personality he 
wanted to convey to the electorate, and what exact mandate he was competing for. 
Whichever persona he had tried he had not been given autonomy from criticism by his 
party. Duncan Smith suffered the same problem, for after initial attempts to claim that he 
was on a personal mission to help the poor, he reverted back to what sounded much more 
like a traditional Conservative in tune with the majority of his party. At all times there 
was at least one, and at times both, of the modernising and traditional wings of the party 
who were very sceptical about Duncan Smith and refused to give him full autonomy. 
This was not as much of a problem for Michael Howard, who the party gave more 
autonomy to display himself to the public as his self portrayal as an honest and 
accountable politician. However, there were still murmurings that this style of leadership 
was not effective enough, and Howard was helped by the imminence of a General 
Election, making it almost unfeasible that the Conservatives would change the leader 
again. David Cameron also had a clear idea of what his political personality was, and was 
given autonomy to make this the main electoral message to an unprecedented extent in 
branding and publicity, especially while the party was doing well in the polls. If Howard 
had shown that it was possible that the party would give autonomy to a leader wanting to 
make himself the main competitor for the electoral mandate, then Cameron was leader 
for long enough to show this could actually happen and take effect. But such a mandate 
was conditional on the prospect of success that could be demonstrated to a vocal and 
volatile party. 
The different leaders had very mixed fortunes at ensuring the majority of power 
resources resided in the leader‟s office. This completes the general picture we saw in the 
party chapter, that the greater prominence of the leader gave him an opportunity to 
exercise more power, but only if he was politically strong, otherwise power had shifted to 
the party, due to their ability to put greater pressure on a leader who had extra 
responsibilities and expectations to fulfil. William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith found it 
extremely difficult to keep a stable team in the leader‟s office, have it keep the Shadow 
Cabinet and MPs under control, and prevent frequent leaks of information to the media. 
Under Duncan Smith the situation was much the same, to the worse extent that the party 
actually forced him to reverse key appointments, giving the impression that the party 
actually had more power over the leader‟s office than vice versa. In contrast David 
Cameron and Michael Howard ran more stable central teams that have been less prone to 
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leaking to the media, and disciplining recalcitrant party members. However in both cases 
this led to criticism below the surface that the central teams were aloof and were not 
pursuing the right strategies.  
The record of leaders gaining more powers in relation to their party has certainly been 
very mixed. In a formal sense the Conservative leader has acquired more power at the 
expense of middle level management since 1997, but many of these powers have been 
unusable, if the leader has not been in a politically strong position. Parties have tolerated 
their leaders establishing strong central offices, and competing primarily for the mandate 
themselves, but only when they are seen to have some realistic chance of electoral 
victory. If not, then the party has been exceptionally volatile and has allowed the leader 
very little room for manoeuvre. We saw that, when comparing leaders, and even within 
the term of leaders, they were granted much more autonomy when they were seen as 
having the potential to win an election. But this was a very high standard for the leader of 
the opposition to be judged against by the party, and in practice this shifted a lot of power 
to the party in a form that had not existed before.  
In the second substantive chapter, about elections and parties, we asked the questions 
about the General Elections that the Conservatives led by William Hague and Michael 
Howard took part in: 
 How prominent a role did the leader of the opposition take within general election 
campaigns, and how did it compare to other figures within the Conservatives? 
Has the leader of the opposition‟s role become more prominent among media? 
Have leaders of the opposition had sizable effects on the voting intentions of the 
electorate? 
The first research question concerns the balance of power between opposition and party, 
while the last two refer to the place of opposition within the wider political system. This 
area highlighted what we saw in the previous chapter that the balance of power between 
the leader and party had become more volatile, and more difficult for all but successful 
leaders to impose themselves upon. The role of Hague and Howard in the election 
campaigns in which they led the Conservative party were strikingly different. Under 
Hague, there was no concerted attempt to personalise the message and the marketing of 
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the campaign around him. The prominence of Portillo and his alternative vision of what 
the direction of the party should be, little use of Hague in publicity material, and the way 
„Save the Pound‟ dominated the visual content of rallies all served to minimise Hague‟s 
role. The prominence given to European policy meant it was exceedingly easy for 
Baroness Thatcher to upstage Hague in the latter part of the campaign. It was also not an 
issue that played to the image of Hague that his team were trying to present, that of the 
straight talking, no nonsense politician. With Howard, there were large differences. The 
central message of the campaign, about the timetable for action and accountability, was 
closely identified with the leader himself, and there were no other figures in the 
Conservative party who competed for status with Howard in the way Portillo had with 
Hague. Still, despite this, the marketing of the campaign did not utilise Howard himself 
overly. But as Howard admitted himself, the public perception of Blair was a large spur 
to honesty and accountability being the central messages of the campaign, and if Blair 
had not been Prime Minister then it would have been likely that the campaign would 
have looked rather different. This relates to our overall conception of a „leaderland‟. If 
the image of the Prime Minister was such a decisive influence on the strategy of the 
leader of the opposition, then it shows the importance of a political environment defined 
by leaders. But it was one in which the party was still very powerful. 
The media coverage the two men received was also very different. In Hague‟s case, the 
tabloid press was often very critical, although less often fulsome of praise. All papers 
associated him closely with the perceived fallings of the campaign. This extreme 
treatment was not meted out to Howard, instead he was treated more dispassionately, 
with cool disdain in some quarters for the lack of imagination in his campaign. But much 
of the coverage repeatedly pinned the ultimate blame for bad electoral performance 
solely on the leader and his shortcomings. Compared to the scope the print media had for 
personal opinion, the broadcast media were much more constrained by impartiality 
restrictions. However, they were able to report at length on splits within the party, (and 
repeatedly did so under Hague, less under Howard) comment on party strategy, and 
produce packages mostly featuring the leader and their activities. Although such 
packages included little of what the leaders had actually said, they often contained long 
sections of narration by the correspondent backed by footage of the leader, underlining 
the importance of what surroundings the leader was put in when being filmed during the 
campaign. The media were less concerned with the leader‟s place as representing an 
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ideological or social group, but tested the leader against his ability to impose strategy and 
unity. 
As for the question of whether the leaders had a substantial effect on the vote, we saw in 
this section that the leaders were adjudged to have a significant affect on the voters, and 
that Conservative voters appraisals of the leader had a significant ability on their 
willingness to vote Conservative. Although in both cases the relative unpopularity of the 
leaders hurt the Conservatives‟ chances of election success – Hague was well behind 
Blair in aggregate approval, and Howard was still behind a much weakened Blair - both 
leaders did not have as big an effect as Blair did on the Labour vote. The leaders did not 
have impressive ratings compared to Blair, and this put them at a massive disadvantage 
politically.  
The place of leaders relative to their party during elections has been shown to be very 
complex. Even though the Conservative party often took the opportunity to actively 
avoid putting the leader centre stage and give more prominence to the party, there was a 
passive sense in which they could not avoid the leader taking centre stage, as media 
coverage put a massive degree of responsibility on the leader for the message and success 
of the campaign, while giving party members freedom to voice their discontent. We see 
also from the BES research that leaders had strong effects and more popular leaders 
would have made their prospects of victory more realistic. It does not come down to what 
other sections of the literature think, that Blair was near impossible to beat in an election, 
as the research shows that Blair became less popular after the Iraq war. We can see, 
taking an overall look at these elections, that there was receptivity to the presidential 
environment by other leaders, and there was an expectation that leaders should be 
presidential, disquiet when they weren‟t, and an inability to „hide‟ from presidential 
expectations in the media and elsewhere.  The expectations on leaders of the opposition 
have markedly increased. 
The third substantive chapter about the political environment asked: 
 What techniques did the leader of the opposition use to persuade people they 
empathised with them, and were strong leaders? Did the media create an 
independent leadership dimension? How did the leader of the opposition relate to 
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the way internationalisation of politics and the growth of the state was affecting 
the Prime Minister‟s office and the Cabinet, and what place did they take within 
state and international networks? What form of organisation did the leader of the 
opposition use for his own Shadow Cabinet? 
As for the techniques leaders of the opposition used to persuade the electorate that they 
were relevant to ordinary people and strong leaders, we found that it was a complicated 
task that often was rendered impossible by competing imperatives. Especially in the 
travails of William Hague, we saw the extreme difficulties that a Conservative leader had 
in persuading people he was down to earth, neither a political nerd nor an elitist. On the 
other side, there was David Cameron, who was relatively proficient with a string of 
different initiatives that claimed he was empathetic with ordinary people (even with his 
background) but found that they were used by his opponents to deride him as lacking 
substance and not being a strong leader. In terms of an overall leadership environment 
the media constructed a great deal of their political coverage around the leaders, viewing 
many events in the context of competition between them. What was noticeable was the 
emphasis they placed on the „Can you see him as Prime Minister‟ test, which worked to 
the especial detriment of Hague and Duncan Smith, and was unable to be overcome by 
policies alone. This changed the nature of opposition, from a passive one that relied on 
government errors, to an active one where the leader of the opposition had to prove he 
was suitable to be Prime Minister. 
In most areas of foreign policy the Conservative leader was able to do little to influence 
the situation while having to react to events, some of which caused them intense 
problems, such as the ratification of the EU constitution or the Iraq war, which had such 
ramifications on the Conservatives‟ relationships with other parties of the right. Often the 
leader was able to do little to counter Labour accusations that he would be a disaster 
negotiating with Britain‟s foreign partners. The substance of these allegations was so 
personally directed, and so low on empirical weight that they were impossible to counter 
in a comprehensive way, and responding to them would often cause problems within the 
party. With the growth of the state, Conservative leaders have faced a very obvious 
problem, having to tread carefully around the greater number of state workers created by 
Labour, for fear that they would turn against them in a general election. Again it was not 
something they directly controlled. Even the most pro small state leader, Hague, was 
forced to offer comprehensive guarantees to huge government departments that their 
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budgets would not be cut. Other Conservative leaders were forced to do the same. Even 
Cameron, with the budget deficit ballooning after the financial crisis, was forced to 
guarantee above inflation increases for the health service. This has in practice provided a 
substantial structural constraint on leaders of the Conservative leaders of the opposition, 
with their traditionally more sceptical attitude to public spending. 
In terms of the political environment that the leader of the opposition had to work within, 
it was one that was very difficult for him to control. With the increasing amount of 
powers the Prime Minister had, through the growth of the state and the 
internationalisation of politics, the leader of the opposition was often forced to have to 
react to government initiatives without any of the power and prominence that derived 
from the office of Prime Minister. This fed into a leadership environment where the 
leader of the opposition had to pass the „could you see him as Prime Minister‟ test, and 
show he was man of the people and a strong leader. The place of opposition leader was 
more prominent and pressurised in previous times, and he continually had to prove his 
suitability to be Prime Minister. This took the focus of opposition politics away from 
policy and towards personality, with a large number of different incentives applying to 
the leader of the opposition, not all of which were straightforward for him to take 
advantage of. 
7.2 Overall Conclusions 
As we have said, the two main objectives of this thesis were to come to conclusions 
about the balance of power between the leader of the opposition and the Conservative 
party, and the place of opposition in the British political environment. We must review 
the conclusions the thesis has come to in these areas while placing them into an overall 
context based on the existing literature. 
This thesis rested much of its analysis on structure not agency, and identifies some ways 
in which structural constraints are important. It rests on an assumption that structural 
considerations are important, as a counterpoint to the weight of existing literature that is 
centred around the interplay between agents. This differs to many of the works about the 
Conservatives in opposition since 1997 which concentrates on the results of the interplay 
of individual agents. The work that shares most similarities in its frame of analysis was 
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Timothy Heppell‟s Choosing the Tory Leader, which asserts that comparative studies are 
essential to understanding the dynamics of leadership politics. Denham and O‟Hara also 
conclude that the leader is central to the politics of the Conservatives and he has a core 
need of securing election by which he is judged. Tim Bale also asserts that the 
Conservative leader is all powerful, the only person who can “pronounce authoritively on 
what constitutes Conservatism in any particular period” with the Shadow Cabinet having 
little appreciative power over strategy. These are not contentions that this thesis would 
disagree with, but the longer time period in which this thesis brings it out, and its relation 
to the place of opposition is what makes for some differences. Such assertions are all 
about the balance of power within the party, but this thesis is also concerned with the 
place of opposition in British politics, and the set of expectations and constraints that 
have been generated upon the office of leader of the opposition. This concern with the 
wider place of opposition in British politics, and the set of expectations and constraints 
that have been generated upon the office of leader of the opposition, as well as the 
balance of power within the party, means that this thesis does not pivot around some of 
the issues which have defined many of the other works. 
The most notable of these pivots is the „Centre Ground‟ concept. This has dictated much 
of what has been written about the Conservatives in opposition since 1997. It is a feature 
of this thesis but not one that dictates the original reason for writing it, in comparison to 
studies like Bale‟s that take up a critical position of the Conservatives for not sticking to 
the Centre Ground. The thesis does not criticise the Conservatives for not sticking to the 
centre ground, but judges whether it was appropriate or possible for an opposition to 
engage in preference shaping over certain points. Over certain points it does not approve 
or disapprove of the different strategies leaders employed, or set them tests. It takes a 
more holistic approach in looking beyond rating individual agents, and placing them in 
the context of the structures they had to work within and the expectations placed upon 
them by the political environment. Consideration of the Prime Minister and his electoral 
effectiveness also does not guide the thesis to conclusions, like the often stated opinion 
that no leader could have won a general election against Blair. Even when wider 
questions about the place of opposition are covered, they are ultimately subservient to the 
question of the centre ground, as Bale puts it, the „why‟; of how the Conservatives failed 
to take position upon it for so long. The electoral theory does not drive the conclusions of 
the thesis. Also, because the thesis is about opposition and not government, it achieves 
some other distinguishing features. It is obviously different from the vast amount of 
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literature written about the government during this period. By studying opposition and 
not the government it provides us with an office where expectations were often little, are 
relatively new, and often seen as unimportant, to see if the status of being leader of the 
opposition has changed. In theory the office of leader of the opposition and its status 
should be affected even more dramatically by these changes than the office of the Prime 
Minister, and this is also a feature that is less considered by the existing literature on 
opposition.  
In terms of power within the party, we see that the leader of the opposition has gained 
power in the way the formal structure of the party has been arranged, but it has been 
using these powers to his advantage that have been so difficult. The party has been a 
constraint on the leader of the opposition, and the changing political environment has 
given the party new ways to constrain the leader, even if it has reduced the party‟s 
prominence relative to the leader. Although the leader enjoys much more prominence and 
responsliblity, as we have asserted, with this comes increased expectations that are hard 
to fulfil in opposition. The modern political environment has also brought less deference 
to the leader, and more opportunities for discontent to be expressed. A leader with a 
coherent strategy and who looks like being electorally successful can overcome this, 
however the „bar‟ is higher than it ever was, in practice giving the party more power. The 
place of opposition within British politics has also changed. It was traditionally a central 
part of the Westminster Model, being adversarial and parliamentary based. The 
parliamentary aspect of opposition has been overshadowed by an increased focus on 
leadership, and the rise to prominence of the leader of the opposition, under pressure at 
all times from the „can you see him as Prime Minister‟ test. This means opposition is 
much more centred on the leader‟s attributes, and attacking the Prime Minister‟s 
defiencies, while to a greater extent than ever before proving the Prime Minister is a 
„normal‟ person. The place of opposition was increasingly as a one-man band, not 
opposing the Government across all areas, but concentrating fire against the Prime 
Minister. Opposition is more leader centred, in a positive and negative sense, having to 
balance complicated imperatives in the portrayal of the leader, and is less parliamentary 
based. This is where the conceptions of leaderland are able to help us form some overall 
conclusions. We saw in the review of the political environment that there was one, and it 
was a firm part of the political environment that was a part of leaders‟ calculations, but 
also an expectation among the media. If leaders did not act in a presidential way, the 
media would quickly make an issue of it, and pressurise the leader to be more of a public 
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face of the party. The media frequently saw things in terms of the battle between leaders, 
and their differing personalities, and crucially introduced the „can you see him as Prime 
Minister‟ test to the leader of the opposition. This test being applied moved opposition 
politics beyond the post war political environment. The test of the opposition leader 
renders the old dictum that was confidently asserted by the old post war literature that it 
was governments that lost elections, and parties in opposition could do little to affect this, 
almost obsolete. Instead there is a test that is almost wholly centred on the leader of the 
opposition, and as seen most graphically in the case of Duncan Smith, could totally derail 
a leader who even would be thought by some to have the correct policies, and be a decent 
man. As we have seen, the skill for a leader at proving they were suitable for Downing 
Street rested on two almost incompatible aims - to prove they were reasonable people 
who understood modern life and that they were strong leaders who could get things done 
in a ruthless modern political environment. Again, there is no hiding place, one day a 
leader may have to prove that they are „in touch‟ with popular culture, on another they 
have to show they can get things done even when ranged against powerful vested 
interests. No matter that the two imperatives might seem somewhat absurd, they 
undoubtedly have existed since 1997, and affected the fortunes of Conservative leaders 
of the opposition. This environment, despite taking its cue from institutions and 
structures outside Parliament, is a significant structural constraint on the leader of the 
opposition, as it effectively precludes those who cannot master these imperatives from 
being successful. The Conservatives have had to compete in this arena of leadership, 
often with very bad results. Some of this may have been down to the presence of Tony 
Blair as Prime Minister, charismatic, a world leader, self-professedly bold, always ready 
to separate himself from his party and always anxious to be, or act to be a common man. 
In many ways he was the archetype of a presidential leader, and his plausibility as a 
leader, and ability to shrug off attacks on his honesty in 2005 hurt the Conservatives in 
the politics of leadership. But what reinforces the point is that the politics of leadership 
continued after Blair. Succeeding Blair, we had Gordon Brown, who professed not to 
care about image, was a passionate member of the Labour party, and lacked charisma in 
his public appearances. But Brown, who was seemingly ill-suited to the presidential 
environment, had to participate in the politics of leadership. Even though they were 
faltering, Brown made attempts to colonize both wings of the leadership tests. From his 
free outpourings of opinions on popular shows like the X- Factor, to his admonitions that 
he made the right economic calls, Brown played leadership politics and was (as Michael 
Foley asserts) judged by it as well. And in a reverse of the post-war political 
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environment, the dictum of the government losing elections was totally turned on its 
head. Like John Major after Britain‟s exit from the ERM, Brown was frequently written 
off as having no hope of winning the 2010 general election, mainly due to his poor 
leadership skills. In a reverse of previous procedure, Conservative party members 
frequently complained in the run up to the 2010 general election that they were being 
scrutinised excessively for splits and about their policies, like they were the government, 
while Labour was able to sail on with huge gaps in their future budget plans, while 
continually and loudly sniping at everything the Conservatives did, more like the 
opposition. This was widely put down to the polls which showed consistent big 
Conservative leads, which had a lot to do with Cameron‟s popularity, which dragged his 
party up in the polls, and Brown‟s perceived weakness at the politics of leadership, and 
his ability to conduct a general election campaign. Even through the turbulent times of 
the global economic crisis, where Brown scored excellent poll ratings for their handling 
of the banking meltdown, the Conservatives maintained huge poll leads, despite an 
unsure initial reaction to the crisis. As well as impacting upon the place of opposition, 
this also has impacted upon the position of the party in relation to the leader, and the way 
they are able to treat him. Paradoxically, because of the increased prominence of the 
leader of the opposition, and the different way that the media treats politics, even 
backbench MPs, have a lot more freedom to undermine the leader‟s claim to unity, and 
they can cause a lot of damage to a leader‟s prospects. This is real power, and the ability 
to show election winning potential seems to be one of the few things that can overwhelm 
it. The politics of leadership trumped the politics of policy detail and increased the 
salience of the „could you see him as Prime Minister‟ test. A more open environment 
among the electorate less tied to different parties through partisan loyalties accentuated 
this trend. 
As we have seen in all the substantive areas of the new political environment, our 
conceptual framework has at times struggled to explain the leaders who did not achieve 
electoral success, or the prospect of it. But what it has shown is that, through successful 
and unsuccessful leaders, the common threat is a constant imperative towards 
competition in the arena of political leadership, this can override all other aspects of 
politics, and places a huge amount of emphasis on the leader of the opposition. While the 
leader of the opposition does not control a large state apparatus like the US President, the 
institution of Prime Minister and the expectations of those who could assume it apply 
totally and directly toward leaders of the opposition. This has changed the nature of 
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opposition, and paradoxically given his party more power over the leader of the 
opposition, as they can easily upset these increased expectations. While the leader of the 
opposition is a more powerful and prominent individual, it places a huge number of 
different obstacles and expectations on them, which create a more demanding structural 
environment. 
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